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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Torey Michael Adamcik appeals from the judgments summarily dismissing two of 
his post-conviction relief claims, and denying his two remaining claims following an 
evidentiary hearing.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 The Idaho Supreme Court set forth the facts underlying Adamcik’s convictions for 
first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, as follows: 
On September 22, 2006, [Cassie Jo] Stoddart was spending the night at 
her cousin’s house, the Whispering Cliffs residence, performing house-
sitting duties.  Matt Beckham (Beckham), Stoddart’s boyfriend, stated that 
he and Stoddart had invited Adamcik to the Whispering Cliffs residence 
that evening to “hang out.”  Adamcik and [Brian] Draper arrived at the 
Whispering Cliffs residence at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 PM.  After 
spending approximately two hours at the Whispering Cliffs residence, 
Draper informed Stoddart and Beckham that he needed to leave and 
shortly thereafter Draper and Adamcik departed. 
  
Approximately fifteen minutes after Adamcik and Draper departed, the 
power at the Whispering Cliffs residence went out.  Beckham called his 
mother to ask for permission to stay the night, but such permission was 
denied.  After speaking with his mother, Beckham phoned Adamcik to 
inform him that Beckham would be going home for the night.  ...  Beckham 
and Adamcik spent the following day together. Beckham tried repeatedly 
to call Stoddart throughout the day but was unable to get an answer. 
  
On September 24, 2006, it was discovered that Stoddart had been killed 
at the Whispering Cliffs residence.  Police [O]fficer Hatch responded to the 
scene and noted large amounts of blood on the victim’s body, as well as 
deep lacerations and stab wounds. Shortly after responding, police and 
paramedics confirmed that Stoddart was dead.  Detectives conducting the 
preliminary investigation determined that Adamcik and Draper had been 
among the last people to see Stoddart alive. 
  
Detectives Thomas and Ganske went to the Adamcik home and 
interviewed Adamcik on September 24, 2006. Adamcik’s father ... was 
present.  ...  During the course of the first interview, Adamcik informed the 
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detectives that he and Draper had gone to the Whispering Cliffs residence 
at approximately 8:30 PM on September 22, 2006, for a party.  Adamcik 
stated that ... he and Draper decided to go and see a movie in Pocatello.  
When the detectives questioned Adamcik regarding the movie he had 
reportedly seen, Adamcik was unable to describe what the movie had 
been about. Adamcik told detectives that following the movie he and 
Draper had gone to spend the night at Adamcik’s home. 
  
On September 27, 2006, after Adamcik’s first interview, but before the 
second, Draper led law enforcement agents to a stash of evidence buried 
in the Black Rock Canyon area (BRC site).  The evidence uncovered by 
law enforcement at the BRC site included: 
 
1. Two dagger-style knives with sheaths. 
2. A silver-and-black-handled knife with a smooth and non-serrated 
blade. 
3. A folding knife with a silver blade and black handle, which is 
similar to a survival knife. The portion of the blade nearest to the hilt 
is serrated. 
4. A homemade Sony videotape (BRC tape). 
5. A box of stick matches. 
6. A melted brown bottle of hydrogen peroxide. 
7. Partially burned notebook paper. 
8. A partially melted multi-colored mask. 
9. A red and white mask. 
10. A pair of black boots. 
11. A single black glove. 
12. A pair of black “Puma” gloves. 
13. A pair of blue latex gloves. 
14. A pair of fingerless black “Athletic Works” gloves. 
15. A black “Calvin Klein” dress shirt. 
16. A black “Hagger” shirt. 
  
Adamcik conceded that his handwriting was present on the notebook 
paper found along with the other evidence at the BRC site.  The BRC tape 
contained footage of Adamcik and Draper planning Stoddart’s murder, and 
later reacting to having killed Stoddart.  ...  The following relevant portions 
of the BRC tape have been rearranged according to the time and date 
stamps that appear on the BRC tape.  
 
1. September 21, 2006, at 8:05:23 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, 
Adamcik is driving and Draper is filming from the passenger seat] 
 
Draper: We’re going for a high death count. 
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Adamcik: Plus, we’re not going to get caught Brian, if we’re going 
for guns, we’re just gonna end it.  We’re just gonna grab the guns 
and get outta there and kill everybody and leave. 
 
Draper: We’re going to make history ....  We’re gonna make 
history. 
 
Adamcik: For all you FBI agents watching this -- 
 
Draper: (laughing) 
 
Adamcik: Uh ... you weren’t quick enough. (laughing) 
 
Draper: You weren’t quick enough, and you weren’t s-s-smart 
enough. And we’re going over to [Jane Doe 1’s] house, we-we-
we’re going to snoop around over there and try to see if she’s home 
alone or not, and if she’s home alone, SPLAT! ... She dead. 
 …. 
2. September 21, 2006, at 8:08:12 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, 
Draper is filming Adamcik with the camera light on] 
 
Draper: We’re at [Jane Doe 1’s] house. It’s clear out there in the 
pasture.  We’ve already snooped around her house a couple times, 
Uh, and sh-sh-she’s not at home so we’re gonna go to that church 
over there and we’re gonna call a girl and a guy named Cassie and 
Matt.  They’re our-our friends but we have to make sacrifices.  So 
um I feel tonight i-i-it is the night and I feel really weird ... and stuff.  
I feel like I want to kill somebody. Uh, I know that’s not normal but 
what the hell. 
 
Adamcik: I feel we need to break away from normal life. 
  ...  
Draper: Natural selection, dude. Natural selection, that’s all I’ve 
gotta say. 
 
Adamcik: There should be no law against killing people. I know it’s 
a wrong thing, but ... 
 . . .  
3. September 21, 2006, at 8:15:39 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, 
Adamcik is driving and Draper is filming from the passenger seat] 
 ....  
Draper: Now we’re going to go over to Cassie and Matt’s house.  If 
they’re home alone, we’re gonna ...  
 
Adamcik: It’s Cassie’s house.  Matt is there. 
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Draper: Matt is there.  Sorry.  We’re gonna ga [sic] -- we’re gonna 
knock on the door.   We’ll see who is there.  We’ll, we’ll see, we’ll 
see -- see if their parents are home or not.  If they’re home alone 
we will leave our way and then we will come back in about ten 
minutes.  We’ll sneak in through the door because chances are 
they’re probably in Cassie’s room. S–s–s–so we will sneak in the 
front door, we’ll make a noise outside. 
 
Adamcik: And Matt will come out to investigate. 
 
Draper: We’ll kill him.  And we’ll scare the shit out of Cassie ... 
okay? 
 
Adamcik: Sounds like fun. 
 
Draper: Well stay tuned. 
 
4. September 21, 2006, at 8:36:46 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, 
Adamcik is driving and Draper is filming from the passenger seat] 
 
Draper: We found our victim and sad as it may be she’s our friend 
but you know what?  We all have to make sacrifices.  Our first 
victim is going to be Cassie Stoddart and her friends . . . 
 .... 
Draper: We’ll let you ... (laughs) we’ll find out if she has friends 
over, if she’s going to be alone in a big dark house out in the middle 
of nowhere (laughs).  How perfect can you get?  I, I mean like holy 
shit dude. 
 
Adamcik: I’m horny just thinking about it. 
 
Draper: Hell yeah.  So we’re gonna fuckin’ kill her and her friends 
and we’re gonna keep moving on.  I heard some news about [Jane 
Doe 2], she’s gonna be home alone from six to seven so we might 
kill her and drive over to Cassie’s thing and scare the shit out of 
them and kill them one by fucking one.  Hell yeah. 
 
Adamcik: Why one by one?  Why can’t it be a slaughterhouse? 
 
Draper: Two by two and three by three.  Cause we’ve got to keep it 
classy. 
 
Adamcik: Keep it classy. 
 
Draper: So yeah. It’s going to be extra fun. 
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Adamcik: You’re evil (laughs). 
 
Draper: Yes, I am.  So are you dude.  Evil.  Evil. 
 ....  
Adamcik: We are bad. 
 
Draper: That sounds so shitty. 
 
Adamcik: We’re evil. That sounds even shittier. 
 
Draper: Hey, we’re not, okay.  Then we are sick psychopaths who 
get their pleasure off killing other people. 
 
Adamcik: That sounds good baby. 
 
Draper: We’re gonna go down in history.  We’re gonna be just like 
Scream except real life terms. 
 
Adamcik: That sounds good baby. 
 
Draper: We’re gonna be murderers.  Like, let’s see, Ted Bundy, 
like the Hillside Strangler. 
 
Adamcik: No. 
 
Draper: The Zodiac Killer. 
 
Adamcik: Those people were more amateurs compared to what 
we are going to be, we’re gonna be more of higher sources of Ed gl 
[sic] … 
 
Draper: Gein 
 
Adamcik: Gein. 
 
Draper: (laughs) Well let’s say we’re that sick and that twisted -- 
 
Adamcik: Oh, you know what Ed Gein’s words were? 
 
Draper: What? 
 
Adamcik: He saw a girl walking’ down the street, right? 
 
Draper: Yeah. 
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Adamcik: Two questions came to his head.  Hmm, I could take her 
out and have a nice time with her -- 
 
Draper: -- and then kill her? Skin her alive? 
 
Adamcik: -- charm the pants off her.  Or, I wonder what her head 
would look like on a stick? (laughs) 
 (laughs) 
 
Draper: Holy shit! 
 
Adamcik: It’s creepy huh? 
 …. 
Draper: Murder is power, murder is freedom, goodbye. 
 …. 
5. September 22, 2006, at 12:10:58 PM [Adamcik and Draper are sitting at 
a table with the camera facing them] 
 
Draper: Alright, cool. 
 
Adamcik: [looking down and writing in a notebook] I was planning 
to kill him.  
 
Draper: September 22, 2006, we’re skipping our fourth hour class.  
We’re writing our plan right now for tonight.  It’s gonna be cool. 
 
Adamcik: We?  Torey and Brian ... [writing] ... we’re making our 
death list right now, for when, for actually tonight ...  
 …  
Draper: Yeah, if you’re watching this we’re probably deceased …   
 
Draper: Hopefully this will go smoothly and we can get our first kill done 
and then keep going. 
 
Adamcik: For you future serial killers watching this tape 
 
Adamcik & Draper: (laughing) 
 
Adamcik: I don’t know what to say. 
 
Draper: It -- It’s -- 
 
Adamcik: -- good luck with that. 
 
Draper: Good luck. 
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Adamcik: Hopefully you don’t have like 8 or 9 failures like we have. 
 
Draper: Yeah, we’ve probably tried maybe 10 times, but they’ve 
never been home alone so – 
 
Adamcik: Or when they have, their parents show up. 
 
Draper: As long as you’re patient you know, and we were patient 
and now we’re getting paid off, cuz our victim’s home alone, so we 
got er, our plan all worked out now ....  I’m sorry.  I’m sorry Cassie’s 
family, but she had to be the one.  We have to stick with the plan ... 
and she’s perfect, so she’s gonna die (laughs) … 
 
6. September 22, 2006, at 9:53:20 PM [It is dark and Draper and Adamcik 
are sitting in a car.] 
 
Draper: We’re here in his car. The time is 9:50, September 22nd, 
2006. Um ... unfortunately we have the grueling task of killing our 
two friends and they are right in -- in that house just down the 
street. 
 
Adamcik: We just talked to them.  We were there for an hour, but 
.... 
Draper: We checked out the whole house.  We know there’s lots of 
doors.  There, there’s lots of places to hide.  Um, I unlocked the 
back doors. It’s all unlocked.  Now we just got to wait and um ... 
yep, we’re, we’re really nervous right now but, you know, we’re 
ready. 
 
Adamcik: We’re listening to the greatest rock band ever. 
 
Draper: We’ve waited for this for a long time. 
 
Adamcik: Pink Floyd. Before we commit the ultimate crime of 
murder. 
 
Draper: We’ve waited for this for a long time. 
 
Adamcik: A long time. 
 
Draper: We -- well stay tuned. 
 
7. September 22, 2006, at 11:31:56 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car 
driving.] 
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Draper: -- just killed Cassie! We just left her house.[1]  This is not a 
fucking joke. 
 
Adamcik: I’m shaking. 
 
Draper: I stabbed her in the throat, and I saw her lifeless body. 
It just disappeared. Dude, I just killed Cassie! 
 
Adamcik: Oh my God! 
 
Draper: Oh, oh fuck.  That felt like it wasn’t even real.  I mean it 
went by so fast. 
 
Adamcik: Shut the fuck up.  We gotta get our act straight. 
 
Draper:  It’s okay.  Okay?  We -- we’ll just buy movie tickets now. 
 
Adamcik: Okay 
 
Draper: (Unintelligible) 
 
Adamcik: No. 
 
Draper: Okay. Bye. 
 
On September 27, 2006, after the BRC site evidence was found, 
detectives Ganske and Thomas conducted a second interview with 
Adamcik at the Pocatello Police Department in the presence of Adamcik’s 
parents.  Detective Ganske read Adamcik his Miranda rights at the 
beginning of the interview and Adamcik signed a waiver-of-rights form.  
During the course of the interview, Adamcik informed detectives Ganske 
and Thomas that he and Draper had arrived at the Whispering Cliffs 
residence at 8:00 or 8:30, got a tour of the home, watched a portion of the 
film Kill Bill Vol. 2, departed from the Whispering Cliffs residence at 
approximately 10:00 PM, and began attempting to break into cars.  
Adamcik stated that during the course of their attempted burglaries he 
made multiple calls to Beckham and during the final call Beckham 
                                                          
1  After a sheriff’s office transcriber prepared a transcript of the videotape, Detective 
Hamilton listened to the video with “really good headphones” and enhanced sound, and 
made a corrected version of the transcript (St. Ex. 89) which was admitted into 
evidence.  (Tr., vol. II, p.1910, L.16 - p.1911, L.6; p.1913, L.6 - p.1915, L.7; p.1927, L.15 
- p.1929, L.18.)  Detective Hamilton testified at trial that, using the enhanced measures 
and after listening to the videotape in court, Draper said “We just killed Cassie!”  (Tr., 
vol. II, p.1930, L.3 – p.1932, L.2.)  Adamcik’s trial team entered its own transcription of 
the videotape into evidence, which read “... just killed Cassie.”  (Def. Ex. VV, p.5, L.13.)  
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informed Adamcik that his mother was coming to get him from the 
Whispering Cliffs residence. 
  
Adamcik stated that he and Draper returned to Adamcik’s house at around 
11:30 PM and did not leave for the remainder of the night.  However, 
when Ganske informed Adamcik that witnesses had seen him at the 
convenience store, Common Cents, Adamcik stated that he and Draper 
had gone to the store so that Draper could buy matches for Draper’s 
cigarettes.  Adamcik eventually admitted that he and Draper had gone to 
Black Rock Canyon.  At the close of Adamcik’s second interview, the 
detectives informed Adamcik of the evidence that they had discovered at 
the BRC site and pressured Adamcik to tell the truth.  Adamcik responded 
by asking “Can I talk to an attorney?”  The detectives stopped questioning 
Adamcik immediately, and exited the room, allowing Adamcik and his 
father, Sean, to converse in private in a different room.  Following this 
private meeting, Adamcik, Sean and the detectives reconvened in the 
interview room where detectives proceeded to tell Adamcik that he was 
going to be arrested and informed Adamcik of the evidence they had 
gathered.[2] [3]  In response to intervening questions from Sean, Adamcik 
made both verbal and nonverbal replies.  
  
At trial, the jury heard extensive forensic testimony documenting and 
analyzing Stoddart’s wounds.  The medical examiner, Dr. Steve Skoumal, 
performed the autopsy on Stoddart on September 25, 2006. Dr. Skoumal 
determined that the cause of Stoddart’s death was stab wounds to the 
trunk.  In all, Dr. Skoumal documented thirty knife-related wounds on 
Stoddart’s body, twelve of which were potentially fatal.  The State also had 
forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Garrison examine Stoddart’s body.  Dr. 
Garrison testified “It’s my opinion that there were at least two knives used, 
one of which was a non-serrated blade, and one of which was a serrated 
blade.”  In general, the majority of the potentially fatal wounds that Dr. 
                                                          
2  On June 21, 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court granted the state’s motion to take judicial 
notice of the Clerk’s Record, Reporter’s Transcripts, and Exhibits in State v. Torey 
Adamcik, Supreme Court Docket No. 34639-2007.  Due to volume, all citations to those 
documents will remain as originally presented in that appeal; all citations to the district 
court post-conviction record (etc.) will be preceded by “PC.”   
  
3  A search warrant executed on Brian Draper’s home on September 26, 2006, led to 
the discovery of a knife sheath under Draper’s bed, which was consistent with the 
shape and length of the “Sloan” knife (St. Ex. 70).  (Tr., vol. III, p.2764, L.24 - p.2771, 
L.2.)  A search warrant executed on the Adamcik residence on September 27, 2006, 
resulted in the seizure of three shovels (St. Exs. 87, 88) and a notebook with a page 
listing: (1) supplies (watches, communication devices, pliers), (2) clothing (cargo pants, 
gloves, utility belt), (3) mask, (4) weapons (daggers, survival knife, pocket knife), and (5) 
the names of six “victims” (St. Ex. 84). 
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Skoumal listed were inflicted with the serrated blade, however, wound 
number 1, which struck the right ventricle of Stoddart’s heart, was inflicted 
by a non-serrated blade -- consistent with Dr. Garrison’s testimony -- and 
was potentially fatal. 
  
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 453-459, 272 P.3d 417, 425-431 (2012) (footnotes 
omitted).   
 On June 8, 2007, a jury convicted Adamcik for the first-degree murder of Cassie 
Jo Stoddart and for conspiring with Draper to commit first-degree murder, and Adamcik 
was sentenced to fixed life for first-degree murder and indeterminate life with thirty 
years fixed for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.  Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 453-
454, 272 P.3d at 425-426.  Adamcik filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his 
sentences, which was denied.  (PC R., p.641.)  The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
Adamcik’s convictions and sentences.  Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417.  
Adamcik filed a petition for rehearing with the Idaho Supreme Court, which was denied.  
(PC R., p.641.)  Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court, which was denied.  (Id.; State v. Adamcik, 133 S.Ct. 141 (2012).)   
 On September 27, 2013, Adamcik, through counsel, filed a petition for post-
conviction relief, presenting seven claims.  (PC R., pp.12-67.)  Those claims were:  
(1) The state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 88 (1963) (PC R., pp.16-25); 
 
(2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to “get important 
expert testimony before the jury in part because they failed to 
obtain the murder weapons for testing by the defense expert” (PC 
R., pp.25-30 (capitalization modified)); 
 
(3) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to suppress 
or exclude evidence of (a) a notebook found in Adamcik’s bedroom, 
and (b) “kiddie porn” found on the Adamcik’s computer, and for 
making an illogical trial decision when the state threatened to 
introduce such evidence (PC R., pp.31-44); 
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(4)  Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to exclude 
Adamcik’s invocation of the right to counsel from videotape of 
police interview (PC R., pp.45-46); 
 
(5) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to the cumulative effect of 
prejudice caused by counsel’s various instances of deficient 
performance (PC R., p.46);    
 
(6) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to communicate a 
favorable plea offer to Adamcik (PC R., pp.46-48); and  
 
(7) Violation of state and federal constitutional provisions against cruel 
and unusual punishment under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 
(2012) (PC R., pp.48-66).  
 
 After the state filed an Answer (PC R., pp.152-169), Adamcik filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Disposition on all but Claims 1 and 6 (PC R., pp.205-256), and the 
state filed a motion for summary dismissal with a supporting brief (PC R., pp.257-281).  
Adamcik filed a response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal, with a 
memorandum supported by the affidavits of the two prosecutors who initially tried 
Adamcik, Sean Adamcik (father), Shannon Adamcik (mother), and Barbara Adamcik 
(grandmother).  (PC R., pp.288-344.) 
 After a hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal and partial summary 
disposition (PC Tr. 10/17/14), the district court entered a memorandum decision and 
order, making the following rulings:  Claim 1 – summarily dismissed (PC R., p.407); 
Claim 2 – both motions denied (id.); Claim 3(a) (notebook) – summarily dismissed (PC 
R., pp.407-408); Claim 3(b) (“kiddie porn” on computer) – both motions denied on 
the “deficient performance” prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), but 
summarily dismissed on the prejudice prong; the court later ruled that evidence on the 
claim could be presented at the evidentiary hearing in regard to Claim 5 (cumulative 
prejudice) (PC R., pp.408, 468); Claim 4 – summarily dismissed on the prejudice prong 
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of Strickland (PC R., pp.402-403);4 Claim 5 – both motions denied (PC R., p.408); 
Claim 6 – state’s motion denied (PC R., p.408) (Adamcik’s motion did not pertain to 
Claim 6; see PC R., p.205); Claim 7 – to be decided in a separate order.  (PC R., 
pp.407-408.)  Adamcik filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order on the 
parties’ motions for summary dismissal/disposition, with a supporting brief (PC R., 
pp.438-447), which was denied (PC R., pp.461-473).   
 On February 24, 2015, the district court entered an order granting the state’s 
motion for summary dismissal of Adamcik’s seventh claim, based on Miller.  (PC R., 
pp.410-426.)  Adamcik filed a “Second Motion for Reconsideration” in regard to the 
summary dismissal of Claim 7 (PC R., pp.613-618), which, after the submission of 
briefs, supplemental authorities, and oral argument, was denied.  (PC R., pp.692-702.)   
 Following a two-day evidentiary hearing in July 2015 at which 21 witnesses 
testified (PC R., pp.499-502), and after receiving written closing arguments from 
counsel (PC R., pp.505-609), the court entered “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Memorandum Decision and Order on Post-Conviction Relief,” denying Adamcik’s 
post-conviction “claims as related to Cause of Action Two, Cause of Action Five and 
Cause of Action Six.”  (PC R., pp.640-675.)  On July 19, 2016, the court entered a 
“Judgement of Dismissal,” stating that “each of Petitioner’s Seven Causes of Action are 
Dismissed.”  (PC R., pp.704-705.)  Adamcik filed a timely notice of appeal.  (PC R., 
pp.706-710.)   
                                                          
4  In the “Conclusion” section of its decision on the parties’ motions, the district court 
said “the State’s Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik’s Fourth Cause 
of Action is DENIED[.]”  (PC R., p.408 (emphasis original).)  However the court clearly 
ruled to the contrary in the body of its decision.  (PC R., pp.402-403 (“As such the Court 
will DISMISS Adamcik’s Fourth Cause of Action and GRANT the State’s Motion for 
Summary Dismissal . . . .”).)  
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ISSUES 
Adamcik states the issues on appeal as: 
 
A.  Did the district court err in denying the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim that the defense team’s performance was deficient 
because it failed to move to suppress the evidence found on a 
computer seized without the authority of a warrant? 
 
B.  Did the district court err in finding Torey was not prejudiced by the 
deficient performance of the defense team which failed to get 
important expert testimony before the jury? 
 
C. Did the district court err in finding that Torey was not prejudiced by 
the cumulative effect of the defense team’s deficient performance? 
 
D. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the Eighth 
Amendment claim?     
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1.  Has Adamcik failed to show error in the district court’s rulings that he failed to show 
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance as alleged in Claims 2, 3, and 5? 
 
2.  Has Adamcik failed to show error in the district court’s denial of Claim 7 which 
alleged, that under Miller and Montgomery, his fixed life sentence was cruel and 
unusual punishment? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court’s Rulings That He 
Failed To Show His Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance As 
Alleged In Claims 2, 3, And 5 
 
A. Introduction 
 Adamcik argues that the district court erred in denying relief on his claims that his 
trial counsel team (“trial team”) was ineffective for failing to: (1) move to suppress 
evidence of “kiddie porn” found on a computer seized from the Adamcik residence 
pursuant to a search warrant, which, in turn, caused counsel to not present character 
evidence about Adamcik and Draper (Claim 3(b)), and (2) present expert testing of the 
serrated Rambo knife (St. Ex. 74) and the smooth-edged Sloan knife (St. Ex. 70), to 
show that the Rambo knife caused wound number 1 (Claim 2).  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.3-
25.)  Additionally, Adamcik contends “the district court erred in finding that [he] was not 
prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the defense team’s deficient performance” (Claim 
5).  (Appellant’s Brief, p.25 (capitalization modified).) 
 Adamcik’s arguments fail.  Application of the law to the facts supports the district 
court’s determinations that Adamcik failed to carry his burden of proof with respect to 
either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, and that any prejudice – cumulative or individual – was insufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome of Adamcik’s jury trial.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
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….”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
 When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they 
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district 
court from those facts.  Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 
(1998).  The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and 
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province 
of the district court.  Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 
2003).  A trial court’s decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of 
proof is entitled to great weight.  Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 
C. Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction 
petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 
129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  With respect to the deficient performance prong, 
the United States Supreme Court has articulated the defendant’s burden under 
Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction 
must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.  A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance 
must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.  The challenger’s 
burden is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
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not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).  “This 
Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial 
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation.”  Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. 
App. 2015) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 
1994)). 
To establish prejudice, a post-conviction petitioner must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 104.  “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. (citations and 
quotations omitted).   
 
D. Adamcik Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing That The District Court 
Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim 3(b) – That His Trial Team Was Ineffective 
For Failing To Move To Suppress Evidence Of “Kiddie Porn” Found On The 
Computer5   
 
 1. Introduction 
 Adamcik argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing Claim 3(b), 
which alleged his trial team was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence 
described as “kiddie porn” found on a computer seized from the Adamcik residence 
                                                          
5  The district court explained that, “more concerning from Adamcik’s . . . perspective, 
would be the images focusing on Adamcik’s fixation with violence and slasher/horror 
movies.”  (Addendum B; PC R., p.653 n.7.)  All references to “kiddie porn” in this brief 
will also implicitly refer to the other images noted by the district court. 
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pursuant to a search warrant.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.3-16.)  His claim is based on the 
fact that, although the search warrant affidavit of probable cause listed computers as 
one of the items sought, the “command” portion of the search warrant did not authorize 
the seizure of computers.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.3-16.)  Based on that anomaly, 
Adamcik contends he meets the three criteria required to show his trial team was 
ineffective for failing to move for suppression: (1) a motion to suppress would have been 
granted, (2) the failure to move to suppress was not outside the boundaries of 
reasonable trial strategy, and (3) he was prejudiced by his trial team’s deficient 
performance.6  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7 (citing Wurdemann v. State, --- Idaho ---, --- 
P.2d --- (February 28, 2017).)  Adamcik’s claim fails.   
  
 2. Factual Background  
 The district court made the following findings of fact germane to Adamcik’s claim: 
24. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition’s Third Cause of Action that it 
was his Defense Team’s intention to “call several character witnesses 
during the trial.[”]  P.C.R. Petition, p.23, ¶ 87.  Adamcik’s P.C.R. Petition 
asserts further that it was also his Defense Team’s intent “to call 
witnesses to testify about Brian Draper’s prior bad acts.” ld., p. 24, ¶ 93. 
Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition that “counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced Torey because he was deprived of the character 
evidence which formed a large basis of the defense.” Id., p.32. 
 
                                                          
6  As noted, this claim was summarily dismissed on the prejudice prong of Strickland 
(PC R., p.393), but, in denying Adamcik’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, the 
court ruled that evidence on the claim could be presented at the evidentiary hearing in 
regard to Claim 5, cumulative prejudice (PC R., p.468).  In its memorandum decision 
and order following the evidentiary hearing, the court first determined, as a prerequisite 
to considering whether counsels’ conduct added any prejudice under Claim 5, that 
Adamcik’s trial team was not deficient for not filing a suppression motion because such 
motion would not have been successful.  (PC R., p.669.)  Having made that 
determination, the court “nonetheless” discussed “this claimed failure (for appeal 
purposes) in considering Adamcik’s prejudice claim based upon the cumulative nature 
of Adamcik’s Defense Team’s conduct.”  (PC R., p.670.)       
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25. On September 27, 2006, Detective Tom Sellers of the Idaho State 
Police submitted an Affidavit of Probable Cause in support of a search 
warrant. See Exhibit “C”.  This Affidavit of Probable Cause sought a 
warrant to search the residence located at 1598 Pointview Drive in 
Pocatello, Idaho.  The Court understands this to have been the residence 
of Adamcik and his family.  It also sought a warrant to search a red 1994 
Geo Prism.  
26. The Affidavit of Probable Cause outlined a lengthy “Statement of Facts 
in Support of Probable Cause”.  It then makes a specific request 
concerning the items law enforcement wishes to “search for and seize as 
evidence”.  These requested items were “bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers, 
and other trace evidence as well as clothing, knives, scripts, journals, 
video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computer, computer 
programs, cellular telephone and cellular telephone account information, 
fingerprints.”  See Exhibit “C”.  This Affidavit of Probable Cause was 
“subscribed and sworn” to before the Honorable Gaylen L. Box on 
September 27, 2006. 
27. On September 27, 2006, Judge Box signed a Search Warrant 
authorizing a search of the property and vehicle outlined in the Affidavit of 
Probable Cause.  It also authorized law enforcement to “search for and 
seize all evidence including but not limited to bodily fluids, stains, hair 
fibers and other trace evidence as well as fingerprints.”  See Exhibit “B”. 
28. It is perplexing to this Court that the warrant itself does not authorize 
the search for or seizure of a computer, even though the Affidavit of 
Probable Cause request includes computers.  In fact, the Search Warrant 
does not address or include “clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video 
cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computers, computer programs, 
cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information.” 
29. The Honorable Gaylen L. Box testified at Adamcik’s post-conviction 
relief evidentiary hearing.  When Judge Box was asked why computers 
were not specifically listed on the Search Warrant, he responded as 
follows: 
I issued the warrant as it was presented to me. I recall no 
specific discussion concerning the computer. 
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 2-3. 
30. On cross-examination, Judge Box testified, that following his review of 
the Probable Cause Affidavit, he made no effort to cross-out or delete 
anything from the Search Warrant itself.  Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p.136, LL. 
22-25, p.137, LL.1-2.  However, he did require that the Affidavit of 
Probable Cause be modified to “provide some basis for the issuance of a 
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nighttime search warrant.”  See Exhibit “C”, ¶ 11 and Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., 
p.136, LL.2-5. 
31. Finally, Judge Box testified that when he signs a search warrant he 
intends to give permission to search for the items identified on the warrant 
and does not intend to grant permission to search for items not listed on 
the search warrant.  Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p.139, LL.16-23. 
32. Pursuant to the Search Warrant issued by Judge Box on September 
27, 2006, law enforcement conducted a search of the Adamcik residence. 
Incident to that search, law enforcement seized as evidence a “computer 
tower.” See Exhibit “D”.  A review of Exhibit “D” reflects that twenty-five 
(25) separate items were seized incident to the search of the Adamcik 
residence and not one of the seized items were “bodily fluids, stains, hair 
fibers, other trace evidence or fingerprints.”  In fact, each one of the seized 
items exceeded the scope of the enumerated items in the Search Warrant. 
33. During the course of Adamcik’s jury trial, the State notified the 
Defense Team that it had obtained a computer that had been seized as 
evidence incident to the September 27, 2006 Search Warrant.  The State 
notified the Defense Team that if it attempted to introduce character 
evidence, the State would attempt to introduce evidence obtained from the 
computer. The computer in question contained what has been 
characterized by Adamcik throughout these post-conviction relief 
proceedings as “kiddie porn.”  A CD containing the photographs that have 
been described as “kiddie porn” was introduced into evidence at the post-
conviction relief evidentiary hearing.  While the images and photographs 
are distasteful and do show some nude images, this Court would not 
characterize the same as “kiddie porn.”  However, the Court can certainly 
understand the Defense Team’s desire not to have those images and 
photographs introduced into evidence and shown to the jury.  
34. As a result, the Defense Team made a strategic decision not to put on 
the character evidence that it had originally planned to introduce at trial. 
Neither did the Adamcik Defense Team attempt to prohibit the threatened 
introduction of this evidence by way of a motion in limine or motion to 
suppress. 
35. The Court heard character testimony evidence from numerous friends, 
acquaintances and family members touching upon their impression of 
Adamcik and various positive and upstanding character traits and qualities 
which they attribute to him. 
36. Adamcik himself testified at the post-conviction relief evidentiary 
hearing addressing issues concerning his Defense Team, trial strategy, 
and offers or the lack thereof.  Finally, he testified in detail concerning his 
version of the crime and facts and circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the crime. 
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(PC R., pp.651-654 (footnotes omitted).) 
 
 3. Deficient Performance 
 
 The district court ruled (although in regard to Claim 5 regarding cumulative 
prejudice (see n.6, supra)) that Adamcik failed to meet his burden of showing his trial 
team was deficient for not filing a suppression motion to exclude the “kiddie porn” found 
on the computer, and, presumably, anything else from the computer that cast a bad light 
on his character (PC R., pp.669-670).  The court held that a motion to suppress 
evidence from the computer would not have succeeded because the omission of the 
words “clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, 
computer, computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular account information” as 
requested in the Probable Cause Affidavit was “due exclusively to a scrivener’s error.”  
(PC R., pp.666, 668-669.) 
 The state relies upon and incorporates into this response, as if fully set forth 
herein, that part of the district court’s analysis and decision in its post-evidentiary 
hearing order (Addendum B; specifically p.665 ¶28 – p.669 ¶43)7 finding Adamcik’s trial 
team was not deficient for not filing a motion to suppress evidence from the computer.  
In addition to the district court’s well-reasoned analysis, the state makes the following 
arguments. 
 The face of the search warrant shows an obvious scrivener’s error.  The Affidavit 
of Probable Cause lists the items to be searched for and seized, “including but not 
limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as clothing, 
                                                          
7  References to page numbers to Addendums A through D will be to the page numbers 
assigned by the Clerk’s Record.     
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knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computer, 
computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information, 
fingerprints and any indicia whatsoever of this crime.”  (PC Plaintiff’s Ex. C, p.15 
(emphasis added).)  The “command” portion of the Search Warrant, the last of three full 
paragraphs of the warrant, did not include the above italicized items.  (PC Plaintiff’s Ex. 
B.)  The district court concluded that the failure to transpose the full list of items to be 
searched from the Affidavit of Probable Cause to the “command” section of the Search 
Warrant was an obvious scrivener’s error.  (PC R., pp.666, 668-669.)  
 Adamcik contends that “nothing in the text of the search warrant would lead the 
police officer to conclude that the seizure of computers was implied . . . .”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.9.)  However, the opening paragraph of the Search Warrant states: 
SEARCH WARRANT 
  THE STATE OF IDAHO to any peace officer of the State of Idaho: 
 Detective Tom Sellers, having this day by affidavit and sworn 
testimony shown that there is probable cause to believe that said affidavit 
is true, that certain property consisting of evidence, including but not 
limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well 
as clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage 
bags, computer, computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular 
telephone account information, fingerprints and any indicia whatsoever of 
this crime.  
  
(PC Plaintiff’s Ex. B (emphases added).)   
 The Search Warrant was signed and dated at the bottom by the magistrate 
judge.  (Id.)  In doing so, the magistrate made a finding of probable cause, based on the 
truth of Detective Sellers’ affidavit, to search for all the items listed in the opening 
paragraph as evidence of the crime, including “computer” and “computer programs.” 
(PC Plaintiff’s Ex. B.)  Because the magistrate made a finding in the first paragraph of 
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the Search Warrant that there was probable cause to search for and seize the computer 
and computer programs, the failure to accurately transpose the list of those items from 
the first to the third paragraph of the Search Warrant was an obvious clerical or 
scrivener’s error – one readily observed on the face of the warrant.8   
 Because a “probable cause” finding is germane to the issuance of a search 
warrant, no other purpose would have prompted the magistrate court to make such a 
finding.  The district court correctly concluded that, despite the scrivener’s error, the 
search warrant was plainly intended to command law enforcement officers to search for 
and seize the computer (etc.); therefore, a motion to suppress the evidence found on 
the computer would not have been granted, and Adamcik’s trial team could not have 
been deficient for failing to file such a motion.   
 
 4. Prejudice  
 Adamcik asserts that had the evidence of “kiddie porn” from the computer not 
been available for the state to use at trial, the state could not have threatened to present 
it in the event “the defense put on its planned character witnesses” (Appellant’s Brief, 
                                                          
8  See United States v. Premises and Real Property with Bldgs., . . . , 949 F.Supp. 166, 
170-171 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), which explained: 
 
An officer armed with the search warrant at issue in this case could, with 
reasonable effort, ascertain that the attic was a place intended to be 
searched.  The recitation of probable cause on the first page of the 
warrant specifically states that marijuana and marijuana-growing 
equipment are believed to be in the attic of the subject premises.  …  The 
search warrant specifically states that “the attic of 500 Delaware Street ... 
is used to cultivate marihuana in felony quantities.”  …  Although the 
command clause of the warrant fails to include the attic, the description of 
the items to be seized includes marijuana plants and paraphernalia to 
package, administer, or grow marijuana.  … An officer armed with the 
warrant in this case needed only to read the warrant in its entirety to 
determine that the attic was a place intended to be searched.  
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p.4) – thwarting the trial team’s plan to introduce character evidence that would have 
shown Adamcik incapable of committing the crimes charged (id., pp.3-16).9   
 The state relies upon and incorporates into this response, as if fully set forth 
herein, that part of the district court’s analysis and determination in its summary 
dismissal memorandum decision and order which found that any failure by Adamcik’s 
trial team to seek suppression of the evidence from the computer did not prejudice 
Adamcik under Strickland (Addendum A; specifically pp.390-393).  The state also relies 
upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation of facts, as set forth at pages 1 through 9, 
supra, to show that Adamcik has failed to meet his burden of showing a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsels’ deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different, and that confidence in the outcome has been undermined.  
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104.  Additionally, several of Adamcik’s arguments warrant further 
comment.   
 The ten people Adamcik claims should have been called to testify at trial about 
his good character, and Adamcik himself, would have been impeached, either directly or 
indirectly, with the many comments by Adamcik that were recorded on the Black Rock 
Canyon videotape, which showed a side of his character that was anything but “good.”  
As one of many examples from that recording, after Draper announced that their first 
                                                          
9  Adamcik alleged in his post-conviction petition that the prosecutor’s threat caused his 
trial team to not call three witnesses to testify about Draper’s bad character.  (PC R., 
pp.34-35.)  The factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the 
form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.  Drapeau v. State, 
103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 
978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).  Because there appear to be no affidavits, 
depositions, testimony, or any explanation of what the three witnesses would say 
through admissible evidence regarding Draper’s bad character, and because Adamcik 
does not explain on appeal what they would have said at trial, they need not be 
addressed further.   
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victim was going to be Cassie Stoddart, Draper fantasized out loud that Cassie was 
“going to be alone in a big dark house out in the middle of nowhere,” and said, “How 
perfect can you get?  I, I mean like holy shit dude.”  Adamcik responded, “I’m horny just 
thinking about it.”  Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 456, 272 P.3d at 428.  Adamcik’s contention 
that he would have been acquitted if his character witnesses would have shown he was 
not like Draper, is not realistic.    
 Next, Adamcik argues parenthetically that “the [evidentiary hearing] testimony of 
Rudolf Reit, had it been presented at the trial, would have corroborated Dr. Leis’s 
testimony that only one knife was used.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.15 (explanation added).)  
Testimony by Reit about his testing of the two knives was relevant at the evidentiary 
hearing only to Claim 2, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain the murder 
weapons for testing by the defense expert, and Claim 5, cumulative prejudice.  (PC R., 
pp.25-30, 407 (denial of summary motions), 658-664, 671-672.)  Any consideration of 
Reit’s evidentiary hearing testimony in regard to proving prejudice under Claim 3(b) is 
improper and irrelevant.  Moreover, the district court only allowed evidentiary hearing 
testimony about prejudice under Claim 3(b) to be presented in regard to cumulative 
prejudice as alleged in Claim 5.  (PC R., pp.469, 670-671.) 
 Adamcik also argues that he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial team to 
move to suppress the “kiddie porn” found on the computer (precluding testimony by his 
character witnesses) because his evidentiary hearing “testimony that Brian killed Cassie 
with the serrated Rambo knife would have been corroborated by Dr. Leis’ [trial] 
testimony that only the Rambo knife was used.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.15.)  Alternatively, 
Adamcik contends, “even if the jury believed Dr. Garrison’s [trial] testimony that there 
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were two knives used, Torey’s [evidentiary hearing] testimony that he dropped the 
Sloan [non-serrated] knife, and ran out of the house ahead of Brian, who did not arrive 
at the car for another couple of minutes, would have caused the jury to conclude that 
Brian used both knives, inflicting additional wounds with the Sloan knife after Torey left.”  
(Id.)  Regardless of the propriety of considering Adamcik’s own self-serving evidentiary 
hearing testimony in regard to whether he has shown prejudice under Claim 3(b), his 
testimony does nothing to show that, had he testified accordingly at trial, the result 
would have been different.   
 As to the number of knives used to inflict the twelve “potentially fatal wounds” into 
Cassie’s body (out of a total of thirty knife wounds), and focusing on wound #1, the state 
addresses that issue in section E, infra, and relies on that argument to show that the 
Idaho Supreme Court correctly determined there was sufficient evidence “for a jury to 
reasonably conclude that (1) two knives were used to murder Stoddart; (2) both knives 
inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife with the serrated blade 
which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the other [non-serrated] knife 
was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured Stoddart’s vital 
structures and which had the potential to be fatal.”  Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 461-462, 272 
P.3d at 433-434.   Adamcik testified at the evidentiary hearing, and presents on 
appeal as an alternative theory, the following version of events:  Draper must have used 
both knives to stab Cassie after Adamcik ran from the murder scene to his car and 
waited for Draper; Adamcik “might” have dropped the (non-serrated) Sloan knife while 
kneeling down beside Cassie while she lay “snoring” on the living room floor, as he held 
a key-ring light to see what was going on.  (PC Tr., p.346, L.11 – p.348, L.3; p.361, L.23 
26 
 
– p.362, L.13.)  Adamcik’s version of events would have been viewed with more than a 
little incredulity, especially in light of the voluminous evidence of teamwork he and 
Draper employed all through the planning, carrying out, and concealment phases of 
Cassie’s murder.  As Adamcik testified at the evidentiary hearing, he lied to the police 
about going to the movies, and (later) about burglarizing cars; he also lied to his parents 
about going to the movies.  (PC Tr., p.363, Ls.3-22.)  Moreover, Adamcik confirmed that 
he drove his car to Black Rock Canyon, and, once there, used his own shovel to dig a 
hole to bury the evidence used in the murder.  (PC Tr., p.363, L.23 – p.364, L.7.)  In 
short, no number of character witnesses could have rehabilitated Adamcik’s character 
as “good,” much less to the extent that he would have been acquitted of first-degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.       
 Based on the above arguments, and those parts of the district court’s 
memorandum decisions and orders incorporated herein, Adamcik has failed to meet his 
burden of demonstrating any error in the summary dismissal of Claim 3(b). 
  
E. Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of Claim 2 
Following An Evidentiary Hearing – That His Trial Team Was Ineffective For 
Failing To Obtain Expert Testing Of The Knives To Show That Wound No. 1 Was 
Inflicted By A Serrated Knife   
 
 The district court’s memorandum decision and order on the parties’ summary 
disposition motions succinctly explained Claim 2 of Adamcik’s post-conviction petition 
as follows: 
Adamcik alleges that his trial counsel retained a forensic investigator by 
the name of Rudolf Reit (Reit) to testify at trial.  P.C.R. Petition, p.14, ¶48.  
Adamcik asserts that his defense counsel’s intent with respect to Reit’s 
testimony, was to . . . have “Reit testify about the results of an experiment 
he conducted which showed that knives similar but not identical to Exhibits 
70 and 74 would make different marks on a body.”  P.C.R. Petition, p.14, 
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¶¶49-50.  The claimed import of this testimony was to establish “that 
Wound #1 was caused by the serrated blade knife.”  Adamcik’s 
Supporting Memorandum, pp.2-3, ¶51.  Adamcik argues that “Reit’s 
evidence about the knife marks would have corroborated Dr. Leis’ 
testimony that Wound #1 was inflicted with a serrated blade.  It could have 
tipped the balance on that issue and resulted in an acquittal.”  Id., at p.8. 
 
(PC R., p.373-374 (footnote omitted).)  
 After an evidentiary hearing (see generally PC 7/22/15 Tr.), the district court 
entered a memorandum decision and order concluding that Adamcik’s trial team was 
deficient for failing to take reasonable steps to have Reit conduct tests of the Sloan 
(non-serrated) and Rambo (serrated) knives that would have led to expert testimony 
about the types of stab wounds each type of knife made – all for the purpose of 
supporting Dr. Leis’ trial testimony that a serrated knife was used to inflict wound #1.  
(PC R., p.644, ¶5 – p.650, ¶21; p.658, ¶13 – p.660, ¶20.)  However, the district court 
concluded that Adamcik failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial team’s 
deficient performance prejudiced him under Strickland.  (PC R., p.664, ¶27.)  
 The state relies on the Idaho Supreme Court’s rendition of facts recited above 
(see pages 1-9, supra), and the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding Claim 2, which are incorporated as if fully set forth herein.  Those findings and 
conclusions are part of the attached Addendum B.  (Addendum B; specifically PC R., 
p.644, ¶5 – p.650, ¶21; p.658, ¶13 – p.665, ¶27.)  In addition to the district court’s 
“prejudice” analysis regarding Claim 2, the state offers the following argument. 
 Adamcik first contends he was prejudiced by his trial team’s failure to obtain the 
Sloan knife (St. Ex. 70) and Rambo knife (St. Ex. 74) for expert testing by Mr. Reit 
because the “lack of witness preparation led to a situation where the jury saw both the 
long-serving Judge and the elected Prosecuting Attorney castigate [defense counsel] – 
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calling him unprepared, unprofessional, and a liar,” thereby undermining counsel’s 
credibility.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.16-20.)  Regardless of the propriety of the prosecutor’s 
and trial judge’s comments to Adamcik’s trial team during the failed attempt to present 
Mr. Reit as an expert witness, the comments bear little, if any, causal relationship to the 
actual deficient performance of his counsel alleged in the post-conviction petition and 
found by the district court – the failure to obtain the two knives for testing.   The essential 
elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are that the attorney’s 
performance was deficient and prejudice caused by the deficiency.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687-688; Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 2012).  The 
question is not whether the outcome of the trial would have been different had the 
comments by the prosecutor and trial judge not been made.  The relevant question is 
whether, had Adamcik’s trial team obtained the knives for testing, the result of the trial 
have been different.  Here, the comments by the prosecutor and the trial judge in 
discussing the admissibility of Mr. Reit’s expert testimony are far too attenuated from 
Adamcik’s counsels’ failure to obtain the knives for testing to give rise to a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result.  See Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(finding the defendant’s chain of inferences “little more than an invitation for the Court to 
make speculation-fueled inferential leaps”); Beyah v. Uribe, 2010 WL 5524912 (C.D.Ca 
2010) (“Petitioner’s defense was not prejudiced because the link between the testimony 
of the potential witnesses and a reasonable likelihood of a better outcome at trial for 
Petitioner is too attenuated.”); Soto-Beltram v. United States, 946 F.Supp.2d 312, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (trial counsel’s “negotiation efforts were simply too attenuated from any 
prejudice that arose during the sentencing phase”).   
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 It should also be noted that the trial court instructed the jury that it was to 
“consider only the evidence at trial” consisting “of the testimony of the witnesses, the 
exhibits offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts.”  (R., vol. V, p.1087 
(Jury Instruction No. 2).)  The same instruction stated: 
Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings were intended 
by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence in this case. 
 
 The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case 
are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the 
instructions, but they are not themselves evidence.  If any argument or 
remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it.  
 
(R., pp.1087-1088.)  Any risk that the jury may have thought less of the defense team’s 
credibility due to comments made by the prosecutor and trial judge, and allowed that to 
enter into its verdict, was minimized by the court’s instructions about both trial counsels’ 
and the courts own remarks.  In short, the jury was instructed to only consider the 
evidence at trial in reaching its verdict, and it is presumed to have followed that 
instruction.  State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997) (the 
jury is presumed to follow instructions).  Based on the above arguments, Adamcik has 
failed to show that the prosecutor’s and/or the trial judge’s comments constituted 
Strickland prejudice as to Claim 2.  
 Next, Adamcik contends he was prejudiced as a result of his trial team’s failure to 
obtain the knives for testing because he was precluded from presenting Mr. Reit’s 
testimony, which, he argues, “was strong evidence that only one knife was used” to 
murder Cassie.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-25.)  At trial, Dr. Garrison testified for the state, 
in effect, that wound #1 was caused by a non-serrated knife, such as the Sloan knife 
(St. Ex. 70).  Dr. Garrison concluded that two knives (the other being a serrated knife 
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such as the Rambo knife) were each used to inflict at least one “potentially fatal” wound 
to Cassie.   (Tr., vol. II, p.2219, L.17 – p.2227, L.15.)  Dr. Garrison based his opinion 
upon the fact that wound #1: (1) showed no signs of having been inflicted by a serrated 
knife, (2) had a hilt mark, and (3) was thirteen centimeters (i.e., 5.118 inches) deep, but 
the Rambo knife’s serrations began seven centimeters (i.e., 2.755 inches) from the tip 
of the blade.  (Tr., vol. II, p.2224, L.5 – p.2226, L.9; p.2251, L.17 – p.2252, L.4; see 
http://www.inches-to-cm.com.)  Dr. Leis, testifying for Adamcik, concluded that only one 
knife was used – the Rambo serrated knife (St. Ex. 74) – “in the attack.”  (Tr., vol. III, 
p.2653, Ls.3-6.)         
 In the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Mr. Reit testified that, after he 
conducted tests of the actual Rambo and Sloan knives on pig skin, he concluded “the 
wounds made by the Rambo [serrated] knife could in part be similar to the wounds 
made by the tanto [i.e., Sloan] knife.  And that the tanto knife wound could be totally 
accounted for by the Rambo knife, if the Rambo knife is not plunged all the way into the 
skin.”  (PC Tr., p.283, Ls.9-14 (explanations and emphasis added).)  Based on the 
premise that the Rambo knife had not been “plunged all the way into the skin,” Mr. Reit 
agreed with Dr. Leis’ trial testimony that only one knife was used to murder Cassie.  
There is no dispute that, if it is assumed that the Rambo knife was only thrust part of the 
way into Cassie’s chest, the wound might look “in part” similar to a wound inflicted by 
the Sloan knife.  However, the testimony by Dr. Leis totally belies that assumption.  
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 At trial, Dr. Leis testified that wound #1 to Cassie’s upper right chest showed no 
signs of serrations and had a “hilt mark;”10 therefore, his testimony has always been 
contrary to any suggestion – including his own – that wound #1 was caused by a 
serrated knife.  Dr. Leis testified:  
Q. Can you describe, Dr. Leis, what Exhibit 22 is? 
 
A. This depicts wound number “1” – which was to Cassie’s right upper 
chest area. 
 
Q. And would you agree that that wound was to the hilt? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. And there is a hilt mark there? 
 
A. Correct. 
 
Q. Are there serrations on that – on that wound? 
 
A. Not – that I can see definitively in this photograph. 
 
(Tr., vol. III, p.2647, Ls.12-24; see id., p.2610, L.22 – p.2612, L.11 (Dr. Leis’ summary of 
Dr. Garrison’s testimony that his photos show wound #1 has a hilt mark, “the result of a 
part of the handle of the knife striking the skin’s surface and leaving an outline behind”); 
p.2651, L.19-25 (“In just looking at wound number “1” or “2” by themselves, there is not 
a specific feature that depicts a serrated blade striking the skin . . . .”).)   
 Because Dr. Leis testified at trial that wound #1 penetrated Cassie’s chest “to the 
hilt,” the blade used to inflict that wound necessarily went all the way into her chest until 
                                                          
10  Dr. Garrison testified that a “hilt” mark or “impact injury” is a mark left by either the 
hilt, hand or finger “as it impacts the skin” during a blow with a knife.  (Tr. vol. II, p.2217, 
L.21 - p.2218, L.10.)  While showing the jury showing photos of wound #1 (see St. Ex. 
94, slides 15, 16), Dr. Garrison explained that, “although this picture is somewhat out of 
focus, you can see it’s fairly rounded here – and another impact injury.  So we know that 
this knife went in up to where the hand was.  It’s an impact injury . . . .”  (Tr., vol. II, 
p.2219, L.23 – p.2220, L.5.) 
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it was stopped by the hilt – leaving a mark.  To be clear, whatever knife was used to 
inflict wound #1 was thrust all the way into Cassie’s chest.  If the serrated Rambo knife 
had been used, wound #1 would have exhibited irregularities and disruptions from the 
serrations on the upper part of the knife blade that was closest to the hilt.  Because both 
Dr. Garrison (see Tr., vol. II, p.2219, L.7 – p.2220, L.11) and Dr. Leis agreed that wound 
#1 did not have any serrations, and that it penetrated Cassie’s chest cavity “to the hilt,” 
the only reasonable conclusion is that wound #1 was inflicted by a non-serrated knife, 
such as the Sloan knife.11   Moreover, because wound #1 was thirteen centimeters 
deep, and the Rambo knife’s serrations began only seven centimeters from the tip of 
the blade, it is unlikely that a serrated knife inflicted wound #1, even taking the 
possibility of “compression” into account.12  (Tr., vol. II, p.2224, L.5 – p.2226, L.9; 
p.2251, L.17 – p.2252, L.4.)  Having convicted Adamcik of first-degree murder, the jury 
clearly understood the significance of these facts – a non-serrated knife was used to 
inflict wound #1.   
                                                          
11  If Dr. Leis’ theory was correct, there should be no hilt mark on wound #1 if wound 
#22 to Cassie’s left hand pinkie stopped the serrated Rambo knife from fully penetrating 
her chest.  Conversely, the fact that wound #1 had a hilt mark, and wound #2 did not, is 
an indication that wound #22 aligned with wound #2 – not wound #1. 
  
12  Adamcik’s trial counsel tried to get Dr. Garrison to agree that, based on the 
possibility of “compression,” the knife used to inflict wound #1 “doesn’t have to be 
thirteen centimeters long.  This could be eight, nine centimeters long, as well,”  Dr. 
Garrison answered, “No, it’s going to depend on the compressibility of the tissues.”  (Tr., 
vol. II, p.2252, Ls.9-16.)  When testifying about wound #15, an unserrated knife wound, 
Dr. Garrison explained, “if we have a wound that goes into the thigh fourteen 
centimeters leaving no markings, even though you would have compression, it’s not 
going to compress that much, so that would have to be, in my opinion, a knife other that 
the serrated knife.”  (Tr., vol. II, p.2226, Ls.4-9 (emphasis added).)  Based on that 
testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that wound #1, only one 
centimeter less deep than wound #15, would also not compress enough to allow for the 
possibility that it was inflicted by a serrated knife. 
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 Despite the fact that he testified that wound #1 went into Cassie’s chest to the hilt 
and showed no sign of serrations, Dr. Leis later testified that wound #1 was caused by a 
serrated knife.  He said that he reached that opinion by enlarging and lightening one of 
the photos Dr. Garrison used to show how wound numbers 22 (left hand pinkie) and 2 
(chest) aligned together (see St. Ex. 94, slides 3, 5), but concluded that, because he 
believed he saw a hilt mark on wound #2, it was really wound #1 (Tr., vol. III, p.2613, 
L.22 – p.2615, L.10; see Def. Ex. DD, slides 6, 8, 10-12; St. Exs. 23; 94, slides 4, 5 
(showing no obvious hilt mark on wound #2)).  A mere glimpse at Dr. Garrison’s photos 
of wound #1 (see St. Ex. 94, slides 15, 16) – showing an extremely pronounced hilt 
mark on the right side – should cast doubt on Dr. Leis’ testimony that the same wound 
can be seen in Dr. Garrison’s photos (or Dr. Leis’ enhanced photos) showing wound 
#2213 and wound #2 in alignment (see St. Ex. 94, slides 3, 5; Def. Ex. DD, slides 6, 8, 
10-12).  
 Lastly, Dr. Leis asked the jury to believe that Dr. Garrison misidentified wound #1 
as wound #2, a mistake that was highly unlikely due to the following factors: 
(1) Dr. Garrison personally conducted an examination on Cassie’s 
body (Tr. vol. II, p.2193, L.16 - p.2194, L.20; p.2201, Ls.5-18), and 
was present when the photo was taken during the re-examination 
of Cassie’s body (Tr. vol. II, p.1731, L.9 - p.1732, L.12; St. Ex. 28). 
(2)  Dr. Leis did not attend Cassie’s autopsy or Dr. Garrison’s re-
examination of her body; he had only seen photos of those 
procedures, and there is no indication he ever actually saw or 
examined Cassie’s body.  (Tr. vol. III, p.2646, L.23 - p.2647, L.8.)  
                                                          
13  Adamcik mistakenly states that Dr. Garrison “testified that wound #22 . . . was 
caused by a smooth-bladed knife, like the Sloan knife.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.22.)  Dr. 
Garrison testified that wound #22 to Cassie’s left hand pinkie was inflicted by a serrated 
knife.  (Tr., vol. II, p.2211, L.8 – p.2213, L.21 (“this was a serrated or survival-type knife 
cut to the hand”).) 
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(3) Each of Cassie’s wounds were clearly identified with easily read 
numbered labeled stickers, placed on her body and photographed 
by Dr. Skoumal or his staff.  (Tr., vol. II, p.2084, L.16 – p.2085, L.7; 
see St. Exs. 20, 94.)  
(4)  Dr. Garrison testified in detail about the points of identification 
linking the two photos of wound #2 in the side-by-side slide 
showing Cassie’s left hand pinkie (wound #22) laid over wound #2 
(closed with tape) on the left, and a photo of wound #2 (not closed 
with tape) on the right.  (See St. Ex. 94, slide 5; Tr. vol. II, p.2213, 
Ls.3-21.)   
 Mr. Reit’s testimony would not have made any difference at trial in attempting to 
buttress Dr. Leis’ testimony.  The “assumption” Mr. Reit employed to theorize that 
wound #1 was a partial stab wound is based entirely on Dr. Leis’ self-contradicting 
testimony that – despite the fact there was a hilt mark on wound #1 – the knife blade 
only partially penetrated Cassie’s chest.  That contradictory testimony, combined with 
the consistent and logical testimony of Dr. Garrison, the photos of the stab wounds, and 
the improbability that wound #1 was mis-identified by Dr. Garrison by a stickered label 
placed by Dr. Skoumal as wound #2 (see St. Ex. 94, slide 5), all reinforce the district 
court’s determination that Adamcik failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland in 
regard to this claim.          
F. Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of Claim 5 – 
Cumulative Prejudice  
 
 1. Introduction 
 
 The district court rejected Claim 5 of Adamcik’s petition, which alleged 
cumulative prejudice based on Claims 2, 3(b), and 4.  (PC R., pp.665-672.)  On appeal 
Adamcik asserts cumulative prejudice based on the district court’s findings that his trial 
counsel were deficient in regard to Claim 2 (failure to obtain the knives for testing), and 
Claim 4 (failure to excise Adamcik’s invocation of rights that appeared on videotaped 
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police interview).  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.25-27.)  Adamcik further argues that Claim 3(b) 
(failure to move to suppress the “kiddie porn” found on the computer) should be 
considered in the cumulative prejudice mix, even though the district court found (in the 
context of determining cumulative prejudice under Claim 5) that his trial counsel’s 
performance was not deficient.  (Id.; see PC R., pp.468, 665, 670 (stating it would 
“nonetheless” consider Claim 3(b) in regard to cumulative prejudice for appeal 
purposes).)   
 Regardless of whether cumulative prejudice is based on all three claims, or just 
the two for which the district court found Adamcik’s trial counsel deficient, Adamcik has 
failed to meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced to the extent that he was 
denied a fair trial.      
   
2. Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Rejection Of 
His Cumulative Error Claim 
 
 Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Martinez, 
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate to application of 
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 
P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).    
 The ultimate question of Strickland prejudice is whether the defendant was 
denied “a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Adamcik 
has failed to show that the errors he cites, i.e., instances of deficient performance, 
amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal.  State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 
784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 
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P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless).  In response 
to this issue, the state incorporates, as if fully set forth herein, those portions of the 
district court’s orders relevant to the denial of this claim.  (Addendum A; specifically PC 
R., pp.394-403; Addendum B; specifically PC R., p.650, ¶22 – p.654, ¶38; p.656, ¶4; 
p.665, ¶28 – p.672, ¶50.) 
 Additionally, in light of the strong evidence presented against Adamcik at trial as 
set out in the Statement of Facts (pp.1-9, supra) and incorporated herein, the strong 
testimony of Dr. Garrison, and the fact that Dr. Leis contradicted his own “one-knife” 
theory by testifying at trial that wound #1 penetrated Cassie’s chest “to the hilt” and 
showed no sign of being made by a serrated knife, Adamcik has failed to show that his 
trial was less than fair or reliable.  For these reasons, Adamcik has failed to show 
cumulative error.   
 
II. 
Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court’s Denial Of Claim 
7 – That Under Miller And Montgomery, His Fixed Life Sentence Was 
Cruel And Unusual Punishment 
 
 Adamcik argues that the district court erred in denying his claim (Claim 7) that he 
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.27-42.)  For its 
response to this issue, the state relies upon, and incorporates as if fully set forth herein, 
those parts of the district court’s decisions that are relevant to this issue:  (1) the court’s 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama [etc.], 
attached as Addendum C (specifically PC R., pp.419-425), and (2) the court’s 
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Memorandum Decision and Order on Second Motion for Reconsideration, attached as 
Addendum D (specifically PC R., pp.696-702).   
 Additionally, the district court’s decisions are consistent with the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. State, Docket No. 42857, 2017 Opinion No. 45 at 
17 (Idaho May 12, 2017) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735), which explained that 
“Miller and Montgomery do, however, require that the sentencing court weighs the 
juvenile offender’s youth and characteristics against the nature of the crime to 
determine whether the crime was one that ‘reflected the transient immaturity’ of youth.”  
The Idaho Supreme Court also explained that “Montgomery was careful, however, to 
note that ‘Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s 
incorrigibility.”  Johnson, Docket 42857 at 16 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735).  
(See Appellant’s Brief, p.34 (“Absent a finding that a crime reflects a juvenile’s 
‘irreparable corruption,’ life without parole may not be imposed.”).) 
 Based on the district court’s well-reasoned analysis of this issue, Adamcik has 
failed to meet his burden of showing any error in the denial of Claim 7. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgments dismissing 
Adamcik’s petition for post-conviction relief.  
 DATED this 28th day of June, 2017. 
 
 
         
 __/s/ John C. McKinney________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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) 
Case No. CV-2013-3682 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON ADAMCIK1S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
. \ 
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition 
arising out of Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik (Adamcik), Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(P.C.R. Petition). Adamcik has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's 
M.S.D). 1 The State of Idaho (State) also filed its motion for summary disposition and supporting 
brief in one (I) document titled Respondent's Dispositive Motion with Brief in Suppo11 of 
Motion for Summary Dismissal (State's M.S.D). Adamcik filed his Response to Respondent's 
Dispositive Motion (Response Memorandum).2 Finally, Adamcik submitted a document entitled 
Supplemental Authority sho11ly in advance of the oral argument on these cross-motions. The 
parties argued their cross-motions to the Court, and following argument, the Court took this 
1Adamcik's M.S.D. was supported by a Brief in Suppmi of Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's 
Supporting Memorandum). 
: Adamcik's Response Memorandum was supported by several affidavits: l 1) the Affidavit of Mark lleideman (Heideman 
Anidavil); (2) the Affidavit of Vic Pearson (Pearson A111davit); (3) the Affidavit of Sean Adamcik {Scan Adamcik Affidavit); {4) 
the Affidavit of Shannon Adamick [sic] (Shannon Adamcik Affidavit); and (5) the Al11davit or Barbara Adamcik (B. Adamcik 
Allidavit). 
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matter under advisement.3 The Comt, having considered the parties' written submissions along 
with the argument presented, now issues it Memorandum Decision and Order (MD&0).4 
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. His P.C.R. Petition outlines seven 
(7) separate claims upon which he seeks post-conviction relief. Adamcik seeks summary 
disposition on five (5) of the seven (7) claims asserted in his P.C.R. Petition.5 The State in turn 
seeks summary dismissal of each claim raised by Adamcik in his P .C.R Petition. 
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition arises out of the underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock 
County Case CR-2006-17984. In this proceeding, Adamcik was charged with and convicted by 
a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo Stoddart (Stoddart). Adamcik was 
also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, Brian Draper (Draper), to commit the first-
degree murder of Stoddart At sentencing, Adamcik was sentenced to a thiity (30) year fixed 
sentence and an indetenninate life sentence for the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and 
a fixed life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction of Stoddart. Adamcik filed a motion 
seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (l.C.R.). This motion 
3It should be noted that incident to this post-conviction relief proceeding, the Court has taken judicial notice of the entire record 
of the criminal proceedings in Bannock County Case CR-2006-17984 pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (l.ll.E.). See 
Order Taking Judicial Notice, Additionally, at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition, the parties 
apprised the Court of their stipulation that the summary dismissal/disposition record will include the depositions taken of 
Adamcik's defense team, Greg May, Bron Rammell, and Aaron Thompson. 
4Adamcik, in his Response Memorandum objected to the State's M.S.D. on the grounds that it had failed to Hie a motion separate 
from ils memorandum, identii)'ing with particularity the grounds supporting the motion and the rule or statute under which it was 
seeking relief. At hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition, Adamcik acknowledged that following the 
objection identified in his Response Memorandum, the State did file Respondent's Amended Dispositive Motion which Adamcik 
advised Lo be "a proper motion filed citing the correct statute." As such, any defect in the initial filing of the State's M.S.D. has 
been cured and the Court will consider the merits of both parties' motions for summary dismissal/disposition. 
'Adamcik acknowledges that his sixth claim or cause of action requires an evidentiary hearing because of the existence of 
material issues of fact, and therefore asks that an evidentiary hearing be set on that matter. Because Adamcik has not moved for 
summary dismissal on his first claim or cause of action, it is also clear that he is conceding, at a minimum, that this issue also 
requires an evidcntiary hearing. It may be that Adamcik has waived or withdrawn this claim entirely, but because the Court is 
not certain of this fact. the Com! will consider the State's M.S.D. on this cause of action as well in this MD&O. See Adamcik's 
Response Memorandum where Adamcik states "further, as will be explained below, Causes or Action 2· 7 should not be 
summarily dismissed even if the Court reaches the m0rits of the Respondent's arguments." Response Memorandum, p. 3. 
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was denied after hearing by the trial court. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In Stale v. Adamcik, 
152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.2d 417, 486-87 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
Adamcik's conviction and sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for Rehearing; the Idaho Supreme 
Court denied the relief sought in that petition. Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. This petition was denied. State v. Adamcik, 133 
S. Ct 141, 184 L. Ed. 2d 68 (2012). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Post-Conviction Relief proceedings are generally governed by the Unifom1 Post-
Conviction Procedure Act (U PCP A) whfoh is codified at Idaho Code § § l 9A90 l through 19-
4911 (LC.) As summarized in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249-50, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068-69 
(2009) (Rhoades): 
[A]petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 
(2008). However, "[t]he 'application must contain much more than a short and 
plan statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(l)."' State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting 
Goomvin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271, 61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct.App.2002)). Instead, 
the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[ s] forth the 
grounds upon which the application is based." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d 
at 136 (citing LC. § 19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied 
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be 
subject to dismissal." id. 
The UPCPA applies to the Adamcik's M.S.D. and the State's M.S.D. LC. §19-4906(c) 
provides that: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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As stated in Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct.App.2012), 
summary dismissal is the functional or procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Rule 
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (l.R.C.P.). In considering a summary judgment, or in 
this case a motion for summary disposition, this Court applies the same standard applied by the 
appellate courts on appeal. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 63, 
305 P.3d 499, 507 (2013). 
DeRushe v. S'tate, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (DeRushe), provides 
that "a claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal pursuant to LC. § 19-
4906 if the applicant has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." (Quoting, Berg v. 
Stale, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998)). 
As summarized by the Rhoades Court on summary dismissal, the trial court: 
l h ]as free review of questions of law. Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626, 167 
P.3d 761, 763 (2007). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court dete1111ines whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions 
together with any affidavits on file and will liberaliy construe the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving paity. Hauschulz v. State, 144 
Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 
Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). However, "while the underlying facts 
must be regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted." 
Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985). "[W]here the 
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the 
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the 
conflict between those inferences." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 
P .3d 4 76, 482 (2008). 
148 Idaho at 250,220 P.3d at 1069. 
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DISCUSSION 
1. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DEPRIVE}) OF A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE 
STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF 
BRADY J--: MARYUND, 373 U.S. 88 (1963). 
In his first claim, Adamcik argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the State 
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brac{Y v. lvfaryland. 373 U.S. 88, 83 S.Ct. l 194, 10 
L.Ed.2d 215 ( 1963) (Brady). The exculpatory evidence that Adamcik claims the State withheld 
was the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Charles 0. Garrison, M.D. (Dr. Garrison), who was an expert 
witness for the State. See First Cause of Action, P.C.R. Petition, pp. 5-14. 
During Dr. Ganison's testimony, upon direct examination, he testified that stab wounds 
to Stoddart's body were caused by at least two (2) separate knives. Transcript on Appeal (Tr. 
App) p. 2225, LL.16-20. Dr. Garrison testified that one (1) of the knives had a serrated blade 
and one (1) had a non-serrated blade. Id. The State introduced two (2) knives into evidence at 
trial: one ( 1) with a serrated edge (Trial Exhibit 7 4 -- the "Rambo knife") and one ( l) without 
(Trial Exhibit 70 -- the "Sloan blade"). 
Adamcik argues that Dr. Garrison testified that what was referred to during the trial as 
"Wound # 1 ", "a potentially fatal wound'\ was caused by a knife with a non~serratcd blade. 
P.C.R. Petition, p.5, 130. Adamcik asserts that "Dr. Garrison testified that all other potentially 
fatal wounds were caused by a knife with a serrated blade." Id at ,3 L 
Dr. Edward Leis, M.D. (Dr. Leis) was an expe1i witness who testified for Adamcik at 
trial. Dr. Leis' testimony contradicted Dr. Garrison's opinion and testimony as it related to 
"Wound # 1 ". Dr. Leis testified that "Wound #I" was, in fact, caused by a knife which had a 
serrated blade. Tr. App. p. 2615, LL.7-10. Dr. Leis asserted that Dr. Garrison was wrong on 
two (2) separate points: (l) that the ,vound to Stoddart's hand was associated with "Wound #2" 
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when it was actually associated \vith "Wound #1"; and (2) that because Stoddart's left hand was 
placed over Wound #1 the evidence of the serration appeared on the hand and not "Wound #1" 
itself. Tr. App. p. 2614, LL. 5-25, p. 2615, LL. 1-10. 
Adamcik asserts that Dr. Ganison was present in the courtroom during the course of Dr. 
Leis' testimony, "presumably to prepare himself to testify as a state's rebuttal witness." P.C.R. 
Petition, p. 5, 135. However, Dr. Garrison was not called by the State as a rebuttal witness. 
Adamcik alleges in his P.C.R. Petition that Dr. Garrison did not reveal his analysis of Dr. Leis' 
testimony to any member of the prosecution or defense team and told the prosecution team that 
there was no reason for him to testify on rebuttal. Id. p. 6, iJ,40-42. 
Adamcik concludes and "alleges on information and belief that Dr. Garrison either 
agreed with or could not disagree with Dr. Leis' testimony regarding Wound #1.'' Id. p. 6, 139. 
Adamcik asserts, again "on information and belief', that "'Dr. Garrison's analysis of Dr. Leis' 
testimony was exculpatory evidence "because it tended to show that only one person inflicted the 
potentially fatal wounds" and that Dr. Garrison's analysis "was impeachment evidence because it 
contradicted Dr. Garrison's previous testirnony in the trial." Id p. 6, 1,43-44.6 
As such, it appears that Adamcik is suggesting that the State was required to either call 
Dr. Garrison as a rebuttal witness or disclose his "analysis of Dr. Leis' testimonyH to Adamcik's 
defense team. Adamcik asserts that if Dr. Garrison's "analysis of Dr. Leis' testimony'' had been 
disclosed the "defense would have called Dr. Garrison to present what would have been either 
exculpatory evidence (that he agreed that Wound #1 was caused by a knife with a serrated blade) 
6Bold emphasis relative to "on information and belief" was added by the Court. 
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or impeaching evidence (that he could not disagree with Dr. Leis' analysis) of his own prior 
testimony. 7" P.C.R. Petition, p. 8. 
A. BRADY v. MARYLAND STANDARD 
Under Brady, the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the 
defense and material to either guilt or punishment, the suppression of this evidence violates due 
process. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87. To show a Brady violation, a petitioner must prove three (3) 
components with respect to the evidence at issue: "the evidence at issue must be favorable to the 
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have 
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). The United 
States Supreme Court has further clarified that the prejudice must create a "probability of a 
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant \VouJd 
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its in 
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. 
A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's 
evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419,434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) citing to United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 
7This cm ire argument presupposes one ( 1) crucial fact and that is that Dr. Garrison agreed with Dr, Leis' analysis and testimony, 
and would not have been able to offer a rebullal. Jt overlooks the other possible conclusion: that being that Dr. Garrison was 
unpersuaded by Dr. Leis' analysis and testimony and did not believe that Dr. Leis' testimony and/or analysis was of sufficient 
weight or credibility to respond to in rebuttal. Therefore, when asked by prosecutors if there was a need or "reason for him to 
testitY" in rebuttal. as alleged in the !'.C.R. Petition, he responded and advised that there was not. See P.C.R. Petition, p. 6, ~42. 
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B. DISCUSSION 
The Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Adamcik's P.C.R. 
Petition. In sho1t, Adamcik has failed to come forward with any admissible evidence to support 
his assertion that Dr. Garrison's testimony, in response to Dr. Leis' testimony, would have been 
or was exculpatory in nature. 
As pointed out above, the only evidence supporting Adamcik's assertion that Dr. 
Garrison's rebuttal testimony would have been exculpatory in nature is contained in Adamcik's 
verified P.C.R. Petition. However of significance to the present issue, these asse1tions are not 
based upon Adamcik's personal knowledge as required by I.R.C.P. 56(e), but are speculative in 
nature and are preceded by the phrase "on information and belief'. The Court is mindful of the 
fact that "a verified complaint has the force and effect of an affidavit in support of a motion for 
summary judgment so long as it confonns to the requirements of Rule 56(e).'' Drennan v. Idaho 
State Correctional Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 603, 181 P.3d 524, 529, footnote 3 (Ct.App. 
2007). However, Adamcik's assertions based "on information and belief' do not satisfy the 
requirements of LR.C.P. 56(e) because they are not based upon the personal knowledge of 
Adamcik or any other qualified affiant. In Van Ste/ton v. Van Ste/ton, 2014 WL 4898591, *10 
(N.D. Iowa), the trial court noted as follows: 
"Rule 56[c]'s personal knowledge requirement prevents statements in affidavits 
that are based, in part, 'upon infon11ation and belief'-instead of only 
knowledge-from raising genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary 
judgment." Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2002); see 
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 831 (1950) 
(facts alleged on "information and belief' are not sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of fact); Can?field Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Co1JJ., 719 F.2d 1361, 1367 
(8th Cir.1983) ("Under Rule 56[c], an affidavit filed in support of or in opposition 
to a summary judgment motion must be based upon the personal knowledge of 
the affiant; information and belief is insufficient" to create an issue of material 
fact); see also SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshowsky, 559 F.3d 133, 138 (2d 
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Cir.2009) ("The Rule1s requirement that affidavits be made on personal 
knowledge is not satisfied by assertions made 'on information and belief.' ") 
(quoting Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F .3d 206,219 (2d Cir.2004)); 
Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 851 (11th Cir.2000) ("upon 
information and belief'' insufficient); Causey v. Balog. 162 F.3d 795, 803 n. 4 ( 4th 
Cir.1998) ("Rule 56[c] precludes consideration of materials not based on the 
affiant's first hand knowledge."); Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 832 (7th 
Cir .1991) (verification based on personal knowledge or infonnation and belief is 
insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment because it avoids the 
possibility of perjury); Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150, 
154 (5th Cir.1965) ("knowledge, information and belief" insufficient). 
Due to the fact that Adamcik has failed to come forward with any admissible evidence in 
response to the State's M.S.D. with respect to the assertion made in his P.C.R. Petition that Dr. 
Garrison's analysis of Dr. Leis' testimony was such that he agreed with it or could not dispute it 
and that any additional testimony of Dr. Ganison would have been exculpatory in nature, the 
Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to the First Cause of 
Action outlined in Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition. 
2. ADAM CI K'S CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE O:F 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL lN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
AND IDAHO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13, UNDER 
STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) BECAUSE 
COUNSEL FAILED TO GET IMPORTANT EXPERT TESTIMONY 
BEFORE THE JURY IN PART BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO OBTAIN 
THE MURDER WEAPONS FOR TESTING BY THE DEFENSE EXPERT. 
Adamcik's Second Cause of Action for post~conviction relief, as outlined in his P.C.R. 
Petition, alleges that Adamcik was denied effective assistance of counsel because his defense 
counsel failed to get important expert testimony before the jury. See Second Cause of Action, 
P.C.R. Petition, pp. 14-19. Adamcik alleges that his trial counsel retained a forensic investigator 
by the name of Rudolf Reit (Reit) to testify at trial. ll.C.R. Petition, p. 14, iJ48. Adamcik asserts 
that his defense counsel's intent with respect to Reit's testimony, was to illicit testimony about 
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the police procedures used at the crime scene8 and to have «Reit testify about the results of an 
experiment he conducted which showed that knives similar but not identical to Exhibits 70 and 
74 would make different marks on a body." P.C.R. Petition, p. 14, i[~49-50. The claimed impoti 
of this testimony was to establish "that Wound #1 was caused by the serrated blade knife." 
Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, pp. 2-3, iJs l. Adamcik argues that "Reit's evidence about 
the knife marks would have corroborated Dr. Leis' testimony that Wound #1 was inflicted with 
the serrated blade. lt could have tipped the balance on that issue and resulted in an acquittal." 
Id, at p. 8. 
In short, Reit was not allowed to testify at trial concerning the tests he had conducted on 
what have come to be referred to as the "exemplar knives." Further, the defense teams attempt 
to have the exemplar knives admitted into evidence was similarly denied. 
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD 
The standard the Court must employ in detennining whether or not defense counsel's 
performance was ineffective has its genesis in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The applicable standard for a trial court, when presented with a 
claim of ineffective assistance counsel, is summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Booth v. 
State, 151 Idaho 612,617,262 P.3d 255,260 (2011) (Booth): 
"The Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to that portion of Adamcik's Second Cause of 
;\ction which purports that Adamcik's trial counsel planned to have Reit testify about the police procedures used at the crime 
scene (sec P.C.R. Petition paragraph 49) irnd that this testimony was not elicited due tn the dct1cicnt performance of one (I) of 
Adameik's trial counsel, Bron Rammcll, be,.ause of ineffective questions and or techniques. See P.C.R. Petition, paragraphs 53 
(including sub-paragraphs) and 54. First, Adamcik appears to have withdrawn this contention. In Adamcik's Supporting 
Memorandum he makes no reference to the expected testimony of Reit and "police procedures used at the crime scene." Rather, 
this assertion is replaced with the assertion that trial counsel intended to have Reit testify "about the different characteristics of 
the knives used in the attack on Cassie Stoddard." See Adamcik Supporting Memorandum, p. 2, il 49. Second, Adamcik has 
failed to pul forth, in the record on summary dismissal, any facts or admissible evidence which would support his contention that 
whatever this expected testimony was, that by resorting to better questions or techniques would have resulted in the admissibility 
of this testimony. Without such a showing, the Court cannot make a determination concerning whether the alleged deficient 
performance reached the level contemplated by Strickland and certainly cannot make a determination that the alleged deficient 
performance was prejudicial as that term has been defined and applied by Strickland and its progeny. 
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"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
570, 225 P .3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may 
properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Baxter v. Slate, 149 
Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct.App.2010). To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's 
performance was deficient and that the defendant \Vas prejudiced by the 
deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 PJd 460, 463 (2004); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.3d2d at 693. 
In Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154 177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (Baldwin), this 
standard was described as follows: 
To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his 
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ivey v. 
State, 123 ldaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). This objective standard 
embraces a strong presumption that defense counsel was competent and diligent. 
Ivey, 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709. Thus, the claimant has the burden of 
showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741. 
B. DISCUSSION 
The patties approach to this issue diverges in their post-conviction relief briefing. 
Adamcik, who seeks summary disposition of this claim in Adamcik's M.S.D., argues that 
defense counsel's performance was deficient under the Strickland standard because they "failed 
to move the Court for permission to have the knives tested" and "mistakenly and unreasonably 
believed that the state had denied it [sic] access to the evidence." Adamcik's Suppo1ting 
Memorandum, p. 6. Adamcik argues further that "the Court excluded impo1tant defense 
evidence when Mr. Ramm.ell could have gotten the evidence admitted by use of well-known and 
simple steps. He could have asked proper questions and he could have obtained the knives 
before trial and had Mr. Reit conduct the same tests" on the actual knives. 1' Id. at p. 8. 
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The State, in turn, approaches this matter from an entirely different perspective. The 
State argues that despite the fact that the State objected to this evidence's admission at trial, 
evidence such as this is "generally admissible" pursuant to I.R.E. 702. State's M.S.D., p. 8. The 
State continues as follov .. ,s: 
Id. 
[I]f hired defense experts used actual or exemplar evidence to advance their 
theory, the court must be flexible in its approach to its employment to the trier of 
fact - the jury. Since the gatekeeping function is the court's, it is awkward to 
claim a theory of deficient performance on the defense counsel. The trial court 
may have erred in not allowing otherwise admissible evidence to be employed, 
despite trial defense counsel's significant efforts to have Mr. Reit's expert tests, 
testimony and evidence be considered by the jury - including the trial court's 
order to strike a significant portion of Mr. Reit's testimony prior to objection. 
In short, the State attempts to turn this into judicial error with the obvious result being 
defense counsel was not deficient in its performance, instead the trial com1 committed error in 
not allowing this evidence, the testimony, tests, and exemplar knives into evidence.9 
During defense counsel's direct examination of Reit there is a discussion of various 
knives and photographs taken by Reit concerning testing he had conducted. At one point during 
this direct examination, the State objected to Adamcik's defense team's attempt to introduce 
Defense Exhibits K through G which was the work product of Reit's knife experiments. 
Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, p. 3, ,s6. The State objected to the admission of these 
exhibits arguing as follows: 
MR. HEIDEMAN: I would object. And, you know, Your Honor, I think the 
witness himself has said this is so far removed from the actual knives, that this 
9Adamcik, in his Response Memorandum, argues that the State should be judicially estopped from asserting this position in 
Adamcik's post-conviction relief proceeding, when it asserted the exact opposite during Adamcik's jury trial. The Court ne~d 
not address the issue of judicial estoppel, because the Court agrees with the rulings of Judge McDermott, at least based upon that 
portion of the record that has been brought to the Court's attention in these summary dismissal proceeding. Therefore, the Court 
will not address or rule on Adamcik's assertion ofjudicial estoppcl as it relates lo the apparent contradictory positions asserted by 
the State. 
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test wouldn't be valid. I should have objected to the first ones, too, because 
they're not the actual knives used in the test. 
I realize I didn't object to the admission of those, but these are ce1tainly 
objectionable - certainly aren't relevant, and I would object to any testing that he 
did on the first admissions, also. 
Tr. App. p. 2524, LL. 8-19. 10 In ruling on the objection, the trial court has the following 
dialogue with defense counsel: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rammell, this is a comt of law and atticles being 
similar to one in evidence and tests being done on an mticle similar to one in 
evidence is not sufficient. 
The items in evidence could have been released for testing to your witness, as 
some were, but -- not going to allow this fellow to testify to -- testify on tests run 
on knives he thinks are similar to one. 
Just not going to allow it, so we can sho1ten this up right now. These will not be 
admitted, and I'm not going to allow him to give opinions on them. I don't think 
this is something the jury -- it could mislead them, I don't think it's proper. He 
hasn't been proven to be an expert in this field. 
Also, he has not used the items in evidence for his testing. So on two grounds he 
should not be allowed to give an opinion -- confuse and mislead the jury, and I 
don't think it would be proper. 
So, we might as well end this right now unless you got more to offer. 
Mr. Rammell: Okay. Well, Your Honor, I think that the standard actually is 
substantially similar. We looked at that and I appreciate --
The Court: Mr. Rammell, this is a homicide case. If you wanted the witness to 
examine evidence, you could have made a motion and it would have been 
granted. 
He could have examined the items that we had, not talked about something that he 
thinks -- I emphasize thinks is similar. 
I mean, we're talking - we should be talking apples and apples here, but we're 
talking about items that were found at Black Rock, and then you want - and then 
10As a result. the State's o~jection to Exhibits K-G morphed into a successful attempt to slrike and exclude Reit's earlier 
testimony concerning other portions of his investigation and testing which had been introduced without a contemporaneous 
objection. 
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he comes in and says, well, he went out and bought some that looked like. Well, 
that's not good enough in my opinion. That's not good enough in a homicide case 
like this. 
Tr. App. p. 2524, LL. 20-25, p. 2525, LL. 1-25, and p. 2526, LL. 1-13. 11 
The first important issue for this Court to address is what legal basis did the State 
advance for its objection, and second, upon what basis did the trial court sustain the objection. 
The State asse1ted first that the exemplar knives were not the actual knives and second based 
upon relevance. Id. at p. 2524, LL.13-17. 12 The trial court, in ruling on this objection, never 
addressed the first prong of the State's objection, relevance. Therefore, there is no need to 
discuss the same in this MD&O. 
The trial court also never identifies the exact legal basis upon which the State's objection 
is sustained. However, a review of the trial court's discussion of this issue clearly demonstrates 
that it was for lack of foundation. The lack of foundation appears to be with respect to two (2) 
essential issues: (1) that it had not been established that Reit was an expert in this field (Tr. App. 
p. 2525, LL. l 0-11 ); and (2) that Reit had not had access to and/or used the items in evidence for 
his testing (Id. at LL.12-13). 
On the record before the Court13 on these cross-motions for summary dismissal, the Court 
must conclude that it is in full agreement with the trial comt's ruling on the State's objection as it 
11 A <lisi:ussion then ensues before the jury concerning whether or not the knives in question ,vcre available to the defense team or 
withheld from the defense team by the prosecution. Mr. Rammell claimed that an associate from his omce represented that the 
State had refused the defense team access to these items of evidence, a fact which was strongly refuted by the State. 
1
~Although the State never expressed its o~jection in legal tenns, it appears that the second prong of its objection was lack of 
foundation. In other words, !he defense team had foiled lo lay sullicient foundation to establish that the exemplar knives were the 
same as or sufficiently similar to the knives in evidence to allow Reil to testify concerning his testing and the results of his testing 
with the exemplar knives. The State established during its voir dire, in aid of objection, that Rcit had never seen the knives in 
evidence prior to their being introduced into evidence by the State. See Tr. App. p. 2516, LL. 24-25, p.2517, LL. l-10. 
1.1The Court emphasizes that it has not conducted an exhaustive review of the Transcript on Appeal. The transcript of the trial 
portion of these proceedings contains over 3,000 pages of testimony and examination. Rather, the Court has relied, in large pan. 
on counsel for the parties to cite the Court to !he relevant portions of the transcript that support their respective positions. This is 
consistent with summary judgment udvocacy and the expectation that the responsibility lies with the parties to point the Court to 
those portions of the record that support their respective positions. In Venable v, Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 156 ldaho 574. 
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relates to lack of foundation. 14 Therefore, the Court must analyze what Adamcik's defense team 
might have done differently in order to utilize Reit's testimony, investigation, and test results. 
Certainly, the most striking and obvious deficiency is the failure of defense counsel to 
obtain access to the knives at issue. If these knives had been obtained through discovery and/or 
motion practice, Reit or some other qualified expert would have been able to determine whether 
they wanted to perform the tests with the actual knives themselves or if they were able to obtain 
the same or sufiiciently similar knives to perform tests with the exemplar knives. 
The Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact conceming Adamcik's 
defense team's conduct and their failure to aggressively seek out and obtain these knives to 
warrant an evidentiary hearing on this issue. When the Court considers the evidence in the 
record on summary dismissal in a light most favorable to Adamcik and construes all reasonably 
inferences to be drawn from that evidence in favor of Adamcik, the Court concludes that a 
determination could be reached that Adamcik's defense team's perfonnance was deficient as that 
term has been defined by Strickland and its progeny. 
Therefore, the Court will DENY the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on this issue. 
However, the Court does find that genuine issues of material fact exist on this issue, which 
similarly warrants the Court's DENYING Adamcik's counter-request for summary dismissal 
582,329 P.3d 356,364 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "'[T]hc trial court is not required to search the record looking 
for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that 
evidence to the coutt's aHention.' Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc .. 145 Idaho 912,919, !88 P.3d 854,861 
(2008)." 
14While stating that the Court is in agreement with the trial court's ruling in this particular instance. this Court will not go so far 
as to conclude that the exemplar knives and testing conducted by qualified expert with respect to the exemplar knives could never 
come into evidence. However, it would require much more foundation than this Court has been pointed to in the record by the 
parties. An expert without having access to the knives in evidence would not be able to testify that they were the same or 
sufficiently similar to the actual knives. Even if the expert were able to obtain the exact same knives. if he has never seen or 
possessed the knives in evidence, he lacks information regarding the specific character of the knives in evidence vis a via the 
exemplar knives. 13y way of example only, he has no ability to compare what kind of condition the knives in evidence are in: ( l) 
do they have any defects or particular characteristics whid1 have manifested themselves due to use, abuse or age since their 
purchase. Without having access to the knives in evidence. there is insufficient foundation to establish that the exemplar knives 
arc the same or sufficiently similar to the knives in evidence. 
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relative to the Second Cause of Action in his P.C.R. Petition. 15 Therefore, the Court ,vill proceed 
to an evidcntiary hearing on Adamcik's Second Cause of Action. 
3. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO 
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO 
SUPPRESS OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE AND MADE ILLOGICAL TRIAL DECISIONS 
WHEN THE STATE THREATENED TO INTRODUCE THAT EVIDENCE. 
Adamcik's third cause of action, as outlined in his P.C.R. Petition, alleges that his 
defense team was deficient due to their failure to move for the suppression of ce11ain items of 
evidence seized by law enforcement pursuant to various search warrants. See Third Cause of 
Action, P.C.R. Petition, pp. 20-33. Specifically, Adamcik asserts that a ''Computer Tower found 
in the basement TV room of the Adamcik home" and a "notebook" found in Adamcik's bedroom 
were obtained by law enforcement in violation of his Fourth Amendment under the United States 
Constitution as well as Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See Adamcik's Supp01ting 
Memorandum. pp. 10-11, 1, 72 and 74. 
Adamcik argues that his defense team should have moved to suppress the seizure of these 
two (2) items on the basis that: (1) there was no probable cause to seize the family computer; (2) 
the search warrant, issued on September 27, 2006, did not authorize law enforcement to seize 
computers and was therefore outside of the scope of the search warrant; (3) there was no 
15The Cou11 recognizes that it has not ruled on the prejudice prong of the Strickland two (2) pronged test nor does the Court feel 
that it is in a position to do so without hearing all of the evidence related to trial counsel's claimed deficient and ineffective 
performance on this issue. The Court is mindful of the fact, without regard to what its eventual determination is concerning 
defense counsel's performance on the Reit's knife evidence, that the State presented testimony through its expert Dr. Garrison. 
This evidence was that two (2) knives were involved in inflicting potentially fatal wounds to Stoddart one ( 1) a serrated knife 
and one ( l) a non•serrated knife. It would appear to the Court that in order for Adamcik to prevail on the prejudice component of 
the S1rickland two (2) prong test, Adamcik must establish that Reit's testimony, investigation and testing, coupled with Dr. Leis' 
testimony would have resulted in Dr. Garrison's opinions changing from those expressed in his direct testimony to views and 
opinions consistent with Dr. Leis and Reit. Without such a result, the jury would still, as the finder of fact, have been free to 
disregard the testimony of Dr. Leis and Reit as lacking credibility and weight and accept, as being more credible, Dr. Garrison's 
opinions and testimony. Nevertheless. the Court concludes, at this stage of the proceedings, that genuine issues of material fact 
exist sufficient tn deny both parties' motions for summary dismissal/disposition relative to the prejudice prong ofSJrickland's 
ineffective assistance ol' counsel lest. 
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probable cause for the first of two (2) search warrants issued on October 4, 2006; and ( 4) there 
was no probable cause for the second search warrant issued on October 4, 2006. 16 
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD 
The same standard of review is applicable with respect to this cause of action as 
Adamcik's second cause of action. Therefore, the Court will not repeat the standard, but refers 
and incorporates the standard outlined in section 2.A. of this MD&O. 
B. DISCUSSION 
Adamcik's assertion that his defense team was deficient due to their failure to suppress 
evidence focuses primarily on two (2) separate pieces of evidence: ( l) a notebook obtained 
incident to a search conducted at the Adamcik residence resulting from a search warrant issued 
on October 4, 2006; and (2) "'kiddie porn' photographs [that] had been discovered" by the State 
incident to a search of the computers obtained as part of a search of the Adamcik residence 
conducted on September 27, 2006 following the issuance of a search warrant issued on the same 
date. 17 For purposes of the MD&O, the Court will address the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim as it relates to the «notebook)' and the "kiddie porn" photographs separately. 
16Adamcik also asserts additional grounds upon which he contends his defense team should have moved to suppress the State's 
use of the computer and evidence obtained from the computer and the notebook. These grounds are that evidence found on the 
computer was not disclosed in a timely fashion by the State, the evidence was not relevant, and finally that the evidence was 
improper character evidence and the unfair pr<:iudiee of the evidence outweighed any probative value as rebuttal evidence. The 
Court declines to discuss these assertions in the MD&O. These are evidentiary issues which never arose during the triaL In order 
for the Court to make any conclusions concerning whether any of these assertions have merit, the Court would be required lo 
resort to mere conjecture concerning many possible scenarios that may have played out had the State attempted to use this 
evidence. However. quite clearly the Stale did not attempt to introduce this evidence into trial and therefore, the Court will not 
engage in hypothecating concerning the various scenarios that could have played out at trial had there been an attempt to 
introduce the same. The crux of Adamcik's ineffective counsel claim is grounded in, and must succeed or fail, in his claim that 
there was no probable cause for the seizure of the computer and/or that seizure of the same exceeded the scope ol'the warrant, 
and that the subsequent warrant authorizing the search of the computer for its contents was not supported by probable cause. 
Further, that there was not probable cause for the seizure of the notebook. This will be the focus of the Court's query, not on 
evidentiary issues and potential scenarios that are speculative at best. Any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon 
these hypothetical issues is DENIED and State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is GRANTED on both the deficiency prong as 
well as the pr~judice prong of the Strickland analysis. 
17Thc authorization for the search of the computers themselves was authorized by way of a subsequent search warrant issued on 
October. 4, 2006. This was the second of two (2) search warrants issued on this date. 
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1. Suppression of Notebook. 
Adamcik argues that his defense team was deficient in their failure to move for the 
suppression of the "notebook" obtained by law enforcement during a search of his home, 
specifically his bedroom, pursuant to a Search Warrant issued on October 4, 2006. This was the 
first of two (2) search warrants issued on this date. 
The Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to 
Adamcik' s claim that his defense team was deficient in failing to move for the suppression of the 
fruits of the search of the Adamcik residence conducted on October 4, 2006 pursuant to a Search 
Warrant issued on October 4, 2006. The fruits of this search included the "notebook" in 
question. 
The Court concludes, based upon its review of the evidence advanced in support of the 
parties' arguments on these cross-motions for summary dismissal, that there was probable cause 
to supp01i the issuance of the first of the two (2) search warrants issued on October 4, 2006. It 
was incident to the search conducted following the issuance of this warrant that the "notebook" 
at issue was located and seized. 
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Baldwin: 
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a 
motion in the underlying action, the court properly may consider the probability 
of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's 
inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 
526, 927 P.2d 910,916 (Ct.App.1996). 
145 Idaho at 155. 
In considering Adamcik's un-filed motion to suppress on this issue, the Court concludes 
that probable cause existed for the issuance of the first of two (2), Search Warrants issued on 
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October 4, 2006. The Court therefore, concludes that defense counsel's failure to file a motion 
to suppress on this issue was not deficient and most certainly was not prejudicial. 
When considering a challenge concerning the issuance of a search warrant and whether it 
was properly supported by a showing of probable cause, the Idaho Comt of Appeals has stated as 
follows: 
When probable cause to issue a search warrant is challenged on appeal, the 
reviewing court's function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis 
for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548-49 (1983); State v. Josehpson; State v. 
Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). In this evaluation, great 
deference is paid to the magistrate's determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d at 546-47; State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213,215,938 P.2d 
1251, 1253 (Ct.App.1997). The test for reviewing the magistrate's action is 
whether he or she abused his or her discretion in finding that probable cause 
existed. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382,387, 707 P.2d 493,498 (Ct.App.1985). 
When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the 
defendant to show that the search was invalid. State v. Kelly, I 06 ldaho 268, 275, 
678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct.App.1984). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth 
Amendment, except that "oath or affirmation" is termed "affidavit." In order for a 
search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that 
evidence or fruits of a crime may be found in a patiicular place. Josehpson, 123 
Idaho at 792-93, 852 P.2d at 1389-90. When determining whether probable cause 
exists: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will he found in a particular place. 
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Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548; see also Wilson, 130 
Idaho at 215, 938 P.2d at 1253. 
Stale v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277,280,220 P.3d 1097, 1099 (Ct.App. 2009) (Belden). 
The affidavit filed in support of the search wa1Tant which was issued contained all of the 
factual information which was contained in the initial search warrant issued on September 27, 
2006. The information contained in the original supporting affidavit provides that: (1) "Adamcik 
is obsessed with knives[,] guns[,] and horror films"; that "Torey [Adamcik] and his friend Brian 
Draper are so obsessed with horror films that they are writing their own script for a honor 
movie"; that "Torey [Adamcik] gave him/her the script about two months ago to read"; that 
"Torey [Adamcik] has a knife collection that he keeps in the closet of his bedroom"; that "Torey 
[Adamcik has been heard] bragging about committing the perfect crime and hmv he watches 
killing movies and actually takes notes during the m_ovie on how not to get caught when 
committing a murder"18• However, the infom1ation contained in the original probable cause 
affidavit is supplemented with new information obtained from an interview Detective Schei, of 
the Pocatello Police Department, conducted with April L. Phillips. The Affidavit of Probable 
Cause dated October 4, 2006, reports that Ms. Phillips had observed "a lot [sic] of knives in 
Torey's [Adamcik] bedroom closest;" she had been in Torey's [Adamcik] house about five 
times"; the last time she was in Adamcik's house was "about a month and a half' prior to the 
interviev,, date; " that Ms. Phillips "thought it was weird that Torey's [Adamcik] knives were 
hidden from his mom''; Ms. Phillips advised "that Torey [Adamcik] has a place in his bedroom 
where he hides stufr' this is a "heating vent in his room and he puts his dresser on top of it." 
18This information is obtained by Bannock County Detective Tom Foltz from a "person who is known to [Detective Foltz] but 
wishes to remain anonymous." See Affidavit of Probable Cause, P.C.R, Petition, Exhibit E. 
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Based upon the information in this Affidavit of Probable Cause, law enforcement sought 
and obtained the first search warrant issued on October 4, 2006. This Search Warrant expressly 
authorized law enforcement to "search for [at the Adamcik residence] and seize all evidence 
including, but not limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as 
fingerprints, knives, clothing, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes and any indicia 
\Yhatsoever of this crime." 
Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum essentially outlines three (3) reasons for his claim 
that probable cause was Jacking. First, he argues that the notebooks "were not found in the 
alleged hiding place." Instead, they were found in "Torey's [Adamcik] closest.'' See Supporting 
Memorandum, p. 18. The fact that the notebooks were found in Adamcik's bedroom closet 
rather than the heater vent, does not invalidate the warrant. Second, Adamcik asserts that there 
was "no indication in the Affidavit that Ms. Phillips was reliable." Id. This is simply inaccurate. 
While there is no express statement vouching for Ms. Phillips' reliability contained in the 
Affidavit of Probable Cause; a cursory review of the Affidavit of Probable Cause reveals that 
much of the information Ms. Phillips provided in her interview was consistent with other 
information law enforcement had garnered during the course of its investigation. This fact, in 
and of itself, is evidence of reliability. Further, as outlined in Belden, when the Court of Appeals 
cites to the United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 
S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983) (Gates), "the task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place." Applying this language to Ms. Phillips) statements, the 
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veracity and basis of knowledge appears to relatively high. As noted, the information is 
consistent with other information law enforcement had acquired from other sources during the 
course of its investigation and the source of her knowledge is from her own personal 
observations and dealings with Adamcik. Finally, Ms. Phillips' information, when coupled with 
the other information contained in the October 4, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause, supports the 
finding of probable cause and the issuance of the Search Warrant in question. As noted in Gate.,\ 
the test is a totality of the circumstances of the test. On the record before this Court on summary 
dismissal and applying the standard outlined in Belden which requires great deference be 
afforded the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant and reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause dated October 4, 2006, this Court 
cannot find that the Judge Woodland abused his discretion in issuing the requested search 
warrant. Rather, the Cou11 finds the determination to issue the Search Warrant dated October 4, 
2006 to be a practical, commonsense decision, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying 
hearsay information, that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in 
Adamcik's residence and specifically in his room's closet or heater vent. 
The third and last issue raised in Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum appears to be that 
the information provided by Ms. Phillips is stale or dated. Her information concerning 
Adamcik's room and house was qualified by her acknowledgement that she had not been in 
Adamcik's house for approximately one and one half months prior to Stoddart's murder. 
Similarly, this Court cannot conclude that this information is stale or too remote to be part of the 
overall basis for issuing a search warrant. Adamcik was living at his parent's residence. There 
is no evidence that he had any other places where he would keep his private items. As noted in 
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Belden, the burden of proof is on Adamcik to show that the search was invalid. Adamcik has not 
come forward with any evidence that items which he had historically kept in his bedroom, closet 
or heater vent, had been moved or relocated in the intervening month and a half. One and a half 
months between the time Ms. Phillips was last at Adamcik's residence and the time of the 
murder does not make Ms. Phillips' information stale under the facts of this case. 
Therefore, in applying the rationale outlined in Baldwin, this Comi concludes that any 
attempt by Adamcik's defense counsel to suppress the search by which law enforcement came to 
be in possession of the notebook at issue, would have been unsuccessful and denied by the trial 
court. Therefore, this issue fails to support Adamcik's claim of deficient performance on behalf 
of his defense team. Therefore, the Court will DENY Adamcik's claim of ineffective assistance 
counsel on this portion of Adamcik's third cause of action and will GRANT the State's request 
for summary dismissal on this p01iion of Adamcik's third cause of action. 19 
ii. Suppression of "Kiddie Pom". 
Adamcik's argument in support of his post-conviction relief claim relative to his third 
cause of action, as it relates to the suppression of the evidence of "kiddie pom" is circuitous and 
complex. In summary, he claims that he has been prejudiced at his trial because of his defense 
team's deficient performance. This deficient performance consists of a failure to put on any 
proof of Adamcik's good character and also a failure to put on proof of his co-defendant's, 
Draper, prior bad acts. Adamcik advances the position that this evidence "formed a large basis 
of the [Adamcik] defense." Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, p.22. However, when 
confronted with the State's threat to use evidence of '"kiddie porn' photographs", which the 
State had discovered when analyzing the contents of a computer seized by law enforcement 
19Based upon the Court's ruling, there is no need for the Court to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. 
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incident to the search conducted on September 27, 2006, if Adamcik's defense team called 
Adamcik's character witnesses, defense counsel relented and abandoned their plan and strategy 
to put on this character evidence. Therefore, Adamcik contends a "large basis of [Adarncik's] 
defense" was abandoned and the "critically important [objective] to differentiate Torey 
[Adamcik] from Brian Draper" was similarly not pursued. 
Memorandum, p. 22. 
Adamcik's Supporting 
Once again, the critical analysis the Court must grapple with is whether a motion to 
suppress, if pursued by the defense team, would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence 
i.e. the computer tower and/or the "kiddie pom" photographs retrieved from the computer tower. 
The computer tower in issue was seized by law enforcement pursuant to a Search 
Wal1'ant issued on September 27, 2006. The basis asserted by law enforcement for the issuance 
of the September 27, 2006 Search Wanant is contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause of the 
same date. 
This issue presents a more difficult analysis than the issue arising from the seizure of the 
notebook. The September 27, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause, after outlining the pertinent 
facts supporting the request, requests authorization "to search for and to seize evidence, 
including but not limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as 
clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes garbage bags, computer, computer 
programs, cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information, fingerprints and any 
indicia whatsoever of this crime." See P.C.R. Petition, Exhibit E. 
However, despite the breadth of this request, the magistrate judge issuing the September 
27, 2006 Search Warrant restricted the scope of the Search Warrant to a "search for and seiz[ure 
of] all evidence including but not limited to bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace 
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evidence as well as finger prints and indicia of crime"; despite the fact that the request contained 
in the September 27, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause requested "clothing, knives, scripts, 
journals, video cameras, video tapes garbage bags, computer, computer programs, cellular 
telephones and cellular telephone account information." Those items are expressly excluded 
from the warrant.20 In this Court's mind, this creates a perplexing and impo1tant issue of fact. 
Did the magistrate judge intend to sign a search warrant authorizing a search consistent with the 
"requesting language" from the September 27, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause or did the 
magistrate judge purposefully delete from the "authorizing language" from the September 27, 
2006 Search Warrant language that mirrored the requesting language from the supporting 
affidavit.21 If the latter is in fact the case, then it would appear that Adamcik's position has merit 
and that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the warrant in seizing computers from the 
Adamcik residence incident to the search conducted on September 27, 2006. At a minimum this 
creates a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to support the presentation of evidence with 
respect to this issue.22 
20This fact is particularly curious to the Court. The Court. having considered and issued many warrants, is familiar with the 
process of preparation and obtaining warrants. The normal practice is that the party preparing the affidavit of probable cause and 
the search warrant itself generally will copy and paste the same language, verbatim. from the affidavit requesting permission to 
search into the search warrant itself. This gives rise to the question - why does the "requesting language'' in the supporting 
affidavit not mirror the "authorizing language" in the September 27, 2006 Search Warrant. Adamcik postulates that the reason 
for this discrepancy is that the issuing magistrate judge agreed with his position that there was no probable cause to conduct a 
search for the excluded items and required that portions of the "requesting language" be stricken from the September 27, 2006 
Search Warrant before he would sign the same. See Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, p. 16 ("the magistrate judge must 
have agreed with the above because he did not authorize the seizure or search of any computers"). However, it is also plausible 
that this discrepancy is merely a scrivener's error and that during the course of preparing the supporting affidavit and the search 
warrant, an error occurred and a portion of the "requesting language" was inadvertently deleted or not properly copied and pasted 
into the search warrant itself. 
21 1n this Court's mind this also renders moot the inquiry concerning whether there was probable cause pursuant to the September 
27. 2006 Affidavit or Probahle Cause to authorize seizure of computers. Whether or not there was probable cause becomes moot 
because law enforcement is authorized to search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to a 
search warrant. Therefore, if the magistrate, even incorrectly, determines there is not probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant, law enforcement is limited by the parameters of the search warrant issued. See .':i,ale v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781, 787, 
760 P.2d J 197, 1203 (Ct.App. 1988). 
22If seizing the computers from the Adamcik residence exceeded the scope of the September 27. 2006 Search Warrant, the 
October 4. 2006 Search Warrant authorizing law enforcement to search the computers it had in its possession must also be invalid 
because the computers were obtained and possessed by law enforcement illegally. 
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Therefore, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of fact when the Court 
construes the evidence in favor of the non~moving party, Adamcik, and applies all reasonable 
inferences in Adamcik's favor. Therefore, the Court will require an evidentiary hearing on this 
issue. In construing this issue in Adamcik's favor, the Court concludes that there are genuine 
issues of material fact which could support a finding that Adamcik's defense team was deficient 
in not identifying this issue and seeking to suppress the fruits of this search. 
However, despite this lengthy analysis, the Court concludes that Adamcik's claim in this 
respect must fail under the "prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. Therefore, the Court will 
GRANT the State summary dismissal on Adamcik's third cause of action as it relates to his 
claim that he was prejudiced as a result of his defense team's failure in filing a motion to 
suppress the evidence of"kiddie porn" photos. 
Adamcik's prejudice argument is predicated upon and anchored in a great deal of 
conjecture and speculation. In summary, this argument goes as follows: had defense counsel 
successfully suppressed the "kiddie porn" photographic evidence, then they would have put on 
evidence of Draper's prior bad acts and of Adamcik's good character. All of this may be true. 
However, Adamcik's argument presupposes that this evidence of Draper's prior bad acts and 
Adamcik's good character would rise to such a level that it would have tipped the balance in his 
favor. In other words, would this evidence of Draper's bad acts and Adamcik's good character 
have been sufficient to convince the jury that he was not guilty first-degree murder? 
On Adamcik's direct appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Supreme Court addressed 
the quantum and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction at the hands of the jury. 
In doing so, the evidence was chronicled as follows: 
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Contrary to Adarncik's argument, there is substantial evidence in the record upon 
which a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamcik 
was guilty of first-degree murder. Dr. Skoumal, the medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy on Stoddart, testified that Stoddart died from multiple stab 
wounds to the trunk. Dr. Skoumal also testified that twelve of the thirty knife-
related wounds on Stoddart's body had the potential to be fatal. Of those twelve, Dr. 
Skoumal was unable to identify the specific wounds that caused Stoddart's death, 
but it is clear from his testimony that she died as a result of more than one of those 
twelve stab wounds. According to Dr. Skoumal, one of those wounds, referred to as 
wound number 1; 
was located in Stodda11's mid, upper chest.... 
The tissues that it penetrated included the skin, muscle, soft tissue, right rib 
number three, the mediastinum-which is in the middle of the chest-the 
pericardia! sac-which is the sac overlining the heart-the right ventricle-
which is a part of the heart. And there were two cups of blood in the 
pericardial sac surrounding the heart. 
It's my opinion that the vital structures were injured, and it had the potential 
to be fatal. 
In response to a subsequent question from the prosecutor, as to whether wound 
number 1 was "potentially fatal," Dr. Skoumal answered in the affirmative. 
Dr. Garrison testified that at least two knives were used in the murder of Stoddart, 
one with a serrated blade, and another with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison 
based this conclusion on the fact that some of the wounds contained excoriations 
and tears around their edges, which is consistent with the use of a knife with a 
serrated blade, while other wounds contained no such excoriations or tears, which 
is consistent with the use of a knife with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison further 
testified that wound number 1 did not contain any irregular cuts, which would be 
expected if wound number 1 was inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. 
From the testimony of these two witnesses, taken together, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that wound number 1, which was a potentially fatal wound, was 
inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. Therefore, the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that two knives were used during the attack on Stoddart, 
and that both knives inflicted wounds that could have caused Stoddat1's death. 
[Footnote 5 deleted by the Court] 
Adamcik's friend, Joe Lucero, testified that he bought four knives for Adamcik 
and Draper. Lucero said that he used $45 to pay for the knives-$40 from Draper 
and $5 from Adamcik. Lucero identified four of the State's exhibits as the knives 
he bought. One of the knives had a serrated blade; the other three knives were 
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non-sctTated. Police found all four knives at the BRC site. Lucero testified that 
Draper made a point to claim ownership of the serrated knife. 
The jury was presented with evidence that two knives inflicted potentially fatal 
wounds, and that Adamcik and Draper collaborated in the murder. This 
collaboration is supported by the BRC tape wherein Draper and Adamcik discuss 
their joint plan to kill Stoddart. The jury was also provided with evidence 
suggesting that Adamcik and Draper were together immediately after Stoddart's 
murder, and jointly attempted to hide weapons and clothing used during the 
commission of the murder. The jury watched the video of police interviewing 
Adamcik, during which Adamcik made verbal and nonverbal assertions that can 
reasonably be construed as his confessing to stabbing Stoddart. This evidence, 
coupled with the testimony provided by the State's experts, is sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that: ( 1) two knives were used to murder Stoddart; (2) 
both knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife with 
the serrated blade which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the 
other knife was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured 
Stoddart's vital structures and which had the potential to be fatal. No evidence 
was introduced that would contradict such conclusions. 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460-63, 272 P.3d 417, 432-35 (2012). 
In order for Adamcik to survive summary dismissal on this issue, he would be required to 
establish "'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694. The Strickland 
Court provides further guidance when it states that "a reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id 
This Court cannot say that even if Adamcik's defense team had put on evidence of 
Draper's bad acts and/or evidence of Adamcik's good character, that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that such evidence would have tipped the balance in Adamcik's favor and resulted in 
the jury disregarding the evidence outlined in the Supreme Court's recitation of evidence 
supporting the verdict and resulted in the jury finding him not guilty of the first-degree murder of 
Stoddart. To reach such a conclusion one would be required to reso1t to speculation and 
co1\jecture. In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792, 178 L.Ed.2d. 624 (2011) 
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the United States Supreme Court noted that "the likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable." As noted in Rhodes "[W]here the evidentiary facts are not 
disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is 
appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the couit alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P .3d at 
1069. In light of the evidence which is in the record on summary dismissal and which was 
considered by the jury in the underlying proceeding, this Cou1t will not speculate and in this 
Court's mind reach the unreasonable inference that the jury's collective judgment and wisdom 
would have been changed by the introduction of this character evidence. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that no genuine issue of fact has been established by 
Adamcik as it relates to the second Strickland prong, prejudice. As such, the Court will GRANT 
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to that portion of Adamcik's third cause 
of action for ineffective assistance of counsel relative to Adamcik's claim that his defense team 
failed to move to suppress evidence of~'kiddie porn" photographs. 
4. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO 
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO 
EXCLUDE TOREY'S INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In his fourth claim, Adamcik argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because his defense team failed to move to exclude Adamcik's invocation of the right to counsel 
in a video that was presented to the jury during the course his trial. See P.C.R. Petition, pp. 34-
35. 
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A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard 
The same standard of review is applicable with respect to this cause of action as Adamcik's 
second cause of action. Therefore, the Court will not repeat the standard, but refers and 
incorporates the standard outlined in section 2.A. of this MD&O. 
B. STANDARD ON INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In general, the State may not comment upon or present evidence at trial of a defendanfs 
decision to exercise his right to remain silent or to be represented by counsel. See Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (Doyle)23 and Griffith v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (Griffith).24 These protections are rooted in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
C. DISCUSSION 
There is really no dispute that Adamcik's defense team did not bring such a motion on 
Adamcik's behalf. Aaron Thompson, one of Adamcik's defense counsel, acknowledges this fact 
in his deposition when the following dialogue occurs: 
Q. Okay. Did you file a motion to suppress the actual invocation of the right 
to counsel under Doyle versus Arizona? 1 mean Doyle versus Ohio? 
A. No. 
Q. Or Griffith versus California? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And did you have a reason not to do that? 
1
·
1Doyle stands for the proposition that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor 
seeks to impeach a defondant's exculpatory story or statements which are told for the lirst time at trial, by cross-examining the 
defendant about the defendant's post-arrest silence aller receiving Miranda warnings. 
14cJr{/Jlth stands for the proposition that the Fillh and Fourteenth Amendments forbid prosecutorial comment on the accused's 
silence or failure to testify. 
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A. I believe -- and this is all on me. I was the one making the decision with 
regard to how to approach the suppression. 
I was so focused on the two aspects. I was focused on one, that there was 
invocation by Shannon and Sean that should have been respected and I felt like 
was completely disrespected. And the post-invocation, functional equivalent of 
counseling that the Doyle argument \Vas not made. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That would be my fault. 
Deposition Aaron Thompson, p. 75, LL. 8-25, p. 76, L.l. 
Therefore; there is not any significant dispute concerning whether the Adamcik defense 
team's performance was deficient with respect to the so called Doyle Argument. As Mr. 
Thompson related, he was so focused on the suppression issue regarding the September 27, 2006 
intenogation that he neglected to make the Doyle Argument. 
The Com1 would note that this issue was not raised by Adamcik on direct appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. The Court assumes that the reason this was not raised on direct appeal is 
that appellate counsel concluded that because the issue had not been raised at the trial level, it 
had not been preserved for appeal. 
As discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminantc, 499 U.S. 
279, 306-07, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (Fulminante), had this matter been 
raised or addressed on direct appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the standard would be a 
"ham1less error" standard: 
Since this Court's landmark decision in Chapman v. Califim1ia, 386 U.S. 18, 87 
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( 1967), in which we adopted the general rule that a 
constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction, the 
Court has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors and has 
recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless. See, e.g., Clemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-754, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450-1451, 108 L.Ed.2d 
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725 ( 1990) (unconstitutionally overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage 
of a capital case); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 lJ.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 
L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital 
case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Carella v. 
California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) jury 
instruction containing an enoneous conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 
U.S. 497, 501-504, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-1923, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) Gury 
instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 ( 1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous 
rebuttable presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 
2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony 
regarding the circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's 
right to cross-examine a witness for bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Ciause);Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-118, and n. 2, 104 
S.Ct 453, 454-455, and n. 2, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right 
to be present at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 
L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at trial, in 
violation of the J;'ifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. 
Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (statute improperly 
forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction on a lesser jncluded offense in a 
capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 
U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the 
presumption of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232, 98 S.Ct. 458, 
466, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (admission of identification evidence in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 
231-232, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570-1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973)(admission of the out-
of-comt statement of a nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment Counsel Clause); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 
33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) ( confession obtained in violation of Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964)); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981-1982, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 
( 1970) (admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 2003-
2004, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970)(denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing m 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause). 
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[Bold Emphasis Added by Court]. The United States Supreme Court goes on to discuss the use 
of the harmless-error standard in the situation cited above. It states as follows: 
The common thread connecting these cases is that each involved "trial error" -
error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which 
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In applying han11less-error analysis to these many different 
constitutional violations, the Court has been faithful to the belief that the 
harmless-error doctrine is essential to preserve the "principle that the central 
purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt 
or innocence, and promotes public respect for the process by focusing on the 
underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of 
immaterial error." Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S., at 681, 107 S.Ct., at 1436 
(citations omitted). 
Id. 499 U.S., at 308, 111 S.Ct. 1264. 
However, because this issue is raised on post-conviction relief rather than by way of a 
direct appeal, the applicable standard for this Court's analysis is the second prong of the 
Strickland standard and not the harmless-error standard outlined in Fulminante. As has been 
discussed above with respect to Adamcik's other ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
Strickland's second prong requires a showing of prejudice which requires that Adamcik establish 
that "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been differene' Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694. 
In applying the facts and circumstance before the Court on summary dismissal, the Court 
concludes that Adamcik's defense team failed to raise the "Doyle Argument" and that said 
failure was deficient and had this motion been raised, at the trial comi level, it likely would have 
been successful.25 Therefore, the Court must consider whether this deficiency on the part of the 
2;Further, the Court also concludes that had the issue been raised at the trial court level and denied by Judge McDermott, this 
Court believes that such a ruling would likely have been deemed to be a trial court error by the Idaho Supreme Court under Doyle 
and Griffith and their progeny. However, the Court also concludes that the Supreme Court would have determined that this 
hypothetical trial court error was harmless-error on a direct appeal. 
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Adamcik defense team meets the second prong of Strickland standard. In order to address this 
issue, the Courl must address the circumstances surrounding Adamcik 's invocation of counsel. 
The evidence in the record on summary dismissal reflects that Stoddart was murdered on 
September 22, 2006. Adamcik was first interviewed by Jaw enforcement on September 24, 
2006. Adamcik denied "that either he or Brian Draper was involved with Ms. Sloddart's death." 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview of Torey 
Adamcik, p. 2. On September 27, 2006, a second Adamcik interview was conducted by law 
enforcement. This interview was conducted following three (3) separate interviews with Draper 
and other investigative efforts of law enforcement. During the course of these three (3) 
interviews, Draper eventually advised that Adamcik had stabbed Stoddait, denying that he had 
been involved in the actual stabbing himself. He further led law enforcement to a location in 
Black Rock Canyon to locate various items taken to that location by himself and Adamcik. 
Prior to the September 27, 2006 interview with law enforcement, Adamcik and his 
parents met with counsel. However, counsel did not accompany them to the interview. 
Although it appears counsel was paid an initial fee for this consultation, it does not appear that 
counsel was retained to represent Adamcik's interest beyond that initial consultation. lt appears 
that there was a factual dispute between law enforcement and Adamcik's parents concerning 
circumstances arising immediately prior to the September 27, 2006 interview. Adamcik argued 
that his mother invoked his right to counsel before this interview and that this invocation was 
disregarded and ignored by law enforcement. Law enforcement disagrees and contends that the 
interviews were conducted appropriately under the law. The trial court concluded pursuant to 
Adamcik's Motion to Suppress Videotaped interview of Torey Adamcik that: (l) law 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON ADAMCIK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DISPOSITlON AND 
THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL -34 
398 of 742 
enforcement and Adamcik's parents discussed having counsel present for the interview; (2) if 
Adamcik's mother had in fact invoked Adamcik's right to counsel, that invocation had been 
waived "once they agreed to go forward with the interview, under the condition that they could 
stop the interview at any time"; and (3) Detectives Ganske, Thomas and Marchand did not 
coerce [Adamcik's parents] into agreeing to go forward with the interview by threatening them 
with Torey's possible detention." Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress 
Videotaped Interview of Torey Adamcik, p. 38, -ii, 1-3.26 
Ultimately an interview was conducted at the Pocatello Police Station. Adamcik and his 
parents were present.27 This first portion of this interview continued for over an hour and 
nineteen minutes when Adamcik requested that he be allowed to "talk to with an attorney." See 
Trial Exhibit 12. At this time, the detective primarily in charge of the interview, Detective 
Ganske, advises "we can do that." Id. Adamcik's father then inquires "can you talk to me" and 
Adamcik responds "probably, ya." Id. Adamcik's father then inquires of the detectives 
concerning whether he can "have a minute with him [referring to AdamcikV' The detective 
responds "sure'' and arrangements are made for a private room to allow this conversation 
between father and son to take place. Id. 28 
After the private conversation with Adamcik and his father, the videotape of the 
interview resumes again. Once Adamcik and his father have come back into the interview room, 
Adamcik's father has a brief discussion with the detectives concerning his wife's return. He then 
26Thc issues raised by Adamcik through his defense team in the Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview or Torey Adamcik are 
not before this Court in this post-conviction relief proceeding. 
27 t\damclk's mother did leave during the course of this interview to pick up her son from a football game. 
ixlt should be noted that the entirety of this interview up to and including the request by Adamcik to "talk to with an attorney" 
was ruled by the trial court to be admissible and played to the jury. See trial court's ruling as contained in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview of Torey Adamcik. Again, this issue is not before the Court on 
post-conviction relief except as it relates to the Doyle component. 
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has a brief exchange with Adamcik before the detectives return to the interview room. The 
detectives then return to the room and a few comments are made. At this time, the following 
dialogue takes place: 
Sean Adamcik: He just um - based upon what the lawyer said- he's just worried 
about telling you guys anything ... 
Detective Ganske: Well here's the deal. .. 
Detective Thomas: (Interrupting Detective Ganske and Sean): Dad, I think we 
owe it to you at this point to find out what we know at this point. There's just no 
easy way to tell you this. We do know that Sean [Detective Ganske corrects 
supplying the name "Torey"] or excuse me Torey and, um [Detective Thomas 
supplies the name "Brian"] Brian have gone back in the house, okay, we do know 
that the two of them murdered, we do know that they murdered Cassie. Okay? 
We've got the evidence at this point to prove that [Detective Ganske makes a 
statement that the Court can't quite hear]. We also have some overwhelming 
evidence - uh trace evidence, that type of stuff that's going to prove that they did 
it as well. It's not just hearsay. It's not just somebody saying it. And then we do 
have a confession from another person giving full disclosure. 
Sean: (directed to Adamcik) So is that why you want a lawyer? 
Detective Ganske: (speaking to Sean) And here's the deal and here's the deal with 
you. What I would like to do is maybe when your wife comes back sit down and 
talk with you all and get you up to speed. 
Detective Ganske: (speaking to Adamcik) You know what you need to do. You 
know exactly what happened and you know what you need to do. So 
unfortunately, you're not going anywhere tonight. You're going to be placed in 
custody tonight. Okay? Um - I'm sorry that's the way it goes, but ... 
Detective Thomas: You are going to be charged with First Degree Murder. 
Detective Ganske: Okay? But like I said before, before you say anything, I 
encourage you to talk to an attomey. You should do that. I am not pulling any 
punches here, still, your - your full cooperation can do nothing but help you at 
this point in time. 
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Sean: Do you understand that Torey? You know you need a lawyer or whatever 
- you want to talk to a lawyer -- I understand that's the advice they gave you 
today, and then whatever you and the lawyer work out. They want you to 
cooperate ... 
Detective Ganske: (speaking to Adamcik) We know the details. We got the knife 
that you used, we got the mask that you used, we've got the videotape. We've got 
it. There's a tape up in there that you buried. Okay? You tried to catch it on fire. 
All that stuff. You know what I'm talking about, I don't need to tell you that. 
Sean: This is right, Torey ... 
Adamcik: Yeah. 
Sean: What they are saying is true? 
Adamcik: nods in the affirmative. 
Trial Exhibit 12.29 
It is important when considering the second or prejudice prong of the Strickland standard 
that Adamcik's defense team requested that the trial court suppress the entire Adamcik interview 
of September 27, 2006 on the basis that his mother had initially invoked Adamcik's right to 
counsel on his behalf, well before he invoked his right to counsel. The trial cout1 denied this 
motion and this matter is not before the Court on summary dismissal. 
The issue before the Court is Adamcik's defense team's failure to seek the suppression of 
the invocation of his right to counsel. In considering this failure on the record before the Court, 
it cannot be said that this failure was prejudicial as that term has been defined and applied under 
the Strickland test. Certainly there is no quantitative measurement for prejudice. However, as 
the Court compares the damage done to Adamcik's defense, utilizing an analogy to earthquakes, 
NThe quoted version of this dialogue as used in this MD&O was prepared by the Court upon viewing and listening to Trial 
Exhibit 12 and also milizing the transcribed portion of this interview as contained in the trial court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order. pp. 30·3 l. 
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the dialogue between the detectives and Adamcik's father in which Sean Adamcik asked 
Adamcik if the detective's recitation of the evidence was true to which Adamcik both replies 
"yes" and nods in the affirmative registers a 9 plus earthquake on the Richter Scale and the 
invocation of the right to counsel, the tremor that precedes the 9 plus earthquake, registers a 2 on 
the Richter Scale. Any inference of guilt the jury may have drawn from the State's introduction 
of Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel is far outweighed by the inferences created from 
Adamcik's responses to his own father's queries, both of which were expressly ruled upon by the 
trial comt to be admissible and are not the subject of collateral attack in this post-conviction 
relief proceeding. Any prejudice flowing from this invocation is diluted even further in light of 
the evidence outlined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Adamcik's direct appeal supporting the 
jury's verdict in this matter. Supra., pp. 25-27. The Court cannot conclude that the exclusion of 
Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel would have created "a reasonable probability that 
... the result of the proceedings would have been different" nor does it "undermine the [Court's] 
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694.30 
Therefore, despite the fact that the trial team was deficient in its perfom1ance in failing to 
identify and raise the Doyle issue with the trial court, this Court concludes that the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland standard has not been met by Adamcik. He has failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary dismissal on this cause of action. As such 
30The Court recognizes that at the summary dismissal stage of a post-conviction relief proceeding. the Court is to apply the same 
standard applicable in a summary judgment proceeding under LR.C.P. 56. This standard requires that the Court construe the 
evidence in a light most reasonable to the non-moving party. As it relates to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the non· 
moving party is Adamcik. This standard similarly provides that all "reasonable inferences" must be construed in favor of the 
non-moving party. However. the Court again relies upon the language in Rhodes "(w]hcrc the cvidcntiary facts are not disputed 
and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." 148 Idaho 
at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069. This Court will make the inference and concludes that to do so would be umeasonable that defense 
counsel's failure to raise and suppress the Doyle issue amounted to prejudice as that term has been utilized in Strickland in light 
of the much stronger inferences lo be drnwn from Adamdk's responses to his father's queries and the substantial evidence 
introduced at trial of his guilt. 
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the Court will DISMISS Adamcik's Fourth Cause of Action and GRANT the State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal alleging ineffective assistance of Adamcik's defense team, on the basis that 
Adamcik has not raised a genuine issue of fact demonstrating a reasonable probability that the 
result of his jury trial and the subsequent guilty verdict would have been different had this issue 
successfully been raised at trial. 
5. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO 
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL THE ABOVE 
INSTANCES OF DEFECIENT PERFORMANCE PREJUDICIED HIM. 
Adamcik's fifth cause of action alleges an ineffective assistance of counsel cause of 
action premised upon the argument that although any one (1) of the above referenced claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may not have resulted in satisfying the prejudice prong of 
Strickland, the cumulative effect of the foregoing alleged multiple instances of ineffective 
assistance counsel, do satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Adamcik's ineffective 
assistance causes of action as asserted in his P.C.R. Petition are as follows: ( 1) Second Cause of 
Action - Failure to Obtain the Murder Weapons for Testing by Defense Expert; (2) Third Cause 
of Action - Failure to Move to Suppress Evidence, a Notebook and Photographs of "Kiddie 
Porn"; and (3) Fourth Cause of Action - Failure to Move to Suppress Adamcik's invocation of 
his right to counsel during the September 27, 2006 interview. 
The Court has ruled that Adamcik is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether his 
defense team's failure to request, either through pre-trial discovery and/or motion practice, the 
actual knives introduced into evidence was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland 
standard, as well as the prejudice prong of Strickland. The Court has likewise ruled that there is 
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a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Adamcik's defense team was deficient in failing to 
move to suppress the prosecution's use of the "Kiddie Porn" photographs.31 Finally, the Court 
has also ruled that Adamcik's defense team was deficient in failing to file a motion to suppress 
Adamcik's invocation of the right to counsel, the so~called Doyle issue.32 
Because the Court has ruled that there is a genuine issue of material fact on whether 
Adamcik's defense team was deficient on cause of action two, and because the Court has ruled 
that Adamcik's defense team was deficient on portions of cause of action three and cause of 
action four, the Court must DENY both patties' motions for summary dismissal on cause of 
action five. The Court must wait and conduct an cvidentiary hearing to review the evidence in 
suppo11 of these three (3) claimed deficiencies and whether the combined cumulative effect of 
the deficiencies in order determine if the cumulative effect of two (2) or more of these 
deficiencies gives rise to "a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceedings would 
have been different" thereby "undermin[ing] the [Court's] confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694. 
Therefore, each party's request for summary dismissal of cause of action number five of 
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition is hereby DENIED, and this cause of action ,.vill proceed to 
evidentiary hearing. 
31 Although the Court granted the State summary dismissal on this cause of action on the basis that there was no genuine issue of 
fact that would allow this matter to proceed to an evidentiary hearing as it related to the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
standard. 
32Again. the Court granted summary dismissal on this cause of action on the basis that there was no genuine issue of fact that 
would allow this matter to proceed to an cvidentimy hearing as it related to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. 
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6. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO 
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL :FAILED TO COMMUNICATE A 
FAVORABLE PLEA OFFER TO HIM. 
In his sixth cause of action, Adamcik argues that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel because his counsel failed to communicate a favorable plea offer to him. The State seeks 
summary dismissal of this claim. Adamcik, in turn, concedes that this cause of action is not ripe 
for summary dismissal, but asserts that due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact, 
this matter should proceed to an evidentiary hearing. The Court agrees with Adamcik that this 
claim must proceed to an evidentiary hearing because of the existence of disputed issues of 
material fact. 
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition is verified. In Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, he asserts as 
follnws: 
107. Sometime after February 14[, 2007] and before and the start of the Brian 
Draper trial [April, 2007]. the state made a plea offer to Torey that it would 
withdraw the request for fixed life and recommended a fixed sentence of 30 years 
in exchange for Torey pleading guilty to the charges. 
108. Defense counsel never informed Torey or his parents of this offer. 
109. Torey would have accepted this plea offer had he known about it. 
P.C.R. Petition, p. 36, 1~[107-10.33 In addition Adamcik, in response to the States Motion for 
Summary Dismissal on this cause of action, also filed the Heideman Affidavit and Pearson 
Affidavit (both asserting that the State made an offer to Adamcik's defense team of "life with 30 
years fixed in exchange for a guilty plea to the murder charges") along with the Sean Adamcik 
33As noted earlier in this MD&O, "a verified complaint has the force. and effect of an affidavit in suppot1 of a motion for 
summary judgment so long as it conforms to the requirements of Rule 56(e)." Drennan, 145 Idaho at 603, 181 P.3d 524, 529, 
footnote 3. 
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Affidavit and the Sha1mon Adamcik Affidavit (both asserting that the State's offer was never 
communicated to them). 
Despite the State's protestations to the contrary, these claims, while in direct 
contradictions to the assertions of Mr. Rammell, as outlined in his deposition, do create genuine 
issues of material fact and when construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Adamcik, 
must be accepted as true at the summary dismissal stage of the proceedings. 
In Missouri v. Frye,_ U.S. __ , 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (Frye), 
the United States Supreme Court clearly establishes that "defense counsel has the duty to 
communicate fonnal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that 
may be favorable to the accused." The United States Supreme Court then articulates the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the context of a failure to communicate a formal offer 
from the prosecution in the following tenns: 
To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea offer has 
lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient performance, defendants 
must demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier 
plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel. Defendants must 
also demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been entered 
without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they 
bad the authority to exercise that discretion under state law. To establish prejudice 
in this instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability that the end result 
of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a 
lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time. Cf. Glover v. United States, 531 
U.S. 198, 203, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) ("[A]ny amount of 
[ additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment significance"). 
132 S.Ct. at p.1409. 
Based upon the conflicting affidavits in the record on summary disposition, the Comt will 
GRANT Adamcik an evidentiary hearing, and DENY the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal relative to both prongs of the Strickland test, as it relates to his claim that his defense 
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team failed to appropriately advise him and his family of a formal plea offer made by the State, 
and whether the failure of the defense team in communicating this formal offer of a life with a 
fixed thirty (30) year term, was prejudicial under the analysis outlined in Flye. 
7. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
IN HIS FAVOR BECAUSE THE FIXED LIFE SENTENCE IMPOSED 
PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
AND ARTICLE 1, §6 PROTECTIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENTS UNDER MILLER v. ALABAMA,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) 
It is the desire of the Court to issue this MD&O despite the fact that the Court continues 
to consider further Adamcik's argument arising out of Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S. _, 132 
S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (Afiller). The Court continues to evaluate Miller, the cases and rationale upon 
which Miller relies in relationship to the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling on Adamcik's direct 
appeal. However, because of the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on the other causes of 
action as outlined above and an impending trial date in April, 2015 on those issues, the Court 
desires to provide the parties with as much advance notice on those issues as possible. It is for 
this reason that the Comi will bifurcate this MD&O and will issue its decision on Adamcik's 
seventh cause of action shortly in separate Memorandum Decision and Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: ( 1) the State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik's First Cause of Action as outlined in his P.C.R. 
Petition is GRANTED; (2) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik's 
Second Cause of Action is DENIED;34 similarly, Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition 
on this cause of action is also DENIED; (3) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it 
relates to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action is GRANTED in part (failure to move to suppress 
34The Court did GRANT the State Summary Dismissal on a small portion of this claim. sec supra. at footnote 6. 
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notebook) and DENIED in part (failure to move to suppress "Kiddie Porn" photographs and 
resultant prejudice, if any), Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition is DENIED; (4) the 
State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik's Fourth Cause of Action is 
DENIED, Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition as to deficient performance is 
GRANTED and as to the prejudice is DENIED; (5) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
of Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED, Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition is 
likewise DENIED; and (6) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on Adamcik's Sixth 
Cause of Action is DENIED. 
This matter will proceed to an evidentiary hearing on those issues and claims surviving 
summary disposition as presently scheduled on April 21 through April 23, 2015. 
Dated this 14111 day of January, 2015. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
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TOREY ADAMCIK, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-3682 - pc_ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on July 21 and 22 of 2015. The bench 
trial addressed a number of Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik ("Adamcik"), claims for post-
conviction relief raised in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("P.C.R. Petition"). Adamcik 
was represented at the evidentiary hearing by counsel, Dennis A. Benjamin and Deborah 
Whipple. The State ofldaho ("State") was represented by counsel, Ian N. Service. 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, and following discussion with counsel, it was 
detem1ined that the Court would require that a transcript of this bench trial be prepared prior to post-
trial briefing. The Court outlined a post-trial briefing schedule to be followed by the parties once 
the transcript had been completed and provided to the Court and parties. The order required that the 
parties submit their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law along with closing arguments 
in separate submissions to the Court. The Comt's order outlined the timing associated with the 
various posHrial submissions. See Order and Briefing Schedule. The pm.ties complied with the 
Court's briefing schedule by submitting the requested post-trial submissions. Upon the filing of the 
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parties; post-trial submissions, the Court took the matter under advisement. The Court now enters 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order ("F.F.C.L. & 
M.D.O") as required by Rule 52(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("l.R.C.P.,') and Idaho 
Code ("LC.") § 19A907(a). 
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Adamcik's P .C.R. Petition arises out of the underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock 
County Case CR-2006-17984. In this proceeding, Adamcik was charged with and convicted by 
a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo Stoddart ("Stoddart"). Adamcik was 
also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, Brian Draper (Draper), to commit the first-
degree murder of Stoddart. At sentencing, Adamcik was sentenced to a thirty (30) year fixed 
sentence and an indeten11inate life sentence for the conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder 
charge and a fixed life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction of Stoddait. Adamcik 
filed a motion seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("I.C.R."). 
This motion was denied after hearing by the trial coutt. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In State 
v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.3d 417, 486-87 (2012) ("Adamcik"), the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed Adamcik's conviction and sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for 
Rehearing. The Idaho Supreme Cou11 denied the relief sought in Adamcik's Petition for 
Rehearing. Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the United States Supreme 
Court. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari was denied. State v. Adamcik, 133 S. Ct. 141, 184 L. 
Ed. 2d 68 (2012). 
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Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. His P.C.R. Petition outlines seven 
(7) separate claims upon which he requested post-conviction relief. 1 The parties filed cross 
motions for summary disposition pursuant to LC. §49-4906(c). 
After considering the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to the various 
motions for summary disposition, the Couii issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Adamcik's Motion for Paiiial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. In doing so, the Court granted summary dismissal in favor of the State on a number 
of Adamcik's claims for post-conviction relief. See Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. 
At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court also denied po1iions of 
the parties' cross motions for summary disposition, concluding that there were triable issues of 
material fact. The claims that the Court ordered would proceed to trial were as follows: (I) 
Adamcik's ''SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied Effective Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial in Violation of the 61h Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because Counsel Failed to get Important 
Expert Testimony before the Jury in part because they Failed to Obtain the Murder Weapons for 
Testing by the Defense Expert"; (2) "FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied 
Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho 
Constitution Article I, Section 13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because 
1At Adamcik's request, the Court took judicial notice of the trial transcript in Stale v. Torey Adamcik, Bannock County Case CR~ 
2006-17984. This included the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the "files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and other records 
in that case." See Order Taking Judicial Notice. As such, the Court reserves the right to refer to and rely upon the same in these 
F.F.C.L. & M.D.O. 
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the Cumulative Effect of all the above Instances of Deficient Performance Pr~judiced him";2 and 
(3) "SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied Effective Assistance Counsel at Trial in 
Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article l, Section 13 under Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because Trial Counsel failed to Communicate a Favorable 
Plea Offer to him." 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of 
Law, they are hereby incorporated into the Court's Conclusions of Law. 
1. When Adamcik was sixteen (16) years of age he was arrested and charged with the 
crimes of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 
2. Shortly after Adamcik's arrest, Adamcik's family retained the law finn of May, 
Rammell and Thompson, Chartered to represent his interest in these criminal proceedings. 
Adamcik was represented at trial and at all stages of the pretrial proceedings by this law firm. 
Adamcik's defense at trial was primarily handled by attorneys, Gregory C. May ("May"), Bron 
M. Rammell {"Rammell") and Aaron N. Thompson CThompson") (referred to collectively as 
"Defense Team"). 
3. In Bannock County Case Number CR-2006-17984, Adamcik was convicted by a jury 
of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 
4. Following Adamcik's conviction, the Honorable Peter D. McDermott sentenced 
2Although the Corni granted the State's request for summary disposition relative to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action and Fourth 
Cause of Action, the basis for doing so was that the evidence did not establish prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 280 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Strickland"). However, with respect to both Adamcik's 
Third Cause of Action and his Fourth Cause of Action, the Court <lid determine that there were genuine issues of material fact 
concerning deficient performance on the part of the Adamcik Defense Team, the first Strickland prong. As a result, at the 
cvidentiary hearing, the Court did allow Adamcik to put on proof of deficient performance relative to Cause of Action Two 
(which the Court denied at summary dismissal), Cause of Action Three (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with 
respect to the prejudice prong), and Cause of Action Four (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with respect to the 
prejudice prong), for the purpose of attempting to establish that the cumulative effect of the deficient conduct of the Defense 
Team amounted to prejudice under the second S1r/ckla11d prong. 
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Adamcik to a thit1y (30) year fixed sentence and an indeterminate life sentence for conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder and a fixed life sentence for the first-degree murder of Stoddart. 
Adamcik's Second Cause of Action 
5. Adamcik's Second Cause of Action asse11s an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
on the basis that Adamcik's Defense Team's conduct at trial was deficient under the first 
Strickland prong. The basis for this claim was that Adamcik's Defense Team failed to get 
important defense testimony before the jury. The focus of this claim surrounds the expert 
testimony of Rudolph Reit ("Reif'). 
6. At trial, the State called Dr. Charles 0. Garrison, M.D. ("Dr. Garrison"), a forensic 
pathologist, to testify. Dr. Garrison, upon direct examination, testified that stab wounds to 
Stoddart's body were caused by at least two (2) separate knives. Trial Transcript (Tr. App.), p. 
2223, L. 23. In regard to Dr. Garrison's testimony that there were at least two (2) separate 
knives, he testified as follows: 
A. It is my opinion that there were at least two knives used, one of which was a 
nonscrrated blade and one of which was a serrated blade. 
Tr. App., p. 2225, LL. 16-19. Dr. Garrison presented a slide show depicting the various wounds 
to Stoddart's body. In doing so, he demonstrated to the jury both wounds that he contends were 
inflicted by a knife with a serrated blade and other wounds, including Wound # 1, which he 
testified were caused by a non-serrated knife. Tr. App, pp. 2205-27. Dr. Garrison's slide show 
demonstrated the distinct characteristics of wounds caused by the two (2) knives and the 
distinctions between the wounds that would be caused by the two (2) knives. Id. 
7. Adamcik's Defense Team retained Dr. Edward Leis, M.D. ("Dr. Leisn}, a forensic 
pathologist, to testify at Adamcik's trial. Dr. Leis' testimony contradicted the testimony of Dr. 
Garrison. Dr. Leis testified that Wound# l, which was one (1) of the potentially fatal wounds 
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according to the testimony of Dr. Steven Skoumal ("Dr. Skoumal"), was caused by a knife with a 
serrated blade. Tr. App., pp. 2610-15. This testimony contradicted Dr. Garrison's testimony that 
at least two (2) knives had been used in the attack and supported Adamcik's theory that only one 
(1) knife was used and that Draper was the individual wielding that one (1) knife.3 
8. Reit was retained by Adamcik's Defense Team to provide forensic testimony 
concerning the knives admitted into evidence and purpo1ted to be the murder weapons. More to 
the point, Reit was being asked to testify concerning experiments he had conducted with 
exemplar knives. Specifically, his testimony was intended to establish that the exemplar knives 
"would make different marks on a body.n P.C.R. Petition, p. 14, ,r 50. The intended purpose 
behind Reit's testimony was to corroborate and bolster the testimony of Dr. Leis, the forensic 
pathologist hired by Adamcik's Defense Team. The purpose of the "knife experiment testimony 
was to show that Wound# l was caused by the serrated blade knife." Id. 
9. During Reit's trial testimony, the State objected to Adamcik's Defense Team's 
attempt to introduce Exhibits demonstrating Reit's testimony and the results of his testing. 
These exhibits were Reit's work product associated with his experiments \Vith the exemplar 
knives. The apparent basis for the State's objection was relevance and foundation.4 
10. During the course of the argument concerning the admission of Reit's testimony and 
proposed exhibits, much of which occurred in front of the jury, counsel for the parties' 
arguments became heated. Adamcik's counsel, Rammell, argued that the Defense Team did "ask 
about the testing of the knives and were told that that would not be possible because of the 
unique characteristics or whatever of the knives." Tr. App., p. 2526, L. 25, p. 2527, LL. 1-5. 
3Dr. Garrison's opinion regarding at least two (2) knives being used in the attack <>n Stoddart was in large part based upon his 
conclusion that Wound# l was caused by a knife with a non-serrated blade. 
4Although the State never actually articulated the legal basis as being foundation, the argument surrounding the objection is most 
suggestive of Jack of foundation. The State essentially argued that since tests were performed by exemplar knives, rather than the 
actual knives, both the tests and the opinions derived from such tests are no! reliable and should not be admissible. See Tr. App., 
p. 2524, LL 8-19. 
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Therefore, Adamcik's Defense Team argued that they were required to use exemplar knives. 
11. Counsel for the State, Mark L. Heideman ("Heideman") aggressively disputed 
Rammell's contention in this regard. Heideman asse1ted that the State had "given them full 
access to all the evidence." Heideman ultimately stated that "for Mr. Rammell to stand here now 
and say the prosecutors or the police prohibited them [Adamcik's Defense Team] from using 
those knives, that's - that's a lie. That is not true." Tr. App. p. 2528, LL. 1 o~ 13. 
12. Reit was not allowed to testify at trial concerning his knife experiments and the 
conclusions drawn from those experiments. Additionally, the exhibits that were the product of 
his work product were refused admission into evidence. The trial court sustained the State's 
objection and concluded as follows: 
THE COURT: All right Mr. Rammell, this is a court of law and articles being 
similar to one in evidence and tests being done on an article similar to one in 
evidence is not sufficient. 
The items in evidence could have been released for testing to your witness, as 
some were, but -- not going to allow this fellow to testify to -- testify on tests run 
on knives he thinks are similar to one. 
Just not going to allow it, so we can shorten this up right now. These will not be 
admitted, and I'm not going to allow him to give opinions on them. I don't think 
this is something the jury -- it could mislead them, I don't think it's proper. He 
hasn't been proven to be an expert in this field. 
Also, he has not used the items in evidence for his testing. So on two grounds he 
should not be allowed to give an opinion -- confuse and mislead the jury, and I 
don't think it would be proper. 
So, we might as well end this right now unless you got more to offer. 
Mr. Rammell: Okay. Well, Your Honor, I think that the standard actually is 
substantially similar. We looked at that and I appreciate --
The Court: Mr. Rammell, this is a homicide case. If you wanted the witness to 
examine evidence, you could have made a motion and it would have been 
granted. 
FlNDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF -7 
646 of742 
He could have examined the items that we had, not talked about something that he 
thinks -- I emphasize thinks is similar. 
I mean, we're talking - we should be talking apples and apples here, but we're 
talking about items that were found at Black Rock, and then you want - and then 
he comes in and says, well, he went out and bought some that looked like. Well, 
that's not good enough in my opinion. That's not good enough in a homicide case 
like this. 
Tr. App. p. 2524, LL. 20-25, p. 2525, LL 1-25, and p. 2526, LL. 1-13.5 
13. While making an offer of proof and outside the presence of the jury, it was later 
established that Brian Cheney, a former associate with Adamcik's Defense Team's firm, had 
discussed with Detective Ballard, the evidence custodian at the Bannock County Sheriff's Office, 
Adamcik's Defense Team's desire to "take the knives with him" apparently for the purpose of 
conducting tests. This request was denied with Detective Ballard advising Mr. Cheney that he 
could not do so without a Cou1t Order. Tr. App., p. 2534, LL. 21-25, p. 2535, LL. 1-2. 
14. It was further discussed, as part of the offer of proof hearing outside the presence of 
the jury, that Mr. Cheney had a similar conversation with Vic A Pearson ("Pearson,,) of the 
Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and second chair to Heideman at trial. The 
substance of this conversation was that Mr. Cheney had asked that the Defense Team be allowed 
access to the knives for testing purposes. This request was rejected due to the approaching 
Draper trial. Rammell argued that Mr. Cheney took this to mean that the Defense Team "could 
never test the knives.'' Tr. App., p. 2535, LL. 14-25. Pearson asserted that such an assumption 
was entirely unfounded. He argued that during his conversation with Mr. Cheney, "I never told 
him he couldn't have the knives.n Tr. App. p. 2536, LL. 7-10. Pearson asserted that what he 
told Mr. Cheney was "we were going to be using them for the Draper trial, and that if they 
3 Again, like the State, Judge McDermott does not articulate the legal basis upon which he sustains the State's Objection, but a 
review of his rationale as articulated above clearly demonstrates that it is based, in part, upon lack of foundation for the 
testimony. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST· 
CONVICTION RELIEF ·8 
647 of742 
wanted to use them, he would have to petition the Court to get a Court Order to use them to test 
them." Tr. App. p, 2536, LL. 12-15. 
15. Adamcik asserts, as a basis for his P .C.R. Petition's Second Cause of Action, that the 
Defense Team's performance was deficient under the first Strickland prong. Specifically, 
Adamcik argues that the Defense Team's failure to obtain the actual knives, either by stipulation 
or court order, for testing, was deficient under the first Strickland prong. 
16. Adamcik had Reit testify at the P.C.R. Petition evidentiary hearing. In advance of 
this testimony, Adamcik obtained access to the actual knives pursuant to a stipulation with the 
State and an order of the Court. Reit conducted testing with the knives in question and testified 
at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing concerning the tests he had conducted and the 
opinions he developed incident to the testing. 
17. Approximately two (2) to three (3) weeks in advance of trial, Reit performed some 
tests with the knives at the sally port at the Bannock County Courthouse. The purpose of the 
testing was to obtain some "exemplars to see if they were similar to what we saw in the photos of 
the victim." Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Evidentiary Hearing ("Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg.") p. 
262, LL. 17-18. Reit used ''pig skin" to conduct his testing "since pig skin simulated human 
skin." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 263, L. 13. In this case, Rcit testified that he used a "pork belly". 
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg, p. 263, LL. 15-16. 
18. Reit used the two (2) knives admitted into evidence at Adamcik's trial, one (1) which 
has been referred to as a knife with a serrated blade, referred to by Reit as the "Rambo Knife" 
(Admitted into Evidence at trial as Exhibit 74-A) and the other which has been referred to as a 
knife with a non-serrated blade, referred to by Reit as the "Tanto Knife". Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg. p. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST· 
CONVICTION RELIEF .9 
648 of 742 
264, LL. 24-25, p. 265, LL. 1-3.6 
19. During the course of Reit's testimony, eight (8) different photographs were 
introduced into evidence reflecting eight (8) different "stabbing demonstrations." Exhibit "I" 
reflects a "stabbing demonstration" utilizing the Tanto Knife "going all the way in." Tr. P.C.R. 
Ev. Hrg., p. 270, LL. 22-25, p. 271, LL. 1-2. Exhibit "J'' "is a photograph of the Rambo knife 
with a stab that went all the way to the hilt." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 271, LL. 16-17. Exhibit 
"K" is a photograph reflecting a "stabbing demonstration" "from the tanto knife, and it's halfway 
in rather than all the way in." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 273, LL. 16-17. Exhibit "L,, is a 
photograph of a "stabbing demonstration" made by the Rambo Knife in the same manner as 
Exhibit "K" "part way." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 273, L. 25, p. 274, LL. 1-2. Exhibit M is a 
''stabbing demonstration" with the Tanto Knife "where the hilt has been colored by eyebrow 
pencil ... show[ing] where the hilt hit the [pig] skin." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 275, LL. 12-15. 
Exhibit "N" is the same photograph as Exhibit "M" except with the Rambo Knife. Tr. P.C.R. 
Ev. Hrg., p. 276, LL 14-25, p. 277, LL. 1-5. Finally; Exhibit "0" and "P" depict "stabbing 
demonstrations" with the knives being "tilted, as might sometimes occur with a stabbing." Tr. 
P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 277, LL 18-20. Exhibit "O" reflects the "stabbing demonstration" utilizing 
the Tanto Knife and Exhibit "P" reflects the "stabbing demonstration" utilizing the "Rambo 
Knife". 
20. The conclusion drawn by Reit as a result of these "stabbing demonstrations" utilizing 
the Tanto Knife and the Rambo Knife was "that wounds made by the Rambo knife could in part 
be similar to the wounds made by the tanto knife and that the tanto knife wound could be totally 
accounted for by the Rambo knife, if the Rambo knife is not plunged all the way into the skin." 
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 279, LL. 8-14. 
6This knife has also been referred to during the trial and these post-conviction relief proceedings as the "Simm" knife. 
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21. In explaining this conclusion, Reit testified as follows: 
Q. So would you tell us what is different between exhibit Kand exhibit L? 
A. They both have characteristics of a knife blade that is sharp, sharp. That is, a 
sharpened edge on the back and a sharpened edge on what you would nom1ally 
say is the cutting surface. 
Q. Okay. And why does exhibit L with the Rambo knife have a sharp, sharp 
edge in this photograph? 
A. Because it had gone part way in. It is sharpened on the back side 
approximately halfway back on the blade. And then it goes to a squared off 
thickened blade back. So had it been introduced all the way, it would have a blunt 
area, but part way it would appear sharp, sharp. 
Q. Okay. So exhibit L could·- exhibit K, the tanto wound, and exhibit L appear 
similar because they are sharp on both sides? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. So in this scenario, a wound made by either knife would appear 
similar? 
A. Yes. 
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 274, LL. 6-25, p. 275, L. 1. 
Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action 
22. Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
based upon the cumulative or combined effect of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
as outlined in Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, Causes of Action Two; Three, and Four. Adamcik 
asserts that the combined effect of these claimed deficiencies resulted in prejudice to Adamcik at 
trial under the second Strickland prong. 
23. Although the Court did grant summary dismissal on Adamcik's Causes of Action 
Three and Four, the Court did so on prejudice grounds. The Court did conclude that there were 
genuine issues of material fact that warranted a trial on the merits concerning whether Adamcik's 
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Defense Team's perfonnance was deficient under the first Strickland prong. See Footnote No. 2. 
As such, the Court must make a determination concerning whether the Adamcik Defense Team's 
performance, relative to the claims outlined in Adamcik's Causes of Action Three and Four, was 
deficient. If a determination is made that the Defense Team's performance was deficient, the 
Court must next determine whether the combined effect of this deficient performance, coupled 
with the deficient performance with respect to Cause of Action Two, amounted to pre;.judice 
under the second Strickland prong. 
24. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition's Third Cause of Action that it was his 
Defense Team's intention to "call several character witnesses during the trial. P.C.R. Petition, p. 
23,187. Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition asserts further that it was also his Defense Team's intent "to 
call witnesses to testify about Brian Draper's prior bad acts." Id, p. 24, ,r 93. Adamcik asserts 
in his P.C.R. Petition that "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Torey because he was 
deprived of the character evidence which formed a large basis of the defense." Id., p. 32. 
25. On September 27, 2006, Detective Tom Sellers of the Idaho State Police submitted 
an Affidavit of Probable Cause in support of a search warrant See Exhibit "C". This Affidavit 
of Probable Cause sought a warrant to search the residence located at 1598 Pointview Drive in 
Pocatello, Idaho. The Court understands this to have been the residence of Adamcik and his 
family. It also sought a wairnnt to search a red 1994 Geo Prism. 
26. The Affidavit of Probable Cause outlined a lengthy "Statement of Facts in Support of 
Probable Cause". It then makes a specific request concerning the items law enforcement wishes 
to "search for and seize as evidence". These requested items were "bodily fluids, stains, hair 
fibers, and other trace evidence as well as clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, 
video tapes, garbage bags, computer, computer programs, cellular telephone and cellular 
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telephone account infonnation, fingerprints.'' See Exhibit "C''. This Affidavit of Probable Cause 
was "subscribed and sworn" to before the Honorable Gaylen L. Box on September 27, 2006. 
27. On September 27, 2006, Judge Box signed a Search Warrant authorizing a search of 
the property and vehicle outlined in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. 1t also authorized law 
enforcement to "search for and seize all evidence including but not limited to bodily fluids, 
stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as fingerprints." See Exhibit "B". 
28. It is perplexing to this Court that the warrant itself does not authorize the search for 
or seizure of a computer, even though the Affidavit of Probable Cause request includes 
computers. In fact, the Search Warrant does not address or include "clothing, knives, scripts, 
joumals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computers, computer programs, cellular 
telephones and cellular telephone account information." 
29. The Honorable Gaylen L. Box testified at Adamcik's post-conviction relief 
evidentiary hearing. When Judge Box was asked why computers were not specifically listed on 
the Search Warrant, he responded as follows: 
I issued the wammt as it was presented to me. I recall no specific discussion 
concerning the computer. 
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 2-3. 
30. On cross-examination, Judge Box testified, that following his review of the Probable 
Cause Affidavit, he made no effort to cross-out or delete anything from the Search Warrant 
itself. Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 22-25, p. 137, LL. 1-2. However, he did require that the 
Affidavit of Probable Cause be modified to "provide some basis for the issuance of a nighttime 
search warrant." See Exhibit "C", 111 and Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 2-5. 
31. Finally, Judge Box testified that when he signs a search warrant he intends to give 
permission to search for the items identified on the warrant and does not intend to grant 
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permission to search for items not listed on the search warrant. Tr. 11.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 139, LL 
16-23. 
32. Pursuant to the Search Warrant issued by Judge Box on September 27, 2006, law 
enforcement conducted a search of the Adamcik residence. Incident to that search, Jaw 
enforcement seized as evidence a "computer tower." See Exhibit "D". A review of Exhibit "D" 
reflects that twenty-five (25) separate items were seized incident to the search of the Adamcik 
residence and not one of the seized items were "bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers, other trace 
evidence or fingerprints.'' In fact, each one of the seized items exceeded the scope of the 
enumerated items in the Search Warrant. 
33. During the course of Adamcik's jury trial, the State notified the Defense Team that it 
had obtained a computer that had been seized as evidence incident to the September 27, 2006 
Search Warrant. The State notified the Defense Team that if it attempted to introduce character 
evidence, the State would attempt to introduce evidence obtained from the computer. The 
computer in question contained what has been characterized by Adamcik throughout these post-
conviction relief proceedings as "kiddie porn." A CD containing the photographs that have been 
described as "kiddie porn" was introduced into evidence at the post-conviction relief evidentiary 
hearing. While the images and photographs are distasteful and do show some nude images, this 
Court would not characterize the same as "kiddie porn." However, the Court can certainly 
understand the Defense Team's desire not to have those images and photographs introduced into 
evidence and shown to the jury.7 
34. As a result, the Defense Team made a strategic decision not to put on the character 
evidence that it had originally planned to introduce at trial. Neither did the Adamcik Defense 
7ln this Court's personal view, more concerning from Adamcik's and his Defense Team's perspective, would be the images 
focusing on Adamcik's fixation with violence and slasher/horror movies. See Exhibit "A". 
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Team attempt to prohibit the threatened introduction of this evidence by way of a motion in 
l . . t· t 8 zmme or mo 1011 o suppress. 
35. 1l1e Court heard character testimony evidence from numerous friends, acquaintances 
and family members touching upon their impression of Adamcik and various positive and 
upstanding character traits and qualities which they attribute to him. 
36. Adamcik himself testified at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing addressing 
issues concerning his Defense Team, trial strategy, and offers or the lack thereof. Finally, he 
testified in detail concerning is version of the crime and facts and circumstances sun-ounding the 
commission of the crime. 
37. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition's Fourth Cause of Action that his Defense 
Team was ineffective in its failure to move to exclude Adamcik's invocation of the right to 
counsel pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (l 976) ("Doyle"). 
38. Thompson candidly admits that Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel which 
occurred during a recorded interview/interrogation that was the subject of a broader motion to 
suppress "got lost in the shuffle." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 34, L. 18.9 Thompson states that his 
focus was "on suppressing the entire video." Thompson acknowledges that the Doyle argument 
should have been brought forward. 
Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action 
39. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition's Sixth Cause of Action that his Defense 
Team was ineffective because they failed to communicate a favorable plea offer to him. 
40. During the course of the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, there was 
8The Court previously ruled on Adamcik's claim that this failure was deficient, concluding that it was not. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, p. 
17. Footnote No. 16. 
9Jiad the broader motion to suppress been granted, certainly that portion of the intcn-ogation where Adamcik invokes his right to 
counsel would have been excluded along with the balance of the interrogation. 
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considerable testimony offered by Adamcik that the State made an offer to Adamcik's Defense 
Team and that the content of this offer was never communicated or passed on to Adamcik or his 
family. 
41. Both of these issues were disputed. The Adamcik Defense Team both disputed the 
conveyance of the offer, and there failure to communicate offers to Adamcik. 
42. The offer testified to by both Heideman and Pearson provided that if Adamcik would 
enter a guilty plea to the murder count, the state would recommend a life sentence with a thirty 
(30) year determinate sentence. The offer also provided that the conspiracy charge would be 
dismissed. 
43. Adamcik testified at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing that he would have 
accepted such an offer if the same had been communicated to him. 
44. At the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, the Honorable Peter D. McDennott 
was asked to testify. 
45. Judge McDermott was asked ''what his sentence would have been had Torey 
accepted this plea offer and entered a plea under the plea agreement." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 
315, LL 22-25, p. 317, LL 3-4. Judge McDermott initially expressed difficulty in answering this 
hypothetical question. However, in doing so he stated "looking back on everything, all I can say 
is that I believe the sentence that I imposed was appropriate given all that I heard in the 
courtroom and all of the documents that I reviewed." Id., p. 316, LL 13-16. When additional 
questions were asked addressing this same topic Judge McDermott responded further. The 
dialogue went as follows: 
Q. Okay. So what I understand your testimony is, you cannot come to a 
conclusion? 
A. Well you know, Dennis, we're talking eight years ago. If that would have 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEl'vlORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF -16 
655 of742 
been presented to me, its likely that I would have not gone along with it. 
Q. Would there be a reasonable probability that you would have given a sentence 
less than life without the possibility of parole? 
A. You know, I don't think so. I think, given the crime and all that transpired in 
the courtroom, and all of the documents I read, I feel that the sentence was 
appropriate. 
Jd.,p.317,LL.19-25,p.318,LL.1-5. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
To the extent that any of the Court's Conclusions of Law are deemed to be Findings of Fact, 
they are hereby incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact. 
1. Adamcik filed his P.C.R Petition on September 27, 2013. 
2. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court granted the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's First Cause of Action as contained in his 
P.C.R. Petition. The Court now reaffirms those conclusions oflaw. 
3. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Comt granted the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action as contained in 
his P.C.R. Petition. The Com1 now reaffoms those conclusions of law. 
4. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court granted the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Fomth Cause of Action as contained in 
his P.C.R. Petition. The Cout1 now reaffirms those conclusions of law. 
5. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court granted the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action.10 
6. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court denied stmm1ary 
10The Court would note that Adamcik recently filed his Second Motion for Reconsideration on this issue. This matter has been 
set for hearing and the Court will consider the arguments of counsel regarding this Second Motion for Reconsideration. The 
Court understands that this Second Motion for Reconsideration is based, in large part, upon the United States Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Afo11tgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). 
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disposition with regard to Adamcik's Second Cause of Action, Fifth Cause of Action11 , and Sixth 
Cause of Action, concluding that there were genuine and triable issues of fact that required an 
cvidentiary hearing. 
7. In July of 2015, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Court heard testimony 
from the following witnesses: (1) Mary Nelson; (2) Nathan Nelson; (3) David Nelson; (4) Arm 
Adamcik; (5) Aaron Thompson; (6) Shannon Adamcik; (7) Sean Adamcik; (8) Honorable Gaylen 
L. Box; (9) Barbara Adamcik; (10) Rusty Adamson; (11) Lacey Adamcik; (12) Joy Nelson; (13) 
Robert Nelson; (14) Mark Heideman; (15) Vic A Pearson; (16) Rudolf Reit; (17) Bron Rammell; 
(18) Honorable Peter D. McDem10tt; (19) Kelly Kumm; (20) David Luras; and (21) Torey 
Adamcik. Certain exhibits were admitted into evidence. The Com1 took judicial notice of other 
documents. See Order Taking Judicial Notice. 
8. Post-Conviction relief proceedings are governed and authorized by the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") which is codified at LC. § 19-4901 through 4911. 
9. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding, a proceeding govemed 
by the I.R.C.P. Rhodes v. State, 148 Idaho 247,249,220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009). 
l 0. Just as a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit must establish their claims by a preponderance of the 
evidence, a petitioner in a post-conviction relief proceeding must "prove by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." State v. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). See also Idaho Criminal Rule I.C.R. 57(c). 
11Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action asserts that Adamcik was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 and Strickland because of the cumulative effect of all of the 
claimed issues of ineffective assistance of counsel as outlined in Adamcik's First through Fourth Causes of Action. As noted 
above, the Court granted the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on Adamcik's Third and Fourth Causes of Action. The 
Court did S() based upon the second Strickland prong, prejudice. However, with respect to both Adamcik's Third and Fourth 
Causes of Action, the Court did find that there were genuine and triable issues of fact concerning whether Adamcik's Defense 
Team's performance was deficient. Therefore, the Court in considering Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action, must necessarily 
consider nnd make a determination concerning whether Adamcik's Defense Team's performance was deficient with respect to 
Adarncik's Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action and if so whether said deficiencies. when combined together, satisfy the 
second Strickland prong of prejudice. 
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11. "A post-conviction applicant has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he 
seeks relief' by a preponderance of the evidence. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 
964, 965 (Ct.App.1990). The trial court, as the finder of fact in post-conviction relief proceedings, 
is to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 798 
(2000). 
12. Where there is competent and substantial evidence to suppo1t the district comt's 
decision made after an evidentiary hearing on an application for postwconviction relief, that decision 
will not be disturbed on appeal. Id 
Adamcik's Second Cause of Action 
13. The standard the Court must employ in determining whether or not defense counsel's 
performance was ineffective has its genesis in Strickland v. ·washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Strickland"). The applicable standard for a trial court, when 
presented with a claim of ineffective assistance counsel, is summarized by the Idaho Supreme 
Coutt in Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,617,262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)("Booth"): 
"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may 
properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Baxter v. Slate, 149 
Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct.App.20 I 0). To prevail on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's 
performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.3d2d at 693. 
14. In Baldwin v. S1a1e, 145 Idaho 148, 154 177 P.3d 362,368 (2008) ("Baldwin"), this 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard was described as follows: 
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To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his 
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ivey v. 
State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). This objective standard 
embraces a strong presumption that defense counsel was competent and diligent. 
Ivey, 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709. Thus, the claimant has the burden of 
showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741. 
15. The second Strickland prong is the prejudice prong. In addressing this prong of the 
Strickland two (2) prong test, the Strickland Court stated that the evidence must establish "that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
16. Strickland also provides additional guidance by defining the phrase "reasonable 
probability" as "a probability sufficient to undennine confidence in the outcome." Id 
17. In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791-92, 178 L.Ed.2d 
624 (2011) ("Harrington"), the United States Supreme Court once again articulated this standard 
in the following terms: 
In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be 
certain counsel's performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is 
possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted 
differently. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27, 130 S.Ct. 383, 390, 175 
L.Ed.2d 328 (2009) (per curiam) (slip op., at 13); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693, 
104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is "reasonably likely" the 
result would have been different. Id., at 696, l 04 S.Ct. 2052. This does not require 
a showing that counsel's actions "more likely than not altered the outcome," but 
the difference between Strick/ands prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-
not standard is slight and matters "only in the rarest case." Id., at 693, 697, 104 
S.Ct. 2052. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 
conceivable. Id., at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
18. In the present case, the Court concludes, after considering all of the evidence and 
pursuant to the Court's findings of fact, that Adamcik's Defense Teams' performance relative to the 
issue of obtaining the knives, testing the knives and presenting testimony concerning the knives and 
lhe theory espoused by Reit, which was supportive of the expert testimony of Dr. Leis, was deficient 
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and did fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
19. The Comt concludes that Adamcik's one (]) knife theory was an important 
component of the Adamcik defense. It matters not in this Court's analysis whether the Adamcik 
Defense Team was told "no" when they requested access to the knives for testing purposes or 
whether they just mistakenly concluded, based upon the conversations Mr. Cheney had with 
Detective Ballard and Pearson, that the State's position was that they could not have access to 
the knives as was testified to by Pearson. The deficient performance was the Defense Team's 
failure to insist upon access to the knives either by way of further dialogue with the State, which 
presumably would have identified and cleared up any confusion or miscommunication, if such 
confusion existed, or by motion practice before the trial court, specifically requesting access to 
the knives. 12 
20. However, without access to these knives, the Defense Team was not able to lay the 
foundation necessary to get Reit's opinions and test results before the jury. Reit's opinions, as 
presented at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing did suppo11 and corroborate Dr. Leis' 
opinion. Dr. Leis' opinion, coupled with Reit's opinion and testing, did support Adamcik's "one 
knife theory.'' 
21. The Court concludes that while the first prong of Strickland has been satisfied, the 
pr~judice prong has not been met. This Court, afrer considering the evidence before the Couti 
and the Cami's Findings of Fact, concludes that Adamcik has not established prejudice flowing 
from the Defense Team's deficient conduct relative to the knives, Dr. Reit and his testing and 
12The Court must assume that such a motion would have been granted, in fact Judge McDermott intimated as much in his ruling. 
See Finding of Fact No. 12. The Court also concludes that it is unfortunate that Judge McDermott, after allowing the dialogue 
outlined in Findings of Fact Nos. 10, 11, and 12 to occur in the presence of the jury, did not cratl some type of curative 
instruction to the jury designed to alleviate the remarks of Heideman characterizing Ramme!l as a liar. The discussions which 
occurred during Rammell's offer of proof clearly established that the Defense Team had been denied access to knives by both 
Detective Ballard and Pearson. It matters not to this Court that the Defense Team may have read more into those refusals than 
intended. The characterization of Rummell as a liar was both inaccurate and unprofessional in the setting in which it occurred. 
See Findings of Fact Nos. 13-14. However, the Court concludes that no prejudice under the second Strickland prnng resulted 
from this characterization. See Conclusion of Law No. 21 and Footnote No. 13. 
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opm1ons. -
22. This Court did not preside over the jury trial which resulted in Adamcik's conviction. 
As a result the Court did not see and hear all of the evidence presented to the jury. However, the 
Court, in its consideration of Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, the summary disposition proceedings 
and presiding over the evidentiary hearing, has read large portions of the transcript of the trial 
and reviewed and considered many of the exhibits introduced at said trial. This Court acting in 
its capacity as the presiding judge in Adamcik's post~conviction proceeding subscribes to the 
same viewpoint expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Adamcik's direct appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. In this decision, the Idaho Supreme Court in addressing the sufficiency of the 
evidence introduced at Adamcik's trial stated as follows: 
Contrary to Adamcik's argument, there is substantial evidence in the record upon 
which a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamcik 
was guilty of first-degree murder. Dr. Skoumal, the medical examiner \:vho 
perfom1ed the autopsy on Stoddart, testified that Stoddart died from multiple stab 
wounds to the trunk. Dr. Skoumal also testified that twelve of the thirty knife-
related wounds on Stoddart's body had the potential to be fatal. Of those twelve, Dr. 
Skoumal was unable to identify the specific wounds that caused Stoddart's death, 
but it is clear from his testimony that she died as a result of more than one of those 
twelve stab wounds. According to Dr. Skoumal, one of those wounds, referred to as 
wound number l; 
was located in Stoddart's mid, upper chest.. .. 
The tissues that it penetrated included the skin, muscle, soft tissue, right rib 
number three, the mediastinum-which is in the middle of the chest-the 
pericardia! sac-which is the sac overlining the heart-the right ventricle-
13 A review of Adamcik's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions or Law and Closing Argument suggests that because 
Heideman called Rammell a "liar" and because the trial court "chastised" Rammcll in front of the Jury concerning his 
performance and approach with respect to Reil, that Adamcik was prejudiced. While this Court agrees that trial counsel never 
wants to be reprimanded by the trial court in the presence of the jury, this Court cannot find that this discussion and chastisement, 
as it has been characterized by Adamcik's current counsel, amounted to prejudice as that term has been defined and applied in 
Strickland and its progeny. First, this Court has confidence that the Adamcik jury possessed the capacity to set aside this 
dialogue between the prosecutor, the trial court and Rammell and decide Adamcik's guilt or innocence based upon the admitted 
evidence and not a dialogue between the trial court and counsel as instructed by the trial court in its jury instructions. Second, in 
order to establish prejudice under the second Strickland prong, the evidence must reach a heightened level that but for this 
chastisement and dialogue, there is a reasonable probability a diITerent result would been reached by the jury. The Court cannot 
reach such a conclusion on this record. The fact that this dialogue occurred and that Rammcll was called a "liar" by Heideman 
and "chastised" by the trial court, docs not "undermine" the Court's "confidence in the outcome" of this jury trial based upon its 
review of the testimony admitted both at the underlying trial phase and in the post-conviction relief proceedings. 
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which is a patt of the heart. And there were two cups of blood in the 
pericardial sac surrounding the heart. 
It's my opinion that the vital structures were injured, and it had the potential 
to be fatal. 
In response to a subsequent question from the prosecutor, as to whether wound 
number 1 was "potentially fatal," Dr. Skoumal answered in the affirmative. 
Dr. GaITison testified that at least two knives were used in the murder of Stoddart, 
one with a serrated blade, and another with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison 
based this conclusion on the fact that some ofthe wounds contained excoriations 
and tears around their edges, which is consistent with the use of a knife with a 
serrated blade, while other wounds contained no such excoriations or tears, which 
is consistent with the use of a knife with a non-serrated blade. Dr. GaITison further 
testified that wound number 1 did not contain any irregular cuts, which would be 
expected if wound number 1 was inflicted by a knife with a non~serrated blade. 
From the testimony of these two witnesses, taken together, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that wound number 1, which was a potentially fatal wound, was 
inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. Therefore, the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that two knives were used during the attack on Stoddart, 
and that both knives inflicted wounds that could have caused Stoddart's death. 
[Footnote 5 deleted by the Court] 
Adamcik's friend, Joe Lucero, testified that he bought four knives for Adamcik 
and Draper. Lucero said that he used $45 to pay for the knives-$40 from Draper 
and $5 from Adamcik. Lucero identified four of the State's exhibits as the knives 
he bought. One of the knives had a serrated blade; the other three knives were 
non-serrated. Police found all four knives at the BRC site. Lucero testified that 
Draper made a point to claim ownership of the senated knife. 
The jury was presented with evidence that two knives inflicted potentially fatal 
wounds, and that Adamcik and Draper collaborated in the murder. This 
collaboration is supported by the BRC tape wherein Draper and Adamcik discuss 
their joint plan to kill Stoddart The jury was also provided with evidence 
suggesting that Adamcik and Draper were together immediately after Stoddart's 
murder, and jointly attempted to hide weapons and clothing used during the 
commission of the murder. The jury watched the video of police interviewing 
Adamcik, during which Adamcik made verbal and nonverbal assertions that can 
reasonably be construed as his confessing to stabbing Stoddart. This evidence, 
coupled with the testimony provided by the State's experts, is sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that: (1) two knives were used to murder Stoddait; (2) 
both knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife with 
the serrated blade which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the 
other knife was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured 
Stoddart's vital structures and which had the potential to be fatal. No evidence 
was introduced that would contradict such conclusions. 
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State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460-62, 272 P.3d 417, 432-34 (2012). 14 
23. Certainly, Reit's aborted testimony and testing was intended by the Adamcik 
Defense Team to corroborate and strengthen Dr. Leis' testimony and bolster and support 
Adamcik's one (1) knife theory. However, this Court cannot find that it is "reasonably probable" 
that had the Defense Team obtained the knives in question, conducted the tests that were 
performed in the post-conviction relief proceeding, elicited the testimony from Reit that was 
elicited at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, and introduced the exhibits that were admitted 
at the post-conviction relief proceeding at Adamcik's trial, that "the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." 
24. This Court did not have the opportunity to observe and hear the testimony of Dr. 
Garrison and Dr. Leis. However, the jury did. It appears that the jury found Dr. Garrison to be 
more credible than Dr. Leis with respect to this issue. The jury heard a great deal of detailed 
testimony from Dr. Garrison on this point concerning his opinion that more than one knife was 
used in the attack and murder of Stoddart. See Finding of Fact No. 6. 
25. Reit's testing and testimony in no way disproves Dr. Garrison's conclusion that two 
(2) knives were used during the course of the Stoddart attack and murder. While Reit's 
testimony and testing is consistent with Dr. Leis' testimony, his testimony and testing are equally 
consistent with Dr. Garrison's testimony and opinions. The only thing established by Reit's 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing testimony is that the effect of stab wounds by both knives 
would appear, and did appear in his testing, similar if the knife that has been referred to as the 
14Thc only correction or clarification this Court would make with respect to the foregoing statement, based upon this Court's 
review of the transcript, evidence and presiding over the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, is the last sentence of the 
foregoing quote, that "no evidence was introduced that would contradict such conclusions." This Court believes that there was 
evidence offered by the Adamcik Defense Team contradicting the evidence that two (2) l<nives were used and that two (2) knives 
inflicted the potentially fatal wounds. This contradicting evidence was introduced in the form of Dr. Leis' testimony which 
suggested that Dr. Garrison's conclusion of"at least two l<nives" was inaccurate, at least as it related to "Wound l." See Finding 
of Fact No. 7. 
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Rambo Knife only penetrated half way into the knife blade as opposed to all the way to the hilt 
of the knife. See Findings of Fact Nos. 19 and 20. 
26. While it is certainly possible that Reit's testimony and testing could have been 
viewed by jurors as supporting Dr. Leis' testimony; it is more probable, in this Court's view, that 
such testimony would have been viewed as supporting Dr. Garrison's testimony. 15 To conclude 
that Defense Team's failure to secure the knives and have Reit testify concerning his testing and 
opinions at trial as he did in the post-conviction relief proceeding effected the outcome of 
Adamcik's trial would require this Coutt to speculate to a point that this Court is not comfortable 
as the finder of fact in these post-conviction relief proceedings. The addition of Reit's testimony 
and testing does not "undermine [this Court's] confidence in the outcome" of Adamcik's jury 
trial. In fact, if anything it confirms in this Court's mind Dr. Garrison's testimony. See Footnote 
15. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Harrington, "the likelihood of a different 
resultmustbesubstantial,notjustconceivable." 562 U.S. 86, 111-12, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791-92. 
27. Based upon the foregoing, the Court will DENY Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition with 
respect to his Second Cause of Action. Although the Court has found that the first Strickland 
prong was established by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court concludes that Adamcik 
has failed to establish the second Strickland prong. Specifically, Adamcik has not established "a 
reasonable probability that, but for [Adamcik's Defense Team's] unprofessional enors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Additionally the 
introduction of this evidence at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing does not 
"undermine [this Couti's] confidence in the outcome" of Adamcik's jury trial and the subsequent 
1
'1n this Court's mind, as the finder of fact in this post•conviction relief proceeding, it is a far more probable inference that the 
stabbing would have resulted in the knife being inserted in such a manner that it would have been stopped by the impact of the 
hilt upon the person or body of the victim. It is less probable that the stab would stop halt\vay up the blade. This was a violent 
attack accompanied by high emotion and great force. It seems improbable to the Court that the emotions, adrenaline and 
physicality associated with this attack would result in a circumstance where the knife would be withdrawn before it was forcibly 
stopped due to the hilt's impact with the victim's person or body. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST· 
CONVICTION RELIEF ·25 
664 of 742 
verdict. Id. 
Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action 
28. For purposes of Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action, this Court hereby incorporates 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 13 through 17 as if set forth in full herein. 
29. Adamcik's asserts that the actions, or rather the omissions, of the Defense Team in 
making the strategic decision not to offer character evidence on Adamcik's behalf was deficient 
under the first Strickland prong. Adamcik also asserts that the Defense Team's failure to file a 
motion in limine or a motion to suppress the State's threats of using the so called "kiddie pom" 
evidence was deficient under the first Strickland prong. 
30. This Court concludes that it was not deficient conduct under the first prong of 
Strickland for Adamcik Defonse Team to fail to move to suppress the evidence of so called ''kiddie 
porn". 
31. As outlined in Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App.1989) 
(Davis), a post-conviction relief petitioner bears a heavy burden in proving that his attorney's 
perfom1ance was deficient. Due to the distmting effects of hindsight associated with evaluating 
defense counsel's conduct at trial, "there is a strong presumption that counsel's perfon11ance was 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance - that is, sound strategy" Id. (Citing 
Strickland). The Davis Comt continues by stating that because of the presumption in favor of trial 
counsel's performance being reasonable, "strategic or tactical decisions made by trial counsel will 
not be second guessed on review, unless those decisions are made upon a basis of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other sh01tcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
Id. 
32. This Court concludes, upon a complete and thorough review of the Affidavit of 
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Probable Cause, Exhibit "e', that the scope of the Search Warrant signed by Judge Box was more 
restrictive than the request made by the Affidavit of Probable Cause was due exclusively to a 
scrivener's error. 
33. The Probable Cause Affidavit requesting authority to conduct the search was very 
detailed in the facts outlined in suppott of a search wan-ant. It was very descriptive concerning the 
information and facts upon which the Search Warrant was being requested. 
34. In this CoUit's view, the Affidavit of Probable Cause established probable cause for the 
issuance of a warrant allowing a search for and seizure of evidence as outlined in the Affidavit of 
Probable Cause, i.e. "clothing, knives scripts, joumals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, 
computer, computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular account information." 
35. Each of the foregoing items \Vere specifically requested in the Affidavit of Probable 
Cause and inexplicably not included in the Search Wanant signed by Judge Box. 
36. The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277, 220 P.3d 1096 
(Ct.App.2009) ("Belden") provides a lengthy, but good analysis of what constitutes probable cause 
for the issuance of a search warrant and the process the issuing magistrate must follow in 
determining whether a warrant should issue. 
When probable cause to issue a search wanant is challenged on appeal, the 
reviewing court's function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis 
for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548-49 (1983);State v. Josephson, 123 
Idaho 790, 792, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1993); State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 
672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). In this evaluation, great deference is paid to the 
magistrate's determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d at 
546-47; State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213,215,938 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Ct.App.1997). 
The test for reviewing the magistrate's action is whether he or she abused his or 
her discretion in finding that probable cause existed. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 
382, 387, 707 P.2d 493, 498 (Ct.App.1985). When a search is conducted pursuant 
to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the search was 
invalid. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268,275,678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct.App.1984). 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, suppo1ted by oath or 
affi1111ation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fomth 
Amendment, except that "oath or affin11ation" is termed "affidavit." In order for a 
search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that 
evidence or fruits of a crime may be found in a particular place. Josephson, 123 
Idaho at 792-93, 852 P.2d at 1389-90. When determining whether probable cause 
exists: 
The task of the issuing n1agistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set fo1th in the affidavit before 
him, including the ''veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying 
hearsay infonnation, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a paiticular place. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548; see also Wilson, 130 
Idaho at 215, 938 P.2d at 1253. 
37. One cannot read the Affidavit of Probable Cause and not come to the conclusion that 
there has been an error with respect to the Search Warrant signed by Judge Box. 
38. The only rational explanation for exclusion of requested items such as clothing, knives, 
scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, cell phones, items that were specifically 
mentioned in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and clearly related to the crime and the information 
uncovered in law enforcement investigation, is some sort of clerical error in the drafting of the the 
Search Warrant. It is inconceivable to this Court that Judge Box would have intentionally limited 
the scope of the Search Warrant to items delineated in the Search Warrant 1o the exclusion of the 
items outlined in the Affidavit of Probable Cause (that were not included in the Search Warrant) 
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which have direct bearing on the facts outlined in the Probable Cause Affidavit. 16 
39. Judge Box clearly testified that he did not request that the scope of the Search Wanant 
be modified or restricted. He merely signed the Search Wanant as presented by law enforcement. 
See Findings of Fact No. 29 
40. 'Iberefore, this CotUt, as the finder of fact in this evidentia1y hearing, makes the 
inference, based upon the evidence before the Court, that Judge Box intended to sign a Search 
Warrant consistent with the request made by law enforcement as outlined in the Affidavit of 
Probable Cause. The Court also concludes that there was an error in the preparation of the Search 
Warrant whereby the individual who prepared the Search Warrant failed to properly include, 
transfer or reproduce all of the items upon which law enforcement was seeking authority to "search 
for and to seize" from the Affidavit of Probable Cause to the Search Warrant. 
41. Consistent with the holding of the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Bollingberg, 674 N.W. 2d 281 (2004) ("Bollingberg'') on a similar set of facts dealing with a 
scrivener's en·or, which this Comt considers to be persuasive on this issue, this Court concludes that 
the true intent of Judge Box in issuing this Search Warrant was to authorize a search consistent with 
the request contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and would have done so but for the fact 
that there was an error in the preparation of the Search Warrant. 
42. The Court similarly concludes that the failure of the Search Wa1Tant to include language 
authorizing a search for "clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage 
16Perhaps the most blatant and obvious examples are that the Search Warrant excludes the following items which were requested 
in the Affidavit of Probable Cause: (I) "clothing" ( despite the fact that Draper's statement indicates that the clothes Adamcik 
wore, high top converse tennis shoes and black jeans were O()t burned); (2) "garbage bag" (despite the fact that Draper's 
statement states that they went back to Adarncik's Imme after the murder and retrieved a "blue garbage sack" from the garage to 
put the costumes and knives in10; (3) scripts and journals (despite the fact that the anonymous informant who appears to be a 
student at P()catello High School said that Adamcik and Draper were writing a "script for a horror movie"); and (4) knives (the 
Affidavit of Probable Cause is replete with the facts that the murder was eommilted with a knife, Drnper and Adamcik are 
obsessed with knives. Incidentally, despite being requested in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and precluded in the Search 
Warrant itself, each of these items was seized in the search of the Adamcik residence. See Exhibit "D". As an aside in today's 
m()dern world of computers and word processors where else is it more probable than a computer that script for a h()rror movie 
would be stored. 
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bags, cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information" as requested in the Probable 
Cause Affidavit was the function of a clerical or scrivener's error and was not the function of Judge 
Box's detennination that the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacked a sufficient showing of probable 
cause to support a search for these items. 17 
43. Therefore, the Court concludes that it would have been futile for the Defense Team to 
pursue such a motion and had such a motion been pursued, the Com1 expects that the motion would 
have been denied. 
44. This Court has previously ruled, at the summary disposition stage of these 
proceedings, that the failure of the Defense Team to raise the "Doyle" argument and bring a 
motion to suppress Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel as reflected in the video 
admitted into evidence amounted to deficient performance under the first Strickland prong. Sec 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and 
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, p. 31. Upon review of the testimony presented at the 
post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, the Court concludes that the evidence supported the 
Court's earlier determination on this issue and the Court concludes that Adamcik's Defense 
Team was deficient under the first Strickland prong by its failure to file a motion in limine or 
motion to suppress Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel on the video tape that was 
ultimately played to the jury during the course of Adamcik's trial. 
45. As a result, the Court must now determine whether the cumulative effect of the 
Defense Team's deficient performance under the first Strickland prong constitutes prejudice to 
Adamcik during the course of his jury trial under the second Strickland prong. The Court has 
17As was noted by the Court in its Finding of Fact No. 32, every item seized by law enforcement incident to the search conducted 
incident to the September 27, 2006 Search Warrant, exceeded the scope of the Search Warrant. This Court cannot imagine Jaw 
enforcement to be so brazen in its disregard of Judge Box's restrictions to the Search Warrant, if in fact, such restrictions were 
imposed. In short, there were no restrictions; there was a mistake in the preparation of the Search Warrant. 
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concluded in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Defense Team's conduct was 
deficient under the first Strickland prong with respect to Adamcik's Second Cause of Action (See 
Finding of Fact Nos. 5 through 21 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 18 through 20). Likewise the 
Com1 has concluded in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Defense Team's 
conduct was deficient under the first Strickland prong with respect to Adamcik's Fourth Cause of 
Action (See Findings of Fact Nos. 37 and 38 and Conclusion of Law No. 44). 
46. Although the Court concluded that Adamcik's Defense Team's conduct was not 
deficient under the first Strickland prong as it relates to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action, the 
Court will nonetheless include and consider this claimed failure (for appeal purposes) in 
considering Adamcik's prejudice claim based upon cumulative nature of Adamcik's Defense 
Team's conduct. 
47. The Court reiterates its Conclusion of Law No. 20. In considering the evidence 
presented in these post-conviction relief proceedings, including the character witness introduced 
in support of Adamcik's Third Claim for Reliet: this Court concludes that Adamcik has not 
demonstrated prejudice sufficient for this Court to conclude that but for these combined 
deficiencies that it is reasonably probable that the result of the jury trial would have been 
different. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694. Based upon this Court's review of the record before 
it, and the Court's fairly thorough review of the trial transcript and evidence submitted at trial, 
this Court concludes its confidence, as the fact finder in this proceeding, has not been 
undermined. Id. This Court, acting in its capacity as the finder of fact, crumot conclude based 
upon the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiru·y hearing that the introduction of 
the same evidence and the exclusion of Adamcik's invocation of counsel at trial would have 
created a substantial likelihood of a different result. See Harrington, 562 U.S., at 112. 
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48. For the same reasons the Court concluded that these deficiencies (and claimed 
deficiency relative to Third Cause of Action) did not amount to prejudice individually, this Court 
concludes they do not amount to prejudice under the second Strickland prong collectively. The 
Court has already articulated this with respect to Adamcik's Second Cause of Action - Reit's 
testimony does not disprove Dr. Garrison's testimony. In fact, if anything it supports his 
testimony as is addressed in this Court's Conclusions of Law Nos. 25 and 26. Nothing about 
combining this deficiency with the others increases quantum of prejudice, or lack thereof, in 
regards to a jury weighing testimony concerning whether one ( 1) or two (2) knives were used in 
the attack and murder of Stoddart. Similarly, the fact that a number of individuals were called to 
give character evidence on behalf of Adamcik, each of whom spoke highly of Adamcik's 
character and qualities as they understood and perceived, negates the powerful and substantial 
evidence introduced in support of his conviction and which is outlined in the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460-63, 272 P.3d 417, 432-35 (2012). 
Finally, as it relates to the failure of the Defense Team's failure to file and pursue a motion to 
suppress Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel, this oversight and any prejudice flowing 
from said failure of the Defense Team is minuscule when compared to Adamcik's responses to 
his father's queries. The Court continues to adhere to its previous conclusion in granting the 
State's summary disposition on this issue: 
Any inference of guilt the jury may have drawn from the State's introduction of 
Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel is far outweighed by the inferences 
created from Adamcik's response to his own father's queries, both of which were 
expressly ruled upon by the trial to be admissible and are not the subject of 
collateral attack this this post-conviction relief proceeding. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Adamcik's Motion for Patiial Summary Disposition and 
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, p. 38. 
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49. For the reasons outlined above, none of the deficient conduct found by the Court in 
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (including the claimed instance of deficient 
conduct related to the Defense Team's failure to move to suppress law enforcement's seizure of 
the computer containing the so called "kiddie porn'' and the Defense Team's strategic 
determination not to call character witnesses which the Court found to be strategic and not 
deficient) either individually or combined qualify as prejudice under the second Strickland 
prong. 
50. Therefore, the Court will DENY Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action for post-
conviction relief asserting that the combined effect of Adamcik 's Defense Team's deficient 
conduct resulted in prejudice under the second Strickland prong. 
Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action 
51. For purposes of Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action, this Court hereby incorporates 
Conclusions of Lav.i Nos. 13 through 17 as if set forth in full herein. 
52. This Court need not resolve the factual dispute concerning whether an offer was 
made by the State that would have allowed Adamcik to plead guilty to one ( 1) count of murder 
accompanied by a recommendation from the State for a thirty (30) year determinate sentence and 
whether that offer was communicated to Adamcik and his family by the Defense Team. 
53. Judge McDermott's trial testimony makes reaching a conclusion on the issue 
outlined in the foregoing paragraph unnecessary. Even if this Com1 were to detem1ine that the 
foregoing offer was made by the State to Adamcik's Defense Team and the Defense Team failed 
to communicate said offer to Adamcik and his family, the fact that Judge McDermott, the 
presiding judge over the Adamcik criminal proceeding, clearly stated that he felt the sentence he 
imposed was appropriate under the facts of this case, resolves the issue relative to prejudice 
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under the second prong of Strickland. He further testified that had the plea agreement referenced 
above been presented to him "its likely I would not have gone along with it." S'ee Finding of 
Fact No. 45. More importantly when asked, in the context of the hypothetical plea agreement, if 
"there would be a reasonable probability that you would have given a sentence less than life 
without the possibility of parole", Judge McDermott responded, "I don't think so. I think, given 
the crime and all that transpired in the courtroom and all of the documents I read, I feel that the 
sentence was appropriate." See Finding of Fact No, 45. 
54. As has been described in length above, the use of the phrase "reasonable probability" 
by Adamcik's counsel was purposeful. This is the standard for prejudice under the second 
Strickland prong. Judge McDem10tt's response to this question is the death kneJl to Adamcik's 
Sixth Cause of Action. Adamcik cannot prevail on this issue unless it is reasonable probable that 
the deficient conduct of his Defense Team resulted in prejudice. Judge McDermott's response, 
as the presiding judge over the criminal proceeding, including his sentencing proceeding, 
succinctly and simply answers that question. Therefore, even if the Defense Team's conduct, 
with respect to Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action were deficient, no prejudice flowed from said 
conduct because Adamcik has failed to establish that it would have resulted in a "reasonable 
probability" of a different result or in this case a different sentence being imposed by Judge 
McDermott. 
55. Based upon the foregoing, Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, Sixth Cause of Action will be 
DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Comt hereby 
DENIES Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition claims as related to his Cause of Action Two, Cause of 
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Action Five and Cause of Action Six. 
The Court, during the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, previously 
granted the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Cause of Action 
One, Cause of Action Three, Cause of Action Four, and Cause of Action Seven. The Court will 
defer preparing a final judgment on Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition until it issues its ruling with 
respect to Adamcik's Second Motion for Reconsideration as that relates to Adamcik's Cause of 
Action Seven. 
Dated this 21st day of March, 2016. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL D1STRICT2diir (iiJ:PE24 ,\, 8~ li 0 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANN~)l( __ .,..ct"'A_L~7 -~--~· DE€-~1Y CLEJ<.K 
TOREY ADAMCIK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
****** 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-3682 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON SUMMARYDISPOSITION 
RE: MILLER V. ALABAMA, __ U.S. 
_, 132 S.CT. 2455 (2012) 
This matter is before the Comt on cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition 
arising out of Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik (Adamcik), Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(P.C.R. Petit1on). Adamcik has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's 
M.S.D). 1 The State ofldaho (State) also filed its motion for summary disposition and supporting 
brief in one (1) document titled Respondent's Dispositive Motion with Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary Dismissal (State's M.S.D). Adamcik filed his Response to Respondent's 
Dispositive Motion (Response Memorandum).2 Finally, Adamcik submitted a document entitled 
Supplemental Authority shortly in advance of the oral argument on these cross-motions. The 
parties argued their cross-motions to the Court, and following argument, the Court took this 
1Adamcik's M.S.D. was supported by a Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's 
Supporting Memorandum). 
2 Adamcik's Response Memorandum was supported by sevcrul affidavits: (I) the Affidavit of Mark Heideman (Heideman 
Affidavit); (2) the Affidavit of Vic Pearson (Pearson Affidavit); (3) the Affidavit of Sean Adamcik (Sean Adamcik Affidavit); (4) 
the Affidavit of Shannon Adamick [sic] (Shannon Adamcik Affidavit); and (5) the Affidavit of Barbara Adamcik (B. Adamcik 
Affidavit). 
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matter under advisement.3 The Court has previously issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal. However, while the Court issued its decision on six (6) of the seven (7) 
claims raised by Adamcik in his P .C.R. Petition, the Court did not issue its decision on the 
seventh claim. Adamcik's seventh claim seeks a declaration by this Court that Adamcik's life 
without parole sentence is in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution on the basis that life without parole for a juvenile offender who commits a capital 
offense, is cruel and unusual punislunent under the rationale outlined in Miller v. Alabama, _ 
U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (Miller) and other United States Supreme 
Court precedent upon which Miller is predicated. 
The Court, having considered the paities' written submissions along with the argument 
presented, now issues its Memorandum Decision and Order on Adamcik's seventh cause of 
action (MD&O). 
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. His P.C.R. Petition outlines seven 
(7) separate claims upon which he seeks post-conviction relief. This MD&O will address the 
seventh claim or cause of action raised by Adamcik in his P.C.R. Petition. Each party has moved 
for summary disposition of Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action. 
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition arises out of the underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock 
County Case CR-2006-17984. In this proceeding, Adamcik was charged with and convicted by 
'It should be noted that incident to this post-conviction relief proceeding, the Court has taken judicial notice of the entire record 
of the criminal proceedings in Bannock County Case CR-2006-17984 pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (I.R.E.). See 
Order Taking Judicial Notice. Additionally, at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition, the parties 
apprised the Court of their stipulation that the summary dismissal/disposition record will include the depositions taken of 
Adamcik 's defense team, Greg May, Bron Rammell, and Aaron Thompsnn. 
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a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo Stoddart (Stoddart). Adamcik was 
also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, Brian Draper (Draper), to commit the first-
degree murder of Stoddmt. At sentencing, Adamcik was sentenced to a thirty (30) year fixed 
sentence and an indeterminate life sentence for the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and 
a fixed lite sentence for the first-degree murder conviction of Stoddart. Adamcik filed a motion 
seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (I.C.R.). This motion 
was denied after a hearing by the trial court. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In State v. Adamcik, 
152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.2d 417, 486-87 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
Adamcik's conviction and sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for Rehearing; the Idaho Supreme 
Court denied the relief sought in that petition. Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. This petition was denied. State v. Adamcik, 133 
S. Ct. 141, 184 L. Ed. 2d 68 (2012). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Post-Conviction Relief proceedings are generally governed by the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) which is codified at Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 through 19-
4911 (LC.) As summarized in Rhoades v. State .. 148 Idaho 247, 249-50, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068-69 
(2009) (Rhoades): 
[ A ]petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P .3d 642, 646 
(2008). However, "[t]he 'application must contain much more than a short and 
plan statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under l.R.C.P. 
8(a)(l)."' State v. Payne, 146 Jdaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting 
Good'tvin v, State, 138 Idaho 269,271, 61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct.App.2002)). Instead, 
the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[ s] forth the 
grounds upon which the application is based." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d 
at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied 
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be 
subject to dismissal." Id. 
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The UPCPA applies to the Adamcik's M.S.D. and the State's M.S.D. LC. §19-4906(c) 
provides that: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
As stated in Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct.App.2012), 
summary dismissal is the functional or procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Rule 
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (l.R.C.P.). In considering a sununary judgment, or in 
this case a motion for summary disposition, this Court applies the same standard applied by the 
appellate courts on appeal. S'yringa Networks-, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 63, 
305 P.3d 499, 507 (2013). 
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (DeRushe), provides 
that "a claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal pursuant to LC. § 19-
4906 if the applicant has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." (Quoting, Berg v. 
State, 131 ldaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738,739 (1998)). 
As summarized by the Rhoades Court on summary dismissal, the trial court: 
[h ]as free review of questions of law. Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626, 167 
P.3d 761, 763 (2007). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions 
together with any affidavits on file and will liberally constrne the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hauschulz v. State, 144 
Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 
Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). However, "while the underlying facts 
must be regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted." 
Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985). "[W]here the 
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evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the 
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the 
conflict between those inferences." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 
P.3d 476, 482 (2008). 
148 ldaho at 250,220 P.3d at 1069. 
ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION IN HIS 
FAVOR BECAUSE THE FIXED LIFE SENTENCE IMPOSED PROCEDURALLY AND 
SUBSTANTIVELY VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, §6 IDAHO CONSTITUTION AND THEIR 
PROTECTIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS UNDER MILLER 
v. ALABAMA,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) 
In Adamcik's initial appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, one of the issues raised was that 
his sentence was "unreasonable or cruel and unusual under the Idaho Constitution." State v. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,459,272 P.3d 417, 431(2012) (Adamcik). Although Adamcik asserted 
that his sentence violated the Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, he did not make a 
similar claim as it relates to the gth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
In Adamcik, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that it had adopted the test "proposed by 
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct 2680, 115 
L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)" in determining whether or not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of 
Article I, Section 6 has been violated. 
In applying this test to the facts and issues raised in Adamcik's appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
Adamcik's fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
under Article I, section 6 of Idaho's Constitution because no gross 
disproportionality exists in this case. Adamcik conspired, carefully planned and 
executed the cold-blooded stabbing death of his fellow high school student, 
Stoddart, based solely on his desire to achieve fame as a serial killer. Like the 
heinous crimes committed by the defendants in Thomas and Brown, whose fixed 
life sentences were upheld on appeal, the gravity of the first-degree murder that 
Adamcik conunitted supports the severity of his fixed life sentence. Fmthennore, 
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the fact that Adamcik's fixed life sentence falls within the sentencing parameters 
set out in LC. § 18-4004 (entitled "Punishment for murder") indicates that no 
disparity exists between the sentence imposed by the trial court and the gravity of 
Adamcik's crime. 
Because we do not find the existence of a gross dispropo1tionality, we decline to 
consider any of Adamcik*s proportionality arguments because "intra and inter-
jurisdictional" analysis is only proper where the Court makes an initial finding 
that a gross dispropo1tionality exists. State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851 
P.2d 336, 340 (1993). Adamcik's argument that this Comt should find his 
sentence to be cruel and unusual due to Adamcik's minority and the growing 
international rejection of life imprisonment for minor offenders is without merit. 
This Court has never held that extra-jurisdictional international conventions shall 
be considered in any way in interpreting and applying the Idaho Constitution. 
Adamcik's sentence comports with Article 1, section 6 of Idaho's Constitution and 
is not crnel and unusual. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 487,272 P.3d at 459. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Adamcik was issued in January of 2012. In June 
of 2012, the United States Supreme Comi issued its decision in Miller. In Miller, the United 
States Supreme Court announced that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 
18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual 
punishments."' 132 S.Ct. at 2460. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court further explains 
its holding in these terms: 
The cases before us implicate two· strands of precedent reflecting our concern with 
proportionate punishment. The first has adopted categorical bans on sentencing 
practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and 
the severity of a penalty. See Graham, 560 U.S., at--, 130 S.Ct., at 2022-
2023 (listing cases). So, for example, we have held that imposing the death 
penalty for nonhomicide crimes against individuals, or imposing it on mentally 
retarded defendants, violates the Eighth Amendment. See Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Several of the 
cases in this group have specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their 
lesser culpability. Thus, Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital 
punishment for children, and Graham concluded that the Amendment also 
prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a child who 
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committed a nonhomicide offense. Graham further likened life without parole for 
juveniles to the death penalty itself, thereby evoking a second line of our 
precedents. In those cases, we have prohibited mandatory imposition of capital 
punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a 
defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death. 
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 
(1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 
L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Here, the confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to 
the conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate 
the Eighth Amendment. [Footnote Omitted] 
Id. at 2463-64. Finally, the Miller Court continues as follows: 
We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole thr juvenile offenders. Cf. 
Graham, 560 U.S., at --, 130 S.Ct., at 2030 ("A State is not required to 
guarantee eventual freedom," but must provide "some meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation"). By making 
youth (and all that accompanies it) inelevant to imposition of that harshest prison 
sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. 
Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider 
Jackson's and Mil1er's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a 
categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and 
younger. But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about 
children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty 
will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted 
in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between "the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." Roper, 543 U.S., 
at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183; Graham, 560 U.S., at--, 130 S.Ct., at 2026-2027. 
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in 
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and 
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
prison. 
Id. at 2469. In conclusion the Supreme Court states: 
Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a 
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all 
children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility 
of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of 
their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of 
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proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment. We accordingly reverse the judgments of the Arkansas Supreme 
Comt and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cases for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Id. at 2475. 
As part of Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, he asserted his seventh claim which relies upon the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Miller. In his arguments in support of summary 
disposition, Adamcik argues as follows: 
In light of Miller, the District Court violated the Eighth Amendment of Article 1 
[sic], §6 of the Idaho Constitution by failing to take into account how children are 
different from adults and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing a child to a lifetime in prison. Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._,_, 
J 32 S.Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). The fixed life sentence also violates the Eighth 
Amendment and Article 1 [sic], §6 of the Idaho Constitution because a fixed life 
sentence may only be imposed in the most unusual of circumstances, 
circumstances which do not exist in this case, Id. In the alternative, the fixed life 
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and Article 1 [sic] §6 of the fixed life 
sentences for juveniles are categorically impennissible. Id. 
Supp011ing Memorandum, p. 33. 
The State argues, in response to Adamcik's seventh claim in his P.C.R. Petition and in 
support of its own motion for dismissal, that Miller has no application in the case at bar. The 
State asse1ts "the State of Idaho can still impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole 
upon a juvenile offender, as long as the crime is that of homicide ... because [life without parole] 
is not a mandatory sentence within the State." State's M.S.D., p. 19. 
A review of Adamcik's submissions relative to this issue reveals essentially three (3) 
arguments in support of his request for summary disposition on this this issue. Those arguments 
are capsulized in the foregoing quote from Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum: (1) that the 
sentencing judge failed "to take into account how children are different from adults and how 
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those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing a child to a lifetime in prison"; (2) that 
the fixed life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and A11icle I, 
Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution because ''a fixed life sentence may only be imposed in the 
most unusual of circumstances, circumstances which do not exist in this case"; and/or (3) in the 
"alternative, the fixed life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and Article 1, [sic] §6 of the 
fixed life sentences for juveniles are categorically impem1issible." Supporting Memorandum, p. 
33. The Court will address these arguments stai1ing first with Adamcik's alternative argument 
that a fixed life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and At1icle I, §6. 
A. Does Adamcik's Fixed Life Sentence Violate the 81h 
Amendment's Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 
There can be no doubt that the simple answer to this question is no. As was articulated in 
M'iller, one of the positions asserted by Jackson's and Miller's counsel was the same position 
being advanced by Adamcik as his altemative position; that the 81h Amendment proscribes an 
absolute prohibition against life without parole sentences for juveniles. The Supreme Court's 
response to this was as follows: 
Because that holding [the holding announced previously in the decision] is 
sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider Jackson's and Miller's 
alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life 
without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger. 
*** 
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in 
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and 
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
prison. 
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. This excerpt from Miller clearly establishes that in appropriate, albeit 
rare and uncommon factual circumstances, life without parole is a pennissible sentence under the 
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cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 81h Amendment. What appears to be required is that 
the sentencing be ''individualized" affording the sentencing court "the opportunity to consider 
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Id. at 
2475. Encompassed within this individualized sentencing, the sentencing court is required "to 
take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against 
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.'' Id. at 2469. 
Therefore, the Court rejects Adamcik's alternative argument that Adamcik's fixed life 
sentence is, as a matter of Jaw, violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8111 
Amendment. 
B. Did the Sentencing Court Fail to take into Account how Children are Different from 
Adults and how those Differences Counsel Against Irrevocably Sentencing a Child to a 
Lifetime in Prison? 
Adamcik asserts that the sentencing court violated the mandate of Miller because the 
sentencer failed to take into account how children are different from adults and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing a child to a lifetime of prison. Hov,.icver, upon 
review of the sentencing transcript and the transcript of Adamcik's Rule 35 proceeding, this 
Court must disagree with Adamcik's assertion in this respect. 
The sentencing comi had the benefit of the pre-trial psychological report which was 
prepared by Kenneth P. Lindsey, Ph.D., a psychologist. This repo11 noted, among other things, 
that Adamcik was immature for his age, that he had difficulty seeing things from the perspective 
of others, and that his MMPI-A showed depression and obsessive anxiety. Supporting 
Memorandum, pp. 27-28, 11123-127. 
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The sentencing court also heard and considered the testimony of Dr. Mark Corgiat, Ph.D., 
a psychologist. Dr. Corgiat concurred in Dr. Lindsey's assessment that Adamcik was immature 
for his age and "less mature [than] he would expect in a seventeen-year old male with normal 
brain development." He also opined that Adamcik "demonstrated a pattern of net1rocognitive 
difficulties that indicated less than age appropriate judgment, impulse control and complex 
problem solving abilities." Dr. Corgiat testified that "adolescent brains are not fully developed, 
particularly in the precortex area" and that "in males, the development continues until their mid-
to-late twenties." Dr. Corgiat also testified that an average adolescent "possesses less than adult 
capabilities in planning, reasoning and judgment", and "is less capable of autonomous choice-
making, self-management, has poorer judgment, is more impulsive, has less capacity for 
regulating his emotions, and has a risk-taking propensity that can overcome whatever 
development he has for regulating judgment." Dr. Corgiat emphasizes that "research ... 
unequivocally demonstrates that the adolescent brain does not function the same as the adult 
brain." Dr. Corgiat continues in his testimony that Adamcik "functions even below age 
appropriate levels", has a "history of ADHD and his IEP [Individual Education Plan] at school 
were indicators of frontal lobe immaturity." Supporting Memorandum; pp. 29-30, 1,131-139.4 
Dr. Corgiafs testimony at sentencing also provides the opinion that Adamcik would be 
"a good candidate for rehabilitation because of his age and ... [his] amenability to education and 
training is better than someone with more advanced brain development" Dr. Corgiat concluded 
that Adamcik was "a very low risk to reoff end» and possessed a greater capacity for change due 
to his "current underdevelopment and consequent ability to make a greater change than someone 
4Tne quotations of Dr. Corgiat's testimony at sentencing is not a direct quote from the sentencing transcript, but rather is a direct 
quote from Adamcik 's Supporting Memorandum characterizing Dr. Corgiat's testimony at sentencing. 
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fully developed." Dr. Corgiafs opinions were driven in part upon his conclusions that 
Adamcik's "absence of a pathological drive or pathological desire to commit oiJcnses", "no 
evidence of sociopathy", and that Adamcik "does not have the personality pattern associated 
with violent crime." Supporting Memorandum, pp. 30-31, ili!l40-141. 
Despite this individualized sentencing hearing, where the sentencing court heard and 
considered precisely the type of testimony mandated by Miller, focusing on the individual 
characteristics of Adamcik, including Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies it)"; the 
sentencing court, after hearing and considering this evidence and testimony, in the exercise of its 
discretion, found Adamcik' s conduct to be one those "uncommon" cases where the "harshest 
possiblc penalty for juveniles" was warranted. 
Specifically, at sentencing the sentencing court noted as follows: 
[M]r. Adamcik, 1 believe pretty much on this, you're an entirely different 
individual than portrayed by your family and friends. You do have ADHD, the 
frontal Jobe of your brain not being fully developed due to your age .... They say 
you have knowledge within normal limits, but your processing is below normal. 
Sentencing Transcript, p. 55, LL. 20-25, p. 56, LL. 1 ~2. 
However, it is clear that the sentencing court, in its discretion having heard and 
considered both the mitigating testimony including Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies 
it)" and the aggravating factors associated with Adamcik's crime, detennined that the most 
serious sentence for a juvenile was appropriate in this case. In doing so, the sentencing court 
stated as follows: 
Dr. Garrison said there were two knives used in killing Cassie Jo, in his opinion. 
On the video after the killing, when Mr. Draper was exclaiming his -- I don't 
know how else to put it -- his excitement and pleasure at just killing Cassie, you 
said, Shut the F up. We've got to get our act together. You didn't say, Why did 
you kill Cassie? 1 thought it was a joke. 
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*** 
[Y]ou both methodically and intelligently planned to murder Cassie Stoddart. 
This was not a joke. I'm convinced neither one of you thought it was a joke. You 
put your masks on, you took your real knives, you went back to the house with the 
definite intention of killing her, which you did. You both wanted to be famous as 
killers. 
*** 
You both have been convicted of murder in the first degree, and it's clear to the 
Court and the evidence at the trials, Cassie was savagely stabbed many times. 
The hmwr, fright and pain she surely encountered before death was certainly 
immense. You disguised yourselves with masks in darkness, which made it more 
frightening for her. You both were excited after the murder about the killing> and 
you both attempted to destroy the evidence initially. The killing was a barbarous, 
cold~blooded horrific act. 
lYJou both have forfeited your privilege to live in a free society, and based on all 
the evidence and all that I've read, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
if you two, or either one of you, were released that you will kill again .... 
I'm not unmindful of how young you fellows are, but you commit a crime of this 
nature, and it's got to be -- it's got to be known, not only by those who commit it, 
but to others in the community thal the punishment will not -- will not be so 
merciful. There's no mercy. Guys, I'm sorry. Guys, like I said, you guys are 
kids, but I just feel like this is a just sentence, given all the evidence that I had to 
look at. So I -- I'm sorry. I hope you two can have some kind of a life in the state 
correctional facility. At least it's more than Cassie has. 
Sentencing Transcript, pp. 56-59. 
This Court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court. The 
sentencing court, although it did not have the benefit of the Miller decision, based upon this 
Court's review of the record of the underlying criminal proceedings and specifically the 
sentencing transcript, concludes that the sentencing court conducted an individualized sentencing 
taking into account all aggravating and mitigating factors, including Adamcik's "youth (and all 
that accompanies it)." However, upon doing so, the sentencing court concluded, in its discretion, 
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that the "barbarous, cold-blooded" actions of Adamcik were one of those "uncommon" situations 
where the most serious penalty for a juvenile offender was wan-anted. 
The same conclusion is supported by the sentencing court's ruling at Adamcik's Rule 35 
hearing. In announcing the sentencing court's decision on A<lamcik's Rule 35 motion, the 
sentencing court stated as fol1ows: 
[w]e're here because Mr. Adamcik willfully and deliberately conspired to kill 
Cassie, and he did kill her. Every time a knife entered Cassie's body, she 
certainly was afraid and in pain until her life bled from her, and this is just 
unconscionable conduct. 
*** 
I took everything into consideration at sentencing, and I'm not unmindful of how 
young Torey is -- and was at the time he killed Cassie. I'm not unmindful of Dr. 
Corgiat's testimony and all other testimony we have had at the sentencing. 
In our society, at least in my opinion, when someone engages in this type of 
conduct, they should be punished as severe as the law allows. There is no 
justification, no excuse that condones this type of conduct. 
Mr. Adamcik wore a mask, Cassie was alone in the dark, and when the knives 
were going in and out of her body, it just had to be ho1Tible for her. And I believe 
the sentence this Court imposed was a righteous sentence given the conduct, and I 
don't believe Mr. Adamcik should be ever released from prison. I'm going to 
deny your motion. 
Transcript, pp. 3110-3111.5 
5The sentencing court has been criticized by Adamcik for this language. Specifically, Adamcik argues that the sentencing court's 
use of the language "this type of conduct" is illustrative of the fact that the sentencing court "did what the Miller court said no 
one can: Impose a juvenile fixed lifo sentence based solely upon the acts of the offense." Adamcik argues that "just as the 
Alabama Legislature may not mandate a fixed life sentence for every first degree murder conviction, an individual court may not 
impose that sentence based solely on its evaluation of heinousness of the offense.'' Response Memorandum, p. 26. However, the 
Court disagrees with Adamcik's rationale on two (2) levels. First, under Miller the Court cc1tainly may impose a fixed life 
sentence based upon the heinousness of the offense, as Jong as it considers all mitigating factors, "including youth (and all that 
accompanies it).'' If upon completing that analysis, the sentencing court determines, in its discretion, that the aggravating factors 
that make the crime so heinous sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors, "including youth (and all that accompanies it) the 
sentencing court certainly possess lhe discretion to impose a life sentence without parole. Second, any suggestion by Adamcik 
that the statements made by the sentencing court demonstrate that the sentencing court possessed an attitude that life without 
parole would be the appropriate sentence in every circumstance where a juvenile, convicted of first-degree murder, appeared for 
sentencing is not borne out by the record. Rather, the sentencing comt repeatedly remarked that it considered all of the evidence, 
both aggravating and mitigating. There is nothing in the record to support Adamcik's claim that the sentencing court possessed 
an attitude that every time and in every instance that a juvenile presented for sentencing on a first-degree murder conviction il 
would impose life without parole. What the sentencing court stated was "you commit a crime of this nature ... the punishment 
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In conclusion, this Court finds that there is nothing in the sentencing court's sentence or 
sentencing that runs afoul of the directives and requirements of the Miller decision of the United 
States Supreme Court. The sentencing court did conduct an individualized sentencing in which 
all mitigating factors associated with Adamcik's youth and immaturity were considered by the 
sentencing court. Adamcik's assertion to the contrary is without merit. 
C. Is the Sentencing Court's Fixed Life Sentence in Violation of the Eighth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution because a Fixed Life Sentence may only be Imposed in the Most 
Unusual of Circumstances, Circumstances which Adamcik Claims do not .Exist in this 
Case? 
Utilizing the same analysis outlined in Section B of this MD&O, the Com-t also 
concludes that the underlying record, including, but limited to the sentencing record, supports the 
sentencing court's exercise of its discretion and finding that this is one of those rare and 
"uncommon" circumstances where imposition of the most serious sentence the court may impose 
upon a juvenile offender is watranted. 
The sentencing court conducted an individualized sentencing. h considered all evidence, 
both mitigation and aggravating. The mitigating evidence specifically included Adamcik's 
"youth (and all that accompanies it)" as required by Miller. However, the sentencing court in the 
considering the totality of the information presented at sentencing, which was comprised of both 
mitigating and aggravating evidence, concluded, in the exercise of its discretion, that this was 
will not •• will not be so merciful. There's no mercy." Sentencing Transcript, p. 59. This Court dctennincs that what the 
sentencing court was referencing when it speaks in terms of a "crime of this nature" is all of the aggravating factors associated 
with this specific crime, not the general crime of first-degree murder. This important distinction is perhaps best illustrated by the 
sentencing court's oral decision with respect to Adamcik's Rule 35 Motion. The sentencing court states "this type of conduct 
[again referring tn the specific aggrnvating facts of this case, not generally about first degree murder itself] ... should be punished 
as severe as the law allows. There is no justification, no excuse that condones this type nf conduct [again referring to the specific 
aggravating facts of this case, not generally about first degree murder itselfl." Transcript, pp. 3110-1 l. Finally, the sentencing 
court again pointing to the specific aggravating facts of this case, not the general charge of first degree murder notes "I believe 
the sentence this Court imposed was a righteous sentence given the conduct." (Bold Emphasis Added]. 
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one of those "uncommon" cases where the most serious sentence possible, life without parole, 
was warranted. 
This Court will not second guess the sentencing court on Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition. The 
sentencing cou1t heard the testimony, both aggravating and mitigating, at trial and at sentencing. 
The sentencing court was in a much better position to consider, weigh, assess witness credibility, 
and make informed judgments concerning this evidence than this Court at this stage of the 
proceedings. This Court, unlike the sentencing court, has had the benefit of reviewing and 
considering Miller as it reviewed the record of this case and the eventual sentence of life without 
parole. In doing so, this Court concludes that nothing about this sentence or the sentencing 
process violates the directives of Miller. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the sentence imposed by the 
sentencing comt is consistent with Idaho's jurisprudence relative to the cruel and unusual 
punishment clauses of Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution and the 81h Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and case law interpreting the same, and specifically the United 
States Supreme Court decision in lvfiller. Therefore, the Court will GRANT the State's motion 
for summary dismissal of Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action as outlined in his P.C.R. Petition. 
Dated this 23rd day of January, 2015. 
MITCHELL W. BRO\\TN 
District Judge 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICI.AL DHfOSJ-9UtC)$TFJilt 3].h I. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF tfNNO~.--... -~· 
DEPUTY CLERK 
TOREY ADAMCIK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
****** 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-3682 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR 
RECONSJDERA TION 
______________ .) 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik ("Admacik''), Second 
Motion for Reconsideration. 1 The Respondent, State of Idaho ("State") filed Respondenf s 
Objection to Petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration ("Objection"). Finally, Adamcik 
filed his Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ("Reply 
Memorandum"). The Court heard arguments from the parties concerning Adamcik's Second 
Motion for Reconsideration. Following said arguments, Adamcik filed a document entitled 
Third Supplemental Authority. Following oral argument and Adamcik's submission of his Third 
Supplemental Authority, the Court took this matter under advisement. The Com1 now issues its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Second Motion for Reconsideration ("MD&O"). 
1Adamcik's Second Motion for R(1e:onsidcration was not supported by a separate memorandum; rather the authority for 
Adamcik's Second Motion for Reconsideration was contained in the motion itself However, Adamcik had filed a document 
entitled Supplemental Authority roughly twenty-one (21) days prior to filing his Second Motion for Reconsideration. This 
Supplemental Authority quite clearly deals with the issue raised in Adamcik's Second Motion for Reconsideration and thus the 
Comi has reviewed that submission and the authority cited therein as par1 of its consideration of Adamcik's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
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BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Adamcik's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("P.C.R. Petition") arises out of the 
underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock County Case CR-2006-17984. In that proceeding, 
Adamcik was charged with and convicted by a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of 
Cassie Jo Stoddart ("Stoddart"). Adamcik was also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, 
Brian Draper ("Draper"), to commit the first-degree murder of Stoddmi. At sentencing, 
Adamcik was sentenced to a thirty (30) year fixed sentence and an indeterminate life sentence 
for the conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder and a fixed life sentence for the first-degree 
murder conviction of Stoddart. Adamcik filed a motion seeking a reduction of his sentence 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("I.C.R."). This motion was denied after hearing by the trial 
court. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.3d 417, 
486-87 (2012) ("Adamcik"), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Adamcik's conviction and 
sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for Rehearing. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the relief 
sought in Admncik's Petition for Rehearing. Admncik then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorm·i 
from the United States Supreme Court. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari was denied. State v. 
Adamcik, 133 S.Ct. 141, 184 L.Ed.2d 68 (2012). 
Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition 
outlined seven (7) separate claims upon which he requested post-conviction relief. The parties 
filed cross motions for summary disposition pursuant to LC. §49-4906( c ). 
After considering the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to the various 
motions for summary disposition, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. In doing so, the Court granted summary dismissal in favor of the State on a number 
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of Adamcik's claims for post~conviction relief. See Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Adamcik's Motion for Paitial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. 
At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court also denied portions of 
the parties' cross motions for summary disposition, concluding that there were triable issues of 
material fact. The claims that the Court ordered would proceed to trial were as follows: (l) 
Adamcik's "SECOND CAUSE UF ACTION: Torey was Denied Effective Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 
13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because Counsel Failed to get 
Important Expert Testimony before the Jury in part because they Failed to Obtain the Murder 
Weapons for Testing by the Defense Expert"; (2) Adamcik's "FlFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: 
Torey was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment 
and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
( 1984 ), because the Cumulative Effect of all the above Instances of Deficient Performance 
Prejudiced him";2 and (3) Adamcik's "SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied 
Effective Assistance Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho 
Constitution A1ticle I, Section 13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because 
Trial Counsel failed to Communicate a Favorable Plea Offer to him." 
2Although the Court granted the State's request for summary disposition relative to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action and Fourth 
Cause of Action, the basis for doing so was that the evidence did not establish prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v, 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 280 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Stricklcmcf'). However., with respect to both Adamcik's 
Third Cause of Action and his Fourth Cause of Action, the Court did determine that there were genuine issues of material fact 
concerning deficient perfonnance on the pmi of the Adamcik Defense Team, the first Strickland prong. As a result, at the 
cvidcntiary hearing, the Court did allow Adamcik to put on proof of deficient performance relative to Cause of Action Two 
(which the Court denied at summary dismissal), Cause of Action Three (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with 
respect to the prejudice prong), and Cause of Action Four (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with respect to the 
prejudice prong), for the purpose of attempting to establish that the cumulative effect of the deficient conduct of the Defense 
Team amounted to prejudice under the second Strickland prong, 
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In a separate memorandum decision, the Cou1t also granted the State summary dismissal 
on Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary 
Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). Adamcik's Seventh 
Cause of Action claimed that "the fixed life sentence imposed on Torey procedurally and 
substantively violates the Eighth Amendment and A1ticle I, § 6 protection against Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment under Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)." P.C.R. 
Petition, pp. 37-55. 
It is from the Court's decision as outlined in its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S. -·' 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) that Adamcik 
seeks reconsideration in his Second Motion to Reconsider. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion seeking reconsideration of a trial court's interlocutory orders is governed by 
Rule ll(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (LR.C.P.). I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2) provides that a 
motion for reconsideration "may be made at any time before entry of final judgment." 
In the Idaho Supreme Coutt's decision in Johnson v. North Idaho College, 153 ldaho 58, 
62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012), the purpose for alIO\ving a motion to reconsider a trial court's 
interlocutory order was succinctly stated in the following terms: 
A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allo\vs the court-when new law 
is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously 
presented law, or any combination thereof-to reconsider the concctness of an 
interlocutory order. In this case, the district court did just that, and in a manner 
fitting within the broad language articulated in Rocky Mountain Power, where the 
most important consideration is the conectness of the interlocutory order. 
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In short, a motion to reconsider is designed to allow the trial court an opportunity to "get it right" 
before a judgment becomes final. Therefore, a motion to reconsider can be based upon the same 
record that the original motion was based upon, or it can be based upon a supplemented record. 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549,554,300 P.3d 1037, 1042 
(2012). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to dete1mine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
DISCUSS.ION 
The United State Supreme Court has recently issued two (2) decisions addressing 
juvenile offenders sentenced to life sentences without the opportunity for parole and the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The first of these two (2) 
decisions is Miller v, Alabama, 567 U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) 
("Miller"). The Miller decision was the basis for the Seventh Cause of Action contained in 
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition. The Court has previously granted the State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition relative to Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action. See Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 
Specifically, the Comt concluded that: 
[t]he sentence imposed by the sentencing court is consistent with Idaho's 
jurisprudence relative to the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of Article 1, 
Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution and the 8111 Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and case law interpreting the same, and specifically the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Miller. 
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Id. at p.16. 
The second case recently issued by the United States Supreme Comt addressing juvenile 
offenders sentenced to life sentences without the opportunity for parole and the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
_U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ("Montgome1y"). Adamcik asse1ts that 
Monlgomery read in conjunction with Miller "confirms that there are substantive Eighth 
Amendment limits on sentences for juvenile homicide offenders." Reply Memorandum, p. 2. 
Adamcik continues that "absent proof that the defendant is that rare juvenile whose crime 
reflects hTeparable corruption, a juvenile may not be exposed to a fixed life sentence, even under 
Idaho's discretionary scheme." Id. Finally, Adamcik asse1ts that the sentencing comt "did not 
adequately consider the mitigating circumstances» outlined in Miller and revisited in 
lvfontgomery and that the evidence at Adamcik's sentencing hearing established that he "is not 
irreparably corrupt" but instead his offense "reflected transient immaturity and that Torey could 
be rehabilitated." Id. 
Montgomery, like Miller, involves an individual who was sentenced under a statutory 
sentencing scheme that mandated a sentence of "life without parole" following the defendant's 
guilty verdict. 136 S.Ct. at 725-26. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in 
Montgomery. In doing so, the holding in Miller was restated in the following terms: 
[M]iller held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders 
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on " 'cruel and unusual 
punishments' "Id., at_, 132 S.Ct., at 2460. "By making youth (and all that 
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence," 
mandatory life without parole "poses too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishmene' Id. at _, 132 S.Ct., at 2469. Miller required that sentencing 
courts consider a child's "diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change" before condemning him or her to die in prison. Ibid. Although Miller did 
not foreclose a sentencer's ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile, the 
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Court explained that a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but 
the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect " 'irreparable corruption.' " 
Ibid. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 1 
(2005). 
136 S.Ct. at 726. 
The Montgomery decision, in addressing whether the Miller holding should be applied 
retroactively, framed the issue in the following terms: 
This leads to the question whether Miller's prohibition on mandatory life ,:vithout 
parole for juvenile offenders indeed did announce a new substantive rule that, 
under the Constitution, must be retroactive. 
136 S.Ct. at 732. The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that 
"Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review." Id. In 
holding that the ruling in Miller announced a substantive rule subject to retroactive application, 
the Montgomery Court expounded upon the holding in Miller. In doing so it stated as follows: 
Miller, then, did more than require a sentence to consider a juvenile offender's 
youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological 
justifications for life without parole collapse fo light of "the distinctive attributes 
of youth." Id., at_, l 32 S.Ct., at 2465. Even if a court considers a child's age 
before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the 
Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects " 'unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity.' " Id., at_, 132 S.Ct., at 2469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 
125 S.Ct. 1183). Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life 
without parole is excessive for all but "the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption,' " 567 U.S., at_, 132 S.Ct., at 2469 (quoting 
Roper, supra, at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183), it rendered life without parole an 
unconstitutional penalty for "a class of defendants because of their status" -that 
is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth. 
PemJ', 492 U.S., at 330, l 09 S.Ct. 2934. As a result, Miller announced a 
substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other substantive rules, Miller is 
retroactive because it " • necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant' " 
-here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders-" ' faces a ptmishment that the law 
cannot impose upon him. Schriro, 542 U.S., at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (quoting 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 
(1998)). 
136 S.Ct. at 734. [Bold Emphasis Supplied]. 
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What this Court takes away from Montgomery and its "did more" discussion is that the 
sentencing comt must do more than merely "consider a juvenile offender's youth.'' Id. The 
reason being that "even if a comt considers a child's age before [or as a component ofJ 
sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment" 
if the defendant's crime reflects "unfortunate yet transient immaturity." Id. Rather, to withstand 
a Constitutional Eighth Amendment challenge of cruel and unusual punishment, the sentencing 
court must make a finding that the defendant is one of those "rare juvenile offender[s] whose 
crime reflects irreparable corruption." 1d. 
This Comt has previously found that Judge McDermott conducted an individualized 
sentencing with respect to Adamcik. In doing so the Court noted that this individualized 
sentencing considered Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies it)." See Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Summary Dismissal Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 
(2012). However, in doing so, the Court did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Montgome,y and more specifically the discussion of the United States 
Supreme Court that this Cou1t has referred to as the ''do more" discussion. Upon review of the 
Montgome1y decision and the "do more" discussion, upon reconsideration of Miller, combined 
with a reconsideration of the paiticular facts of the Adamcik case, this Court concludes that 
Judge McDem10tt did make an appropriate finding under Miller and more recently Montgomery, 
that Adamcik's crime qualifies and meets the criteria of being that "rare juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects irreparable corruption." 
The Court specifically adopts its Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary 
Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.CL 2455 (2012), the rationale, authority, 
findings and conclusions contained therein. Further in support of the Court's conclusion that 
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Judge McDermott concluded and made findings consistent with the "irreparable corruption" 
standard articulated in Montgomery the Court cites to the entirety of Judge McDermott's 
sentencing discussion. See Sentencing Transcript. More specifically, the Court outlined in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama, -· _ U.S. 
_, J 32 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) the factors discussed by Judge McDermott which are, in this Court's 
view, the most salient with respect to the Miller holding. Those same excerpts are equally 
applicable in supporting Judge McDermott's conclusion that are the equivalent of Monlgom<!ly's 
requirement of a finding of irreparable corruptness. 
Dr. Garrison said there were two knives used in killing Cassie Jo, in his opinion. 
On the video after the killing, when Mr. Draper was exclaiming his -- I don't 
know how else to put it -- his excitement and pleasure at just killing Cassie, you 
said, Shut the F up. We've got to get our act together. You didn't say, Why did 
you kill Cassie? I thought it was a joke. 
*** 
[Y]ou both methodically and intelligently planned to murder Cassie Stoddart. 
This was not a joke. I'm convinced neither one of you thought it was a joke. You 
put your masks on, you took your real knives, you went back to the house with the 
definite intention of killing her, which you did. You both wanted to be famous as 
killers. 
*** 
You both have been convicted of murder in the first degree, and it's clear to the 
Court and the evidence at the trials, Cassie was savagely stabbed many times. 
The hotTor, fright and pain she surely encountered before death was certainly 
immense. You disguised yourselves with masks in darkness, which made it more 
frightening for her. You both were excited after the murder about the killing, and 
you both attempted to destroy the evidence initially. The killing was a barbarous, 
cold-blooded horrific act. 
[Y]ou both have forfeited your privilege to Jive in a free society, and based on 
all the evidence and all that I've read, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that if you two, or either one of you, were released that you will kill 
again .... 
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I'm not unmindful of how young you fellows are, but you commit a crime of this 
nature, and it's got to be -- it's got to be known, not only by those who commit it, 
but to others in the community that the punishment will not -- will not be so 
merciful. There's no mercy. Guys, I'm sorry. Guys, like I said, you guys are 
kids, but I just feel like this is a just sentence, given all the evidence that l had to 
look at. So I -- I'm sorry. 1 hope you two can have some kind of a life in the state 
correctional facility. At least it's more than Cassie has. 
Sentencing Transcript, pp. 56-59. [Bold Emphasis Added]. 
Unless Judge McDennott was clairvoyant he could not have foreseen the rulings of the 
United State Supreme Court that would come down in Miller and Montgomery. As such, it 
would he impossible to expect usage of phrases such as "irreparably conupt" or "unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity." Yet a review of the sentencing transcript clearly establishes that Adamcik 
was given a full blown sentencing hearing which consisted of three (3) days of testimony and 
argument, much of which focused on his age and youthful characteristics. However, the 
sentencing judge, who is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the witnesses and 
dete1111ine the credibility and what weight to attach to it, made the detennination that he was 
"convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that if you two, or either one of you, were released that 
you will kill again." Without using the plu·ase coined by the Supreme Court in Montgomery and 
its forerunners of "irreparably conupt", this finding by Judge McDermott can only be construed 
as being the equivalent of "ineparably corrupt."3 
3 Adamcik has focused on statements expressed by Judge McDermott during the pronouncement of Adamcik's 
sentence and during the course of denying Adamcik's Rule 35 motion to suggest that Judge McDermott did not 
consider Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies it)" and that Judge McDem1ott's personal attitudes were such 
that he would impose a life without parole sentence in every instance where a juvenile committed murder. See 
comments made by Judge McDermott at sentencing ("Teenage killers perhaps should receive no mercy. I don't 
know") Sentencing Transcript, p. 56 and comments made by Judge McDermott at Adamcik's Rule 35 hearing (In 
our society, at least in my opinion, when someone engages in this type of conduct, they should be punished as severe 
as the law allows''). Transcript p. 3110-1 l. These statements arguably stand for the proposition that Judge 
McDermott would have imposed this sentence regardless of the evidence and would impose the same sentence for 
any juvenile convicted of first degree murder. However, the Comt does not need to address this specific issue. The 
Comi is convinced, based upon the discussion above, that in this specific case, Judge McDermott made the requisite 
findings under Eighth Amendment case law to support a finding that Adamcik's crime and the attendant 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will DENY Adamcik's Second Motion to 
Reconsider. Incident to the Court's previous ruling on each of Adamcik's Claims as outlined in 
his P. C.R. Petition, the Court wi11 enter, by separate order, a final .I udgment of Dismissal. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 19111 day of July, 2016. 
~;#!/~ 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
circumstances surrounding the crime equate to one of the rare instances identified in Mo11tgome1y where Adamcik's 
crime reflects "irreparable con-uption" on his part. 
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